31.7.09

Against the Lisbon Treaty

There is an idea abroad in North America that the European Union (EU) represents a progressive alternative to U.S.-sponsored neoliberalism. You can find this argument in books such as Jeremy Rifkin's The European Dream and in numerous articles in left-leaning journals. Yet nothing could be further from the truth.

At the behest of the European Commission, the EU's powerful unelected executive, member state governments are busy dismantling welfare states, enhancing their military forces, enacting illiberal political measures and neoliberal economic policies, and expressing undisguised contempt for anyone who disagrees with them. The dissenters include the peoples of France, the Netherlands, and Ireland, all of whom have had the nerve to vote against the neoliberal version of European integration.

The Irish, given a second chance to get the answer right in a referendum scheduled for October 2, are currently being subjected to a tidal wave of pro-Lisbon Treaty propaganda financed from their own taxes. Not a word of the treaty has been changed as a result of their rejection of it. According to the EU's own rules, this refusal to amend the original should have killed the proposal. But the Commission has merely appended a number of non-legally binding interpretative declarations. The protocol containing these declarations openly states that these declarations "will clarify but not change either the content or the application of the Treaty of Lisbon." The people of France and the Netherlands have been given no second chance, though the Lisbon Treaty is almost identical to the European Constitutional Treaty they rejected at the ballot box, in the Dutch case by a landslide.

The EU's much-vaunted successes are open to question, to say the least. Europe has indeed gone more than six decades without a major war, but whether or not this is a result of the European Union is impossible to say. A degree of economic integration, beginning in the 1950s with the European Coal and Steel Community, can almost certainly claim some of the credit. But building on the back of this integration a permanent, unquestionable, constitutionally established neoliberal economy is another matter. Like so many aspects of EU-style integration, the institutionalization of the misleadingly-named free market takes advantage of people's natural desire for peace and prosperity to build what is rapidly becoming a capitalist dystopia.

Undermining Social Ownership

The 2005 Directive on Services in the Internal Market, for example, has exposed almost all services to market-based competition. Despite assurances to the contrary, the EU is applying the directive across the board, making it increasingly difficult for local or national public authorities to provide services designed for people, rather than profit. Covering everything except transportation, financial services, certain services provided free of charge by the state, and those already covered by other directives, the Services Directive forbids member states from blocking operators if they've been authorized in any other member states. Despite claims from social democrats in the European Parliament, the Country of Origin Principle (COP) introduced by the Services Directive remains, in all its essentials, intact. The COP means that a company may register in one member state, operate in another, and follow the labor and environmental protection laws prevailing in its state of registration. A series of European Court of Justice rulings have declared that the right to establish or operate a business takes precedence over the rights of labor unions or national governments to negotiate or fix rates of pay per trade, for example. In addition to undermining workers' rights, the Services Directive makes it illegal for governmental authorities at any level to favor local businesses, which makes any effective regional development plan impossible.

In the last decade the EU has used competition policy to undermine social ownership in sector after sector. Fully aware of the extent of public opposition to privatization of essential services, the European Commission claims neutrality on ownership structures yet passes measure after measure forcing socially-owned enterprises to compete in the capitalist market. This enables private corporations to cherry-pick profitable elements of sectors such as postal services, water, energy, and health care. The shareholders of these corporations then pick up the profits, while the taxpayer picks up the tab for essential but unprofitable services.

The EU's malign policies are not limited to undermining both individual and social wages. The Common Agricultural Policy has ravaged Europe's countryside and handed agriculture en masse to corporate farmers. The Common Fisheries Policy has emptied the seas of fish, throwing families that in many cases have relied on the sea's bounty for generations of employment out of work. Trade and development policies have benefited EU-based corporations, with no thought given to the social, economic, and environmental consequences for developing countries.

Irish voters are also particularly concerned by the Lisbon Treaty's threat to the country's neutrality since the treaty effectively would bring Ireland into a military alliance. EU defence policy, the institutional and constitutional basis of which will be hugely enhanced by the Lisbon Treaty, is based not on the real security needs of Europe's peoples, but on the interests of the biggest, most powerful member states and their corporations. The treaty will boost defense spending by all 27 member countries and will encourage the consolidation of European arms manufacturers so that they become more powerful and competitive global actors.

Not Popular, Not International

There has never been a single popular demonstration in favor of European integration. In what Gramsci called a "passive revolution," an elite, lacking popular support, is using legalistic devices to enforce its will. The "Lisbon Strategy," with its absurd ambition to make the EU's economy the most competitive in the world by 2010, comes closest to admitting this. In this case, competitiveness equals efficiency, which equals profitability, with the final element serving as a justification for all manner of ills.

The EU is not an internationalist project at all. Internationalism is, as the name suggests, about cooperation among nations and peoples. The EU is, instead, a universalist project which seeks to impose universal values and universalized structures on a large group of countries with very different economies, histories, traditions, and constitutions. The values that underlie this instance of universalism are those of a hegemonic elite, an elite that has decided that the misnamed free market is a cornerstone of democracy, undermining the latter by transferring powers from elected to unelected institutions and drastically narrowing the policy space available to parliaments and national governments.

The Lisbon Treaty represents a further deepening of this corporate project. It would massively increase the voting power of big member states, more than doubling Germany's to 17% while halving Ireland's to below one percent. It would give the EU the power, for the first time, to harmonize indirect taxes. It would remove the Irish government's right to propose and approve an EU commissioner. It would underline and enhance the precedence of EU law over national legislation, including national constitutions. It would abolish the national veto in 32 new policy areas and thus all but eliminate the power of national parliaments and any possibility of popular influence on decision-making. It would permit heads of state and government to add to the list of areas where policies can be adopted without unanimous approval, with no need for a new treaty. It would create a powerful new office of EU President, an office over which the electorates of the 27 member states would have no influence. And it would require member states, including neutral Ireland, "progressively to improve their military capabilities" and to aid and assist other member states experiencing armed attack "by all the means in their power."

If the Irish reject the Lisbon Treaty a second time, they will not be rejecting cooperation between European nations, but rather a specific vision of Europe's future that is tilted in favor of military and corporate power.

Steve McGiffen

Violence increases in Russia’s Caucasus republics

By Niall Green

Earlier this year, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev proclaimed an end to the long-running “counterterrorism” operation in the North Caucasus. Speaking in April, Medvedev announced that Kremlin military planners would initiate the withdrawal of thousands of troops from the area. However, a recent spike in violence between Russian security forces and local militants indicates that Moscow has no plans to loosen its military grip in the region.

Moscow has maintained a large military presence in the troubled territory since separatist forces in the Russian republic of Chechnya declared independence in 1994. The Kremlin had hoped to draw down its operations in the region, which are a major drain on resources at a time of mounting economic crisis in Russia.

A suicide bomber killed six people and himself at a concert hall in the Chechen capital, Grozny, on Sunday. A further ten people were wounded. The number of violent clashes in Chechnya and other parts of Russia’s North Caucasus region has increased this year, following a reduction in killings in the aftermath of the bloody Second Chechen war in 2001.

The neighboring Russian republics of Ingushetia and Dagestan have seen the bulk of the increase in violence, linked to conflicts between Islamist separatists and Russian federal forces and their local allies. In May, the interior minister of Dagestan was assassinated by gunmen. The following month, the president of Ingushetia was seriously injured by a car bomb. Nine Chechen policemen were recently killed when militants attacked their vehicle during an operation in Ingushetia.

In July, Russian human rights activist Natalia Estemirova was kidnapped in Grozny and found murdered in Ingushetia. She was a prominent critic of the pro-Kremlin regime in Chechnya.

This week, Russian security forces killed eight suspected Islamist militants in Dagestan, following an hour-long gun battle in a forest near the capital, Makhachkala. Around the same time, another militant was killed in Chechnya. This brings the total number of alleged militants killed by Russian security forces in the three Muslim-majority Russian republics to over 20 in July alone.

Pro-Russian officials have been in talks with some Chechen separatists. Earlier this month, the BBC reported that a representative from the Chechen government of Ramzan Kadyrov, the son of a former Chechen warlord who had fought against Moscow in the 1990s, had talks with Akhmed Zakayev in the Norwegian capital Oslo.

Zakayev claims to be the head of the Chechen government-in-exile. In 2007, Zakayev split from the Chechen separatist leader Doku Umarov, president of the self-declared Republic of Ichkeria (Chechnya). Umarov had declared that Chechnya should be ruled under Shariah law and that Western countries were the enemies of Islam. Zakayev opposed this stance, favoring the building of ties with Western powers and rapprochement with more secular forces in Chechnya.

Though largely autonomous, it is very unlikely that the Kadyrov government in Grozny would enter into such talks, the first for eight years, without Moscow’s benediction. The Norwegian hosts of the meeting said that the dialogue had been coordinated “with the highest leadership in the Kremlin.”

Zakayev and his followers are reported to be close to but distinct from the separatist militants still fighting in Chechnya. The Chechen government representative stated that the talks had focused on “the total political stabilization of the Chechen Republic and the final consolidation of Chechen society.” Kadyrov has stated that Zakayev could safely return to Chechnya, where he should play a role “reviving Chechen culture.”

Asked by the BBC if he would take up this offer, Zakayev stated, “I will definitely return to the Chechen Republic and there are no conditions that I would impose on this.”

The Russian elite has strong interests in the region. The Northern Caucasus republics are transit routes for Central Asian oil and gas, and are considered vital to Moscow’s defence policy. In addition, the secession of one of these provinces would threaten the opening up of independence movements in Russia’s other ethnic and national minority republics, such as Tatarstan.

National and ethnic divisions were maintained by the Stalinist regime in the former USSR to divide the Soviet working class and peasantry. Russian chauvinism infused the bureaucracy, and national and ethnic grievances were exacerbated by brutal acts of repression, such as Stalin’s mass expulsion of the Chechen people to Central Asia after World War II.

Such separatist movements within the Russian Federation today reflect the inability of the Russian elite to meet the democratic and social aspirations of all Russians, while local ethnic and national elites, such as Kadyrov in Chechnya, see independence or autonomy merely as a means to enrich themselves and a narrow band of their cronies.

With Russia’s economy in crisis due to the fall in the price of oil and other natural resources, as well as major infrastructural problems, Moscow and its local proxies will be compelled to rely more on military and police violence to maintain their authority, as the weight of the recession is placed on the backs of working people.

Moscow is acutely conscious of the role of US foreign policy in the Caucasus region and is fearful of the threat of “color revolutions” spreading into its republics. While the current round of killings appears to be between Russian forces and Islamist groups, the means employed by the Kremlin are intended to signal to any dissenting faction the methods through which it will secure its rule.

Following on from their summit with US President Barack Obama this month, Medvedev and Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin are seizing on a window of opportunity to advance the interests of the Russian elite in the region. In exchange for Moscow’s aiding of the war in Afghanistan—prior to the summit Medvedev allowed the US Air Force to fly across Russia en route to the US-occupied country—Washington appears to have conceded, for the time being, Russian interests in the ex-Soviet republic of Georgia, which borders Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan.

In a highly provocative move, shortly after Obama left Moscow Medvedev visited South Ossetia, the breakaway Georgian province at the center of the war between Moscow and the US-backed government in Tbilisi last year. This was a statement of intent that Moscow will seek to consolidate its power in the province, and also in the other pro-Russian Georgian territory of Abkhazia.

Seeking to maximize its renewed role as a partner in Washington’s war in Afghanistan, Moscow will pursue its own “war on terror” in the North Caucasus, while seeking to expand its authority on the southern side of the Caucasus Mountains.

Honduras: primera crisis latinoamericana en la era Obama

Los que tenían evaluaciones reduccionistas, equiparando a Obama con Bush, tienen que reevaluar de inmediato sus visiones equivocadas. Bastó el golpe en Honduras –la primera gran crisis latinoameriana desde el relevo en la Casa Blanca– para que se viera cómo Estados Unidos recupera capacidad de acción en un continente donde la había perdido casi por completo.

Bush seguramente no habría condenado el golpe, menos todavía presionado a los golpistas para que aceptaran el retorno del presidente depuesto; el golpe en Venezuela lo certifica. Pero lo hacen en un contexto en que los gobiernos latinoamericanos, que habían logrado dirimir por sí mismos conflictos anteriores, como fue el caso entre Ecuador y Colombia, a raíz de la invasión del ejército colombiano en territorio ecuatoriano, en la reunión realizada en República Dominicana retomaron las relaciones, ahora perturbadas por la nueva ola de denuncias irresponsables de Uribe, Colombia y Venezuela se ven apartados de la solución de la crisis hondureña. La existencia de Unasur, con un Consejo de Seguridad Sudamericano donde, por primera vez, no está Estados Unidos, que se limitó a mandar su flota naval, como para demostrar que sus armas son otras que las políticas, revela cómo el continente tiene formas propias para zanjar sus problemas y sus crisis.

Aun con ese poder de iniciativa, se cometió el error de aceptar la intermediación de Óscar Arias, no por casualidad propuesta por Hillary Clinton, que representa el ala más conservadora del nuevo gobierno estadunidense. Aun contando con la unánime condena internacional al golpe y el apoyo al retorno de Zelaya al gobierno, el movimiento dirigido por el presidente hondureño aceptó la intermediación de Arias que, si bien lo recibió cuando fue expulsado por los militares de su país, además de haber mediado en los acuerdos de Contadora –que le valieron el Premio Nobel de la Paz–, retornó a la política costarricense para implementar el Tratado de Libre Comercio con Estados Uidos. Tuvo grandes dificultades para triunfar por muy pequeño margen en las elecciones, tan es así que fue obligado a convocar a un referendo sobre el TLC, donde también triunfó por un margen muy pequeño. Es el hombre de Estados Unidos en la región, cuando otros gobiernos, como los de Nicaragua, El Salvador y el mismo Honduras, se distancian de Washington.

Arias se comportó exactamente como quería Estados Unidos. Promovió un reconocimiento de hecho al gobierno golpista, poniendo a las dos partes a negociar como si tuvieran estatutos similares. Planteó en primer lugar la condición de que Zelaya retorne a la presidencia, pero renunciando a cualquier iniciativa propia, haciendo que termine su mandato, simplemente para mantener la continuidad institucional, como si ésta no hubiera sido claramente vulnerada. Ni siquiera se acusaría a ningún golpista, al contrario de lo anunciado por Zelaya, que pretende sancionar a los militares que han perpetrado el golpe. Se terminaría el mandato, sin pena ni gloria, y como Zelaya perdió las elecciones internas del partido al que todavía pertenece, no concurriría con ninguna alternativa que permitiera que el pueblo se pronunciara sobre su gobierno.

Micheletti juega con la continuidad hasta que el nuevo gobierno sea elegido. La importante decisión de los presidentes del Mercosur afirma que no reconocerá a ningún gobierno surgido del golpe. Debiera ser una posición asumida por todos los que condenan el golpe.

Frente a la resistencia de Micheletti de devolver la presidencia a Zelaya, Estados Unidos pasó a una alternativa, que es la de que las fuerzas armadas acepten las condiciones propuestas por Arias. Se dice que la declaración de los altos mandos militares hondureños fue redactada en Washington, en la oficina de un senador demócrata estadunidense, para terminar de confirmar que el gobierno de Obama busca de todas formas salvar la apariencia de institucionalidad, como si no hubiera habido ya una ruptura de la institucionalidad democrática, que impide que Zelaya gobierne y que someta a su pueblo una alternativa de continuidad política fuera de las oligarquías que han dominado siempre al país, responsables de que sea uno de los más pobres del continente.

Así, tampoco se puede aceptar que Zelaya reasuma simplemente para concluir su mandato, como si nada hubiera pasado –es decir, sin la punición de los golpistas, entre ellos los altos mandos de las fuerzas armadas, la alta cúpula del Poder Judicial, políticos y dirigentes de los dos partidos tradicionales–, ni que el pueblo pueda pronunciarse sobre el gobierno de Zelaya, que debiera poder lanzar un candidato que represente la continuidad de su gobierno, por alguno de los partidos alternativos.

El retorno de Zelaya para cumplir su mandato simplemente, sería la victoria de la postura estadunidense, que salva las apariencias como condenando el golpe, sin castigar a los responsables, haciendo que se cumplan las semanas que faltan del mandato de Zelaya, que se retiraría del gobierno y con ello se terminarían las alternativas que empezaba a construir para Honduras.

Hace tiempo, desde el golpe en Venezuela, se han incrementado las ofensivas contra los gobiernos de Lula, Evo Morales y Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, pues la derecha intenta frenar la ola de gobiernos que salen del consenso neoliberal que los conservadores, apoyados por Estados Unidos, han impuesto en el continente. En caso de que logren su objetivo en Honduras, habrían encontrado una vía sui generis, sin victoria electoral y sin ensuciar sus manos, para intervenir directamente en un golpe. Sería la primera victoria del gobierno Obama en el continente, en un momento en que las posturas bushistas de Uribe amenazan con situaciones muy difíciles para el nuevo gobierno estadunidense, haciendo retroceder al escenario de aislamiento total en la región, cuando Colombia era su gran aliado.

Los gobiernos que han condenado el golpe en Honduras, que han construido la Unasur y el Consejo Sudamericano de Defensa, tienen que hacerse responsables por una solución democrática para la crisis hondureña, al igual que deben hacerse cargo de los conflictos que rebrotan entre Colombia y sus vecinos, para parar definitivamente los chantajes de Uribe, que sirven apenas para recubrir su proyecto de instalación formal y abierta de una base militar estadunidense en su país. Lo cual, además, choca con la pertenencia al Consejo Sudamericano de Defensa, que debería reunirse para exigir una declaración formal del gobierno colombiano de que no violará los acuerdos del Consejo.

O América Latina se hace cargo de sus problemas y de su destino, definitivamente, o el imperio, bajo una u otra forma, volverá a dictar las reglas en la región que más ha avanzado en el mundo en los procesos de integración regional y de construcción de alternativas al modelo neoliberal.


Emir Sader

«Le mouvement taliban nigérian est endogène»


Marc-Antoine La Pérouse de Montclos, chercheur à l'IRD revient sur les affrontements entre forces de l'ordre et insurgés islamistes au Nigéria.

D’où vient ce mouvement taliban au Nigeria ?

En janvier 2004, des islamistes radicaux se faisant appeler les «talibans» sont apparus dans la région du Borno, à la frontière du Niger. Ils venaient vraisemblablement du campus de l’université de Maiduguri. En Afrique de l’Ouest, le mot talibédésigne traditionnellement les jeunes élèves des écoles coraniques qui mendient dans la rue pour financer leur scolarité. Ici, on est clairement dans le cas d’une référence à l’islam radical à la mode pakistanaise ou afghane. A l’époque, les «talibans» de Maiduguri avaient attaqué des commissariats pour se procurer des armes. Puis, bizarrement, on n’a plus entendu parler d’eux, alors qu’ils ont, semble-t-il, monté des camps d’entraînement. Pourquoi des violences ont éclaté maintenant ? C’est un mystère. Il s’agit d’une zone peu contrôlée par le pouvoir central.

Qui dirige ce mouvement ?

C’est un autre mystère. On ne sait pas qui est leur leader. En 2006, un imam nommé Mohamed Yusuf avait été identifié et arrêté. Il avait reconnu avoir des «talibans» parmi ses fidèles, mais il ne se reconnaissait pas comme leur chef. Or, dans la longue histoire des mouvements islamiques radicaux au Nigeria, les «prophètes» autoproclamés ou millénaristes ne se sont jamais cachés. Qu’il s’agisse de Maitatsine, qui avait pris la tête d’une révolte ayant causé 5 000 morts à Kano (nord du Nigeria) en 1980, ou de Zakzaki, qui se réclame du chiisme.

Y a-t-il une dimension ethnique ou tribale dans ces troubles ?

Il semble que non. Les régions du Borno, de Yobe et de Bauchi, peuplées de Haoussas et de Kanouris, sont homogènes et très largement musulmanes. On n’est pas du tout dans le même cas de figure que les troubles qui ont récemment ensanglanté la région de Jos, dans la ceinture centrale du pays. A Jos, point de rencontre entre l’islam et la chrétienté, les violences interreligieuses recouvrent des disputes entre communautés pour le contrôle de la terre ou des réseaux commerciaux. Ce qui se passe en ce moment est une attaque contre l’Etat pour obtenir l’application d’une version dure de la charia, la loi islamique.

Y a-t-il une influence étrangère dans ces troubles ?

Il n’y a pas de liens connus avec Al-Qaeda. La Libye et l’Iran ont eu des velléités au Nigeria, via des fondations. On sait aussi que des pays arabes du Golfe ont financé le gouverneur de l’Etat de Zamfara, Ahmed Sani, lorsqu’il a voulu étendre le domaine d’application pénale de la charia. Mais le mouvement taliban nigérian, à ma connaissance, est complètement endogène. Son appellation relève d’une volonté d’être pris au sérieux dans sa capacité de nuisance. Un peu à la manière des gangs noirs sud-africains qui se faisaient appeler les «Germans», les «Berliners»ou les «Japanese» au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale.

    Islam and pluralism are not incompatible

    There is a pervasive view in the media today that Islam does not support pluralism. Sadly, we often hear how difficult it is for non-Muslim minorities to live in peace and harmony in Muslim countries. Violent extremists who misuse Islamic theology to justify terrorist attacks have exacerbated prejudices against Muslims and today many people think that Muslims do not believe in pluralism and diversity.

    By contrast, history reveals that Islam – as preached in the Koran and exemplified by the life of the Prophet Muohammad and his companions – actually accepts, celebrates and even encourages diversity.

    It should be noted that the term “minority” has no place in Islamic law. It has no place in Sharia (or law based on Islamic principles) and jurists have never used the term. Rather, it emerged from Western societies, which use it to distinguish between ethnic groups.

    According to Islamic principles, everyone who lives in a Muslim state is entitled to enjoy the same rights of citizenship, despite the differences they may have in their religion or population size.

    In 622, when the Prophet Mohammad migrated from Mecca to Medina in the Arabian Peninsula and started to build the first Muslim state, he ensured that its Muslim and non-Muslim inhabitants could coexist in harmony. There was a substantial Jewish community in Medina, and the Prophet proposed an agreement of cooperation – between Muslims and the 11 Jewish tribes – called the Constitution of Medina, which Muslim historians and scholars generally accept as the first written state constitution.

    This constitution spelled out the rights of Jews as non-Muslim citizens in the Muslim state. As a result, the Prophet managed to establish a multi-faith political community in Medina based on a set of universal principles. The rules set out in the constitution were meant to maintain peace and cooperation, protect life and property, prevent injustice and ensure freedom of religion and movement for all inhabitants – regardless of tribal or religious affiliation. Allegiance to the community superseded religious identity, as spelled out in the rules for joint defense: “[E]ach must help the other against anyone who attacks the people of this document.”

    The Prophet’s treatment of the “People of the Book,” in this case Jews, showed religious tolerance as well as prudence. The constitution established the pattern for the future relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims, specifying non-Muslim citizens as equal partners with Muslim inhabitants.

    Almost 15 years later, when Muslims conquered Jerusalem from the Byzantines, Caliph Omar Ibn al-Khattab granted its people, who were mainly Christians, safety for their persons, property and churches. As well-known British historian Karen Armstrong writes, “[Omar] was faithful to the Islamic inclusive vision. Unlike Jews and Christians, Muslims did not attempt to exclude others from Jerusalem’s holiness.”

    Omar’s assurance of safety to the people of Jerusalem stands as an important example for leaders in multi-faith societies today, and history has proven that when these examples were put into practice, non-Muslims were treated kindly and justly.

    These examples of Muslim and non-Muslim coexistence are not confined to a specific time or place, but are meant to be applied in all times and places. Today, for example, Jordan’s Constitution guarantees freedom of religious belief. Christians in Jordan, who form the majority of non-Muslims, enjoy by law nearly 10 percent of the seats in Parliament and have similar quotas at every level of government and society. Their holy sites, property and religious practices are protected from any kind of interference by the state.

    Cultural and social realities in many Muslim-majority societies have led to violations of the rights of non-Muslims in contemporary times. Islamic history, however, demonstrates that the path towards mutual understanding and tolerance does not deviate from the essence of Islam. On the contrary, to revive the spirit of inclusivity, Muslim societies should look to the Koran, and emulate the model it lays out.

    An inclusive vision is, and always will be, the only safe haven for followers of other religions in an Islamic society.

    Maher Y. Abu-Munshar

    30.7.09

    The Decider

    Who Runs U.S. Foreign Policy?
    And what role has Obama carved out for himself?
    by Michael Crowley

    Whether he is shaping the White House's message on Iran, or personally cajoling Asian leaders to crack down on North Korea, or brokering power deals among NATO allies, Obama has, in effect, been his own national security advisor and secretary of state.

    "The level of harmony is just striking," says James Goldgeier, a national security aide in the Clinton White House and a political scientist at George Washington University. There are signs, however, that the administration's approach to foreign policy, however well-intentioned and well-executed, is vulnerable to unexpected challenges--the very kind that are likely to multiply the longer the president is in office.

    The unanswered question is how Obama's confidence and emphasis on process will serve him in the months and years to come, as he begins to reap the fruits--or a lack thereof--of his strategic vision. Process only works if the assumptions underlying the strategy it is meant to implement are correct, but, as nations begin to respond to Obama's initiatives, those assumptions may be tested--from Jerusalem to Moscow. Already, we have seen one hitch in the Obama model: Iran.

    29.7.09

    Mapping a Legal Geography of Yugoslavia's Disintegration


    A Legal Geography of Yugoslavia's DisintegrationAna S. Trbovich's A Legal Geography of Yugoslavia's Disintegration is a valuable intervention in the long running and, at times, torturous debate over the collapse of the former Yugoslavia. The book provides a richly detailed, if not exhaustive, interpretation of the legal constitutional landscape of the region and its history. The author's academic and political credentials, most recently as director of the Center for European Integration and Management of Public Administration at the University of Singidunum in Belgrade, as well as her service as assistant minister of International Economic Relations for the government of Serbia, is reflected in her extensive knowledge and experience in the intricacies and nuances of political decision making. Trbovich chronicles the complex national state administrative and political incarnations of Yugoslavia, focusing primarily on post-1914 Yugoslavia. To this end, she carefully maps out the complex legal and political terrain -- the "legal geography" -- of the former Yugoslavia. The evolution of Yugoslavia as a state is meticulously researched, evidenced in extensive footnotes and citations, including scholarly work, a host of relevant legal statutes, resolutions, and reports. The list of maps as well as an extensive bibliography containing primary and secondary sources are excellent resources for those interested in both international law and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).

    The purpose of the book becomes clear early on, and that is to make a case for what the author argues was the complicity of the international community in the break-up of the former Yugoslavia and the illegal use of force in 1999 against the FRY by NATO forces. Most important though is Trbovich's analysis of what she argues is "an almost complete reversal" of international practice of respect for the territorial and constitutional integrity of sovereign states (p. 1). To this end, the author carefully lays out the legal, juridical, and constitutional grounds for intervention in the internal affairs of states by citing contexts where such action has been used not only legitimately but also in concert with international law and principles of sovereignty, as well as with respect for the integrity of state legal and constitutional structures. Trbovich begins her analysis with an examination of the problematic and selective interpretation of two pivotal international legal principles -- self-determination and secession -- and how, in the case of Yugoslavia, misguided assessments on the part of the international community led to the demise of Yugoslavia and the bloody wars of secession that followed. She demonstrates how policy decisions based on the protection of minority and human rights -- ubiquitous and, some argue, hegemonic concepts for which there are no consensual definitions -- undermine the credibility and force of international law. Thus, for example, when does a minority become a "people" deserving of the political right of self-determination? The dubious viability of particular (minority) rights regimes (and here the author cites the case of Kosovar Albanians) raises questions about the legality of claims for self-determination that often serve to undermine the integrity of a state's constitution. According to Trbovich, discussion and debate is better served by a focus on constitutional and legal provisions and precedents than by appeals to universal moral principles.

    The author charts the historical development of the Yugoslav federation beginning in 1918 when Serbian, Croatian, and, to a lesser extent, Slovenian and other national movements were solidifying the ideological foundations of what would later become demands for self-determination and, eventually, secession in 1991. Throughout the book, Yugoslav regimes after 1918 all receive positive valuation relative to those of other states in the region. This is attributed to a history of democratic governance and recognition of the rights of Yugoslavia's constituent nations. The histories of Kosovo i Metohija (the name enshrined in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia constitution, dropped by Josip Broz Tito in 1974, and then reinstated by Slobodan Milošević in 1989), Croatia, Slovenia, and the other Yugoslav republics and provinces are examined with particular emphasis on the challenges they have posed to the legitimacy of Yugoslav federal administrative borders and to the state itself.1 Among the historical examples the author uses to bolster her analysis, World War II comes under particular scrutiny as a period when Croatia aligned itself with the fascist Axis powers in 1941 and perpetrated atrocities against Serbs, Jews, and others. According to Trbovich, the actions of the fascist Ustasha state against Serbs amounted to genocide. While debates about the roles and responsibilities of Croats, Serbs, and others during this period, and charges of genocide and ethnic cleansing rage on, the author focuses mainly on the claim that Serbs were the primary victims of Croatian genocide. The fascist taint of Croatia during World War II is extended to the 1990s in reference to Croatia's offensive in Krayina (Krajina). The choice of language is significant: "Thus while Serbs are admonished for expelling Croats . . . the cleansing of numerous Serbs . . . occurred unnoticed" (p. 302, emphasis mine).

    The tendency to present evidence to support one's arguments to the neglect of that which may cast doubt is not unusual in the scholarship on Yugoslavia, but it is somewhat troublesome given the lengths to which Trbovich has gone to present a comprehensive, extensively researched, and balanced perspective on the region and its history. For example, the omission of highly respected scholarship on Kosovo and Bosnia, such as Noel Malcolm's Kosovo: A Short History (1998) andBosnia: A Short History (1994), and Julie Mertus's Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War (1999) is curious at best, as is that on Serbia, such as Robert Thomas's The Politics of Serbia in the 1990s(1999), and Jasminka Udovički and James Ridgeway's Burn This House: The Making and Unmaking of Yugoslavia (2000). The book also, at times, betrays a certain degree of hostility toward Croats, claiming ultimately that the foundations of Croatia's grievances against Yugoslavia amount to historical revisionism. While few would deny the brutality of Croatia's WWII fascist past and their actions in Operations Storm and Flash, Trbovich seems compelled to exonerate Serbs of any wrongdoing, reflected in frequent allusions to the "conciliatory" nature and peaceful intentions of FRY and their continuous willingness to compromise (p. 298). For example, the Yugoslav National Army is deemed to have "acted only in self defence" in responding to the "illegal use of force by secessionists" (p. 283). Scant attention is devoted to the culpability of the Milošević regime and of Bosnian Serbs for the brutal war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (including the four-year siege of Sarajevo), the massacre at Srebrenica, the destruction of Vukovar, and, more generally, the central role of extreme nationalism during the 1990s. If the author's intention is to present a balanced argument that focuses mainly on the constitutional and legal grounds of intervention in the affairs of sovereign states, then greater care should have been taken to present an evenhanded treatment of all parties to the conflict. The use of value-laden terms, such as "pogrom" in relation to Serbs only, as well as accusations of ethnic cleansing and genocide against Albanians and Croats to the exclusion of Serbs, is deeply problematic and diminishes the persuasiveness of Trbovich's analysis, especially in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary (pp. 355, 406).

    Trbovich's analysis of the events leading up to and during the NATO bombing of Belgrade represents more careful and balanced analysis of the role of international bodies in intervention. Although the author mainly identifies discrimination of Serbs at the hands of Albanians in Kosovo (even though the reverse is well documented), Trbovich makes a compelling case against the controversial series of decisions that led to NATO's air campaign against FRY in 1999. The rush to respond resulted not only in devastating consequences for those caught on the ground, but also serious repercussions for the process by which claims for self-determination are assessed and acted on by the international community. Trbovich makes a strong case for her assertion that NATO's actions in FRY have compromised the principles on which international laws and precedents concerning state sovereignty are built. For example, Trbovich invokes the rules of jus ad bellum (law governing the right to go to war) and jus in bello (conduct of war once it has begun) embedded in the UN Charter, to underscore her contention that NATO actions were a direct violation of the UN Security Council process to which it was accountable and that diplomatic initiatives to resolve the conflict peacefully were not exhausted. The justification that followed the NATO campaign -- humanitarian intervention -- is thus flawed on both moral and legal grounds. Trbovich's argument is ever more urgent given the troubling spate of interventions by the West since 2001 in Iraq and Afghanistan and the looming threat of more to come. Her analysis confirms the critiques of many legal scholars who argue that debates concerning intervention in Kosovo or Bosnia and Herzegovina are increasingly difficult to evaluate, given that they often appeal to realist, relativist, and/or moral principles. Exceptions to prescriptive legal statutes and conventions, not to mention realpolitik, are becoming the norm in international affairs.

    The final two chapters of the book thus provide some useful lessons for thinking about conditions under which international intervention is necessary and/or legitimate. Although in hindsight it is perhaps easy to say that the political fates of both Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina remain precarious, Trbovich argues convincingly for the need for greater commitment to early diplomacy in reaching negotiated solutions and cautions against the increasingly problematic trend toward the enforcement of democratic governance and the compromising of territorial sovereignty. This, according to the author, ultimately represents an abrogation of our collective duty to respect the integrity of state constitutions, sovereignty, and international law. While readers may find some observations, analogies, and/or conclusions drawn by the author objectionable, her contribution to the debates over the uses and abuses of international treaties, and laws around intervention in the context of human and minority rights, is a welcome and necessary one.

    Daphne Winland

    Note

    1 The transliteration of Serbian names to phonetic English will be confusing to those who, particularly in the past fifteen to twenty years, have grown accustomed to reading script (sometimes with diacritics) in the Roman alphabet. Thus, a commonly cited name such as Milošević appears as Miloshevich.

    'E pur si muove'

    JOSÉ SARAMAGO


    "Y sin embargo, se mueve". Estas palabras las diría como si fuera un susurro casi inaudible Galileo Galilei al terminar la lectura de la abjuración a que fue forzado por los inquisidores generales de la Iglesia Católica el 22 de Junio de 1633. Se trataba, como se sabe, de obligarlo a desmentir, condenar y repudiar públicamente lo que había sido y seguía siendo su profunda convicción, es decir, la verdad científica del sistema copernicano, según el cual es la Tierra la que gira alrededor del Sol y no el Sol alrededor de la Tierra. El estudio del texto de la abjuración de Galileo debería estudiarse con conveniente atención en todos los establecimientos de enseñanza del planeta, fuese cual fuese la religión dominante, no tanto para confirmar lo que hoy es una evidencia para todo el mundo, que el Sol está parado y la Tierra se mueve a su alredor, sino como manera de prevenir la formación de supersticiones, lavados de cerebro, ideas hechas y otros atentados contra la inteligencia y el sentido común.

    No es, pese a la introducción, Galileo el objeto primero de este texto, sino algo más próximo en el tiempo y en el espacio. Me refiero al Barómetro Hispano-Luso del Centro de Análisis Social de la Universidad de Salamanca, publicado hoy, sobre las eventuales posibilidades de creación de una unión entre los dos países de la Península Ibérica de cara a la formación de una Federación hispano-portuguesa.

    Los lectores que acompañan regularmente éste y otros comentarios míos recordarán la polémica, adornada con unos cuantos insultos elegidos y unas cuantas acusaciones de traición a la patria, que mi pronóstico de una unión de ese tipo suscitó hace relativamente poco tiempo. Pues bien, de acuerdo con el sondeo de la Universidad de Salamanca, 39,9% de los portugueses y 30,3% de los españoles apoyarían esa unión. Los porcentajes muestran un sensible avance, tanto en un país como en el otro, sobre los cálculos realizados en aquel momento. Los que rechazan la idea constituyen poco más del 30% de las personas consultadas, es decir, 260 de los 876 ciudadanos entrevistados durante los meses de abril y mayo de este año.

    Al contrario de lo que generalmente se dice, el futuro ya está escrito, lo que ocurre es que nosotros no tenemos todavía la ciencia necesaria para leerlo. Las protestas de hoy pueden convertirse en los acuerdos de mañana, y, por supuesto, también podría suceder lo contrario, aunque una cosa es cierta y la frase de Galileo tiene aquí perfecto encaje. Sí, Iberia. E pur si muove.

    ETA hace estallar un coche bomba en una casa cuartel de la Guardia Civil en Burgos · ELPAÍS com

    ETA ha hecho estallar sin aviso previo una furgoneta con 200 kilos de explosivo junto a la residencia de los agentes. La bomba reventó el edificio y ha causado 46 heridos leves. La policía cree que el vehículo fue robado en Francia

    28.7.09

    Russian Economy and Russian Power

    U.S. Vice President Joe Biden’s visit to Georgia and Ukraine partly answered questions over how U.S.-Russian talks went during U.S. President Barack Obama’s visit to Russia in early July. That Biden’s visit took place at all reaffirms the U.S. commitment to the principle that Russia does not have the right to a sphere of influence in these countries or anywhere in the former Soviet Union.

    The Americans’ willingness to confront the Russians on an issue of fundamental national interest to Russia therefore requires some explanation, as on the surface it seems a high-risk maneuver. Biden provided insights into the analytic framework of the Obama administration on Russia in a July 26 interview with The Wall Street Journal. In it, Biden said the United States “vastly” underestimates its hand. He added that “Russia has to make some very difficult, calculated decisions. They have a shrinking population base, they have a withering economy, they have a banking sector and structure that is not likely to be able to withstand the next 15 years, they’re in a situation where the world is changing before them and they’re clinging to something in the past that is not sustainable.”

    U.S. Policy Continuity

    The Russians have accused the United States of supporting pro-American forces in Ukraine, Georgia and other countries of the former Soviet Union under the cover of supporting democracy. They see the U.S. goal as surrounding the Soviet Union with pro-American states to put the future of the Russian Federation at risk. The summer 2008 Russian military action in Georgia was intended to deliver a message to the United States and the countries of the former Soviet Union that Russia was not prepared to tolerate such developments but was prepared to reverse them by force of arms if need be.

    Following his July summit, Obama sent Biden to the two most sensitive countries in the former Soviet Union — Ukraine and Georgia — to let the Russians know that the United States was not backing off its strategy in spite of Russian military superiority in the immediate region. In the long run, the United States is much more powerful than the Russians, and Biden was correct when he explicitly noted Russia’s failing demographics as a principle factor in Moscow’s long-term decline. But to paraphrase a noted economist, we don’t live in the long run. Right now, the Russian correlation of forces along Russia’s frontiers clearly favors the Russians, and the major U.S. deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan would prevent the Americans from intervening should the Russians choose to challenge pro-American governments in the former Soviet Union directly.

    Even so, Biden’s visit and interview show the Obama administration is maintaining the U.S. stance on Russia that has been in place since the Reagan years. Reagan saw the economy as Russia’s basic weakness. He felt that the greater the pressure on the Russian economy, the more forthcoming the Russians would be on geopolitical matters. The more concessions they made on geopolitical matters, the weaker their hold on Eastern Europe. And if Reagan’s demand that Russia “Tear down this wall, Mr. Gorbachev” was met, the Soviets would collapse. Ever since the Reagan administration, the idee fixe of not only the United States, but also NATO, China and Japan has been that the weakness of the Russian economy made it impossible for the Russians to play a significant regional role, let alone a global one. Therefore, regardless of Russian wishes, the West was free to forge whatever relations it wanted among Russian allies like Serbia and within the former Soviet Union. And certainly during the 1990s, Russia was paralyzed.

    Biden, however, is saying that whatever the current temporary regional advantage the Russians might have, in the end, their economy is crippled and Russia is not a country to be taken seriously. He went on publicly to point out that this should not be pointed out publicly, as there is no value in embarrassing Russia. The Russians certainly now understand what it means to hit the reset button Obama had referred to: The reset is back to the 1980s and 1990s.

    Reset to the 1980s and 90s

    To calculate the Russian response, it is important to consider how someone like Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin views the events of the 1980s and 1990s. After all, Putin was a KGB officer under Yuri Andropov, the former head of the KGB and later Chairman of the Communist Party for a short time — and the architect of glasnost and perestroika.

    It was the KGB that realized first that the Soviet Union was failing, which made sense because only the KGB had a comprehensive sense of the state of the Soviet Union. Andropov’s strategy was to shift from technology transfer through espionage — apparently Putin’s mission as a junior intelligence officer in Dresden in the former East Germany — to a more formal process of technology transfer. To induce the West to transfer technology and to invest in the Soviet Union, Moscow had to make substantial concessions in the area in which the West cared the most: geopolitics. To get what it needed, the Soviets had to dial back on the Cold War.

    Glasnost, or openness, had as its price reducing the threat to the West. But the greater part of the puzzle was perestroika, or the restructuring of the Soviet economy. This was where the greatest risk came, since the entire social and political structure of the Soviet Union was built around a command economy. But that economy was no longer functioning, and without perestroika, all of the investment and technology transfer would be meaningless. The Soviet Union could not metabolize it.

    Former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev was a communist, as we seem to forget, and a follower of Andropov. He was not a liberalizer because he saw liberalization as a virtue; rather, he saw it as a means to an end. And that end was saving the Communist Party, and with it the Soviet state. Gorbachev also understood that the twin challenge of concessions to the West geopolitically and a top-down revolution in Russia economically — simultaneously—risked massive destabilization. This is what Reagan was counting on, and what Gorbachev was trying to prevent. Gorbachev lost Andropov’s gamble. The Soviet Union collapsed, and with it the Communist Party.

    What followed was a decade of economic horror, at least as most Russians viewed it. From the West’s point of view, collapse looked like liberalization. From the Russian point of view, Russia went from a superpower that was poor to an even poorer geopolitical cripple. For the Russians, the experiment was a double failure. Not only did the Russian Empire retreat to the borders of the 18th century, but the economy became even more dysfunctional, except for a handful of oligarchs and some of their Western associates who stole whatever wasn’t nailed down.

    The Russians, and particularly Putin, took away a different lesson than the West did. The West assumed that economic dysfunction caused the Soviet Union to fail. Putin and his colleagues took away the idea that it was the attempt to repair economic dysfunction through wholesale reforms that caused Russia to fail. From Putin’s point of view, economic well-being and national power do not necessarily work in tandem where Russia is concerned.

    Russian Power, With or Without Prosperity

    Russia has been an economic wreck for most of its history, both under the czars and under the Soviets. The geography of Russia has a range of weaknesses, as we have explored. Russia’s geography, daunting infrastructural challenges and demographic structure all conspire against it. But the strategic power of Russia was never synchronized to its economic well-being. Certainly, following World War II the Russian economy was shattered and never quite came back together. Yet Russian global power was still enormous. A look at the crushing poverty — but undeniable power — of Russia during broad swaths of time from 1600 until Andropov arrived on the scene certainly gives credence to Putin’s view.

    The problems of the 1980s had as much to do with the weakening and corruption of the Communist Party under former Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev as it had to do with intrinsic economic weakness. To put it differently, the Soviet Union was an economic wreck under Joseph Stalin as well. The Germans made a massive mistake in confusing Soviet economic weakness with military weakness. During the Cold War, the United States did not make that mistake. It understood that Soviet economic weakness did not track with Russian strategic power. Moscow might not be able to house its people, but its military power was not to be dismissed.

    What made an economic cripple into a military giant was political power. Both the czar and the Communist Party maintained a ruthless degree of control over society. That meant Moscow could divert resources from consumption to the military and suppress resistance. In a state run by terror, dissatisfaction with the state of the economy does not translate into either policy shifts or military weakness — and certainly not in the short term. Huge percentages of gross domestic product can be devoted to military purposes, even if used inefficiently there. Repression and terror smooth over public opinion.

    The czar used repression widely, and it was not until the army itself rebelled in World War I that the regime collapsed. Under Stalin, even at the worst moments of World War II, the army did not rebel. In both regimes, economic dysfunction was accepted as the inevitable price of strategic power. And dissent — even the hint of dissent — was dealt with by the only truly efficient state enterprise: the security apparatus, whether called the Okhraina, Cheka, NKVD, MGB or KGB.

    From the point of view of Putin, who has called the Soviet collapse the greatest tragedy of our time, the problem was not economic dysfunction. Rather, it was the attempt to completely overhaul the Soviet Union’s foreign and domestic policies simultaneously that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. And that collapse did not lead to an economic renaissance.

    Biden might not have meant to gloat, but he drove home the point that Putin believes. For Putin, the West, and particularly the United States, engineered the fall of the Soviet Union by policies crafted by the Reagan administration — and that same policy remains in place under the Obama administration.

    It is not clear that Putin and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev disagree with Biden’s analysis — the Russian economy truly is “withering” — except in one sense. Given the policies Putin has pursued, the Russian prime minister must believe he has a way to cope with that. In the short run, Putin might well have such a coping mechanism, and this is the temporary window of opportunity Biden alluded to. But in the long run, the solution is not improving the economy — that would be difficult, if not outright impossible, for a country as large and lightly populated as Russia. Rather, the solution is accepting that Russia’s economic weakness is endemic and creating a regime that allows Russia to be a great power in spite of that.

    Such a regime is the one that can create military power in the face of broad poverty, something we will call the “Chekist state.” This state uses its security apparatus, now known as the FSB, to control the public through repression, freeing the state to allocate resources to the military as needed. In other words, this is Putin coming full circle to his KGB roots, but without the teachings of an Andropov or Gorbachev to confuse the issue. This is not an ideological stance; it applies to the Romanovs and to the Bolsheviks. It is an operational principle embedded in Russian geopolitics and history.

    Counting on Russian strategic power to track Russian economic power is risky. Certainly, it did in the 1980s and 1990s, but Putin has worked to decouple the two. On the surface, it might seem a futile gesture, but in Russian history, this decoupling is the norm. Obama seems to understand this to the extent that he has tried to play off Medvedev (who appears less traditional) from Putin (who appears to be the more traditional), but we do not think this is a viable strategy — this is not a matter of Russian political personalities but of Russian geopolitical necessity.

    Biden seems to be saying that the Reagan strategy can play itself out permanently. Our view is that it plays itself out only so long as the Russian regime doesn’t reassert itself with the full power of the security apparatus and doesn’t decouple economic and military growth. Biden’s strategy works so long as this doesn’t happen. But in Russian history, this decoupling is the norm and the past 20 years is the exception.

    A strategy that assumes the Russians will once again decouple economic and military power requires a different response than ongoing, subcritical pressure. It requires that the window of opportunity the United States has handed Russia by its wars in the Islamic world be closed, and that the pressure on Russia be dramatically increased before the Russians move toward full repression and rapid rearmament.

    Ironically, in the very long run of the next couple of generations, it probably doesn’t matter whether the West heads off Russia at the pass because of another factor Biden mentioned: Russia’s shrinking demographics. Russian demography has been steadily worsening since World War I, particularly because birth rates have fallen. This slow-motion degradation turned into collapse during the 1990s. Russia’s birth rates are now well below starkly higher death rates; Russia already has more citizens in their 50s than in their teens. Russia can be a major power without a solid economy, but no one can be a major power without people. But even with demographics as poor as Russia’s, demographics do not change a country overnight. This is Russia’s moment, and the generation or so it will take demography to grind Russia down can be made very painful for the Americans.

    Biden has stated the American strategy: squeeze the Russians and let nature take its course. We suspect the Russians will squeeze back hard before they move off the stage of history.

    George Friedman

    Biden's Russia blunder

    The vice president's comments on Russia don't say a lot for his supposed foreign policy expertise.
    There's the real world and Bizarro World, there's matter and antimatter, and then there's Sarah Palin and Joe Biden. Both the would-be vice president and the actual one have a history of making foolish off-the-cuff remarks, and each has a knack for unnecessarily infuriating the opposition -- they just do it from opposite sides of the political spectrum. And if Palin scores political points by stretching the truth, Biden loses headway by being honest.

    A case in point: his appallingly ill-advised statements over the weekend about Russia.

    "The reality is, the Russians are where they are," Biden said, in comments published Saturday. "They have a shrinking population base, they have a withering economy, they have a banking sector and structure that is not likely to be able to withstand the next 15 years, they're in a situation where the world is changing before them and they're clinging to something in the past that is not sustainable."

    Biden was just calling it as he sees it on Russia, but to upend the contents of his brainpan in front of a Wall Street Journal reporter, on the heels of a diplomatic initiative by the Obama administration that sent both President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to Moscow bearing "reset buttons" and promises to open a new era of mutual respect and improved relations, was immensely counter- productive. The Kremlin sent a bristling response questioning whether the president or the vice president was shaping U.S. foreign policy goals, and Clinton tried to smooth things over by calling Russia a "great power" in an appearance on NBC's "Meet the Press." But the damage was done.

    As one Russian newspaper reported: "Joe Biden unexpectedly returned to the rhetoric of the previous Bush administration."

    Obama surely knew when he chose Biden as his running mate that he was getting a loose cannon. So he can't possibly be surprised when his vice president shoots the occasional 16-pound ball through his policy agenda, such as the time in April when Biden advised people to avoid flying or riding subways so as not to contract swine flu, even as the rest of the administration was trying to reassure jittery Americans about the much-hyped flu bug and head off a transportation meltdown. And who can forget Obama's withering glance when Biden made sport of Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. for mucking up the presidential oath at precisely the same moment that Obama was pleading for bipartisanship and mutual respect in Washington?

    Yet Obama's principal rationale for choosing Biden was that the former senator's foreign policy expertise would make up for his own lack of diplomatic experience. This can't be what the president had in mind.

    Los Angeles Times

    A Russian Reign of Terror?

    Cathy Young

    The abduction and murder of human rights activist Natalia Estemirova in the conflict-ridden Northern Caucasus has been the latest crime to shake Russia's embattled liberal community - and raise the question of whether today's Russia lives not just under an authoritarian regime, but a reign of terror against dissenters. While there are different theories as to the real perpetrators of this vile crime, none are particularly flattering to the Kremlin.

    On July 15, 50-year-old Estemirova, a teacher, journalist, and single mother of a 15-year-old daughter, was abducted outside her home in Grozny, the capital of Chechnya. Later that day, she was found shot to death in neighboring Ingushetia, another turmoil-ridden Russian province of the Northern Caucasus.

    Estemirova's death echoes the fatal shooting of journalist Anna Politkovskaya in her Moscow apartment building in 2006 and the brazen murder of human rights attorney Stanislav Markelov and journalist Anastasia Baburova on a busy Moscow street in broad daylight last January.

    Many critics of Vladimir Putin's authoritarian regime (and its incarnation under the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev) believe that the Kremlin is ordering and directing these murders to silence critics. Yet, if that is the case, the terror is extremely selective: Other equally or more outspoken critics of the regime have been often harassed, persecuted and censored, but not physically harmed.

    Many point out that the Estemirova, Politkovskaya and Markelov murders all have a "Chechen connection": all three were relentless critics of human rights abuses in Chechnya and of its president, Ramzan Kadyrov. In the last several years, after a separatist rebellion and a brutal war, the Kremlin has "pacified" Chechnya by making rebel-turned-loyalist Ramzan Kadyrov, the president of the region, a de facto dictator. While Kadyrov has put an end to the random slaughter of Chechens by Russian troops, he himself is known for brutal killings and torture of political opponents. Several of his rivals have been assassinated outside Chechnya, in places ranging from Moscow to Dubai. Estemirova (who, unlike Politkovskaya, was not known for strong criticism of the Kremlin) had challenged Kadyrov, and he is known to have threatened her. Oleg Orlov, chairman of Memorial, the human rights group for which Estemirova worked - and which has suspended its activities in Chechnya for the time being - has openly named Kadyrov as the chief culprit.

    If Kadyrov is, in fact, killing his critics, this does not necessarily mean that he is doing so with the Kremlin's active blessing: while Kadyrov is ostensibly in his post at Moscow's pleasure, it is very likely that he could not be removed without unleashing a new war. At the very least, however, it means that the Russian government has made a deal with the devil and is condoning assassinations to hold up that deal.

    Andrei Piontkovsky, a Hudson Institute fellow and commentator for the independent Russian press, has voiced another theory on the Grani.ru website: the Estemirova murder, he suggests, may be the work of a hard-line Kremlin faction which resents the de facto independence granted Chechnya under Kadyrov's reign, and wants him compromised and removed and Chechnya placed back under the control of the Russian military.

    Either way, in a very real sense the real blame does lie with Putin - as a group of Russian human rights activists asserted an open letter published after Estemirova's murder. If nothing else, during his 8-year presidency Putin helped create a climate of hatred and suspicion around human rights activists and journalists who did not toe the government line; he repeatedly depicted dissenters as disloyal and unpatriotic, once accusing them of "scrounging around foreign embassies like jackals." After Politkovskaya's murder, his reaction was to say that "she had minimal influence on political life in Russia" and added, "This murder does much more harm to Russia and Chechnya than any of her publications." Thus, in one breath, the then-Russian president not only dismissed Politkovskaya's work as insignificant but also branded it as harmful to her country.

    On the surface, Medvedev's reaction to Estemirova's death couldn't have been more different. Not only did he condemn the murder and promise that the culprits would be found, he also praised Estemirova's work as "important" and "very useful": "She spoke the truth, she openly and perhaps sometimes harshly judged some of the processes taking place in the country, and that's the value of human rights activists, even if they are inconvenient and irritating to the government." But does this amount to anything more than words? In the same breath, Medvedev also complained that the versions of the murder getting the most exposure were the ones "most unacceptable to the government," as if the facts mattered less than convenience.

    Despite Medvedev's promises, few concerned Russians - and Westerners - actually expect Estemirova's killers to be found. In a July 21 press release, top United Nations human rights offered the Russian government their help in solving her murder and others like it. As they noted, the assurances that justice will be done "will be worth little unless the authorities take steps that go beyond what has been done in the past, which has all too often led to a cycle of impunity."

    No response from the Kremlin has been forthcoming. Meanwhile, on July 23, a rally to honor Estemirova's memory was broken up by riot police in downtown Moscow because it drew more people than stated in the organizers' request for a permit. An amateur video shows a 70-year-old man at the rally being dragged into a bus.

    As with some other high-profile murders of people tied to the opposition, the Kremlin has tried to float the theory that the people behind the crime are enemies of Russia seeking to discredit the Russian government. So far, the Russian authorities' own actions bring them far more discredit than enemy subterfuge ever would.

    How Russia Learned To Love Global Warming

    Everyone focuses on China, but Russia might be an even bigger enigma when it comes to global climate talks. The country is still, let's not forget, the world's third-larger emitter of greenhouse gases, and, from a purely selfish perspective, wouldn't appear to have much interest in phasing out fossil fuels. Not only does Russia's economy rise and fall with the fortunes of the oil and gas industry, but, as Peter Savodnik reported in an eye-opening piece for The National last month, many Russia leaders are actually excited about a warmer world where Siberia's thawed out, St. Petersburg's more livable, and state-owned mining companies can drill like crazy in the ice-free Arctic:

    It might seem impolitic to embrace what many regard as a looming global catastrophe. But this has not stopped the Russians. In September 2003, none other than Vladimir Putin signalled his approval, noting that global warming would help Russians "save on fur coats and other warm things". More recently, Rinat Gizatullin, a spokesman for the Natural Resources Ministry, told the BBC: "We are not panicking. Global warming is not as catastrophic for us as it might be for some other countries. If anything, we'll be even better off. As the climate warms, more of Russia's territory will be freed up for agriculture and industry."

    Earlier this year, Alexander Bedritsky, head of Russia's state weather centre, issued a public statement noting that "the heating season will be reduced, and this is a positive factor for us as it will allow us to economise on fuel". The weather centre estimated that Russians could save as much as 10 per cent on heating bills by 2050. Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the ultranationalist Duma deputy who is widely believed to be close to the Kremlin and who speaks for millions of like-minded Russians, has publicly pined for the day when global warming takes its toll on the West, gloating that London will be submerged by the Thames and "Britain will have to give freedom to Scotland and Wales and Northern Ireland". ...

    Enthusiasm for global warming in Russia, if that's the right way to put it, goes beyond simple household concerns or national economic interests. For the Russians, who regard the Arctic as essentially their rightful territory, shrinking ice floes will ease access to the bounty of natural resources around the polar ice cap, including large reserves of oil, gas, gold, diamonds, nickel and tungsten.

    This doesn't sound like a country ready to clasp hands, sing Kumbaya, and ink a treaty to avert disruptive changes to the planet. And, indeed, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev has bragged that his country plans to increase emissions 30 percent by 2020. Now, thanks to the collapse of Soviet-era heavy industry, that goal would still put Russia's emissions 10 to 15 percent below 1990 levels, roughly the (weak) target other industrialized countries are shooting for. But Russia's economy is also grotesquely energy-inefficient and ought to be trying to clean up, not continue to spew recklessly. So is there anything that can convince Putin and Medvedev to shift course? In The New York Times today, Tom Zeller serves up some optimism:

    "Russia has so much in terms of oil and gas resources, it's hard to focus on the renewables," said Isabel Murray, the Russia program manager for the Office of Global Energy Dialogue at the International Energy Agency in Paris.

    But that, Ms. Murray and other experts say, is slowly starting to change. Beyond the meeting in Arkhangelsk, a new energy efficiency bill has gone through a first reading in the Russian Parliament, Ms. Murray said.

    "That's going to happen," she said, adding that Russia recognizes that its stated goal of increasing fossil fuel exports is contingent on developing efficiency and renewable energy strategies. "In the end, if they use more renewables domestically, they can export more" fossil fuels, she said. "It's sort of a no-brainer."

    I would add that another incentive for Russia to support a climate agreement is that, in the short term, one of the easiest ways for the world to cut emissions is, as Robert F. Kennedy Jr. argued in the Financial Times, to use natural gas instead of coal to generate electricity. (Natural gas still produces carbon-dioxide, but a great deal less than coal.) Russia has vast amounts of natural gas to export, and this should be a tempting proposition. Trouble is, most EU countries have been worried about making that switch because, quite understandably, they fear Russia could shut off the gas for political leverage, as it's been doing to Ukraine the past few years.

    So Russia is a tough case, probably even tougher than China (at least Beijing's leaders are legitimately freaked out about pollution riots and the fact that the Gobi Desert is steadily chomping its way toward the capital). A recent report from the Center for American Progress suggested that the Obama administration could possibly entice Russia into cooperation by stressing the benefits of energy efficiency (Russia's industrial sector is notoriously creaky and wasteful). Beyond that, though, action on global warming won't be an easy sell.

    --Bradford Plumer

    New Balkan visa rules: Serbia in, Albania still out

    A Fistful Of Euros
    by Douglas Muir

    And the Montenegrins and Macedonians. EU Commissioner Olli Rehn just announced his recommendation that these three countries be granted visa-free travel to the EU starting January 1, 2010.

    While many European readers will blink and shrug, this is a huge, huge deal for the region. For the last 20 years, it’s kinda sucked to be a Serb. Back in Yugoslav times, you had one of the world’s best passports. East, west, developing world… the Yugoslav passport was welcomed for easy travel in almost every country on earth. But after 1991, suddenly your passport was a piece of junk: nobody welcomed Serbs, you were often viewed with suspicion, and you had to fill out elaborate forms (and wait for months) to get a visa to enter the EU. Even after the wars ended, Serbia was still kept firmly at arm’s length.

    A whole generation of young Serbs have grown up grumpy about this: they didn’t do anything, so why are they being punished, while young Croats and Bulgarians can freely travel to London and Paris?

    No more. Assuming the recommendations is approved — and it’s almost a rubber stamp — then six months from now, Serbs (and Montenegrins and Macedonians) will be able to jump on a plane and just fly to anywhere in the EU, no visa required.

    Mind you, they won’t be able to get work permits. It’s just travel. But still: it’s going to make a huge difference.

    This being the Balkans, there are of course some complications.

    While Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia are in, Albania, Kosovo and Bosnia are still out. At one level, this makes sense; these countries just aren’t ready. None of them have managed to get biometric passports up and running, never mind any of a dozen other requirements. There are also legitimate concerns about illegal immigration; Albania and Kosovo, in particular, are full of unemployed young people who’d jump at the slimmest chance to work in Hamburg or Manchester, legally or not.

    That said, this has some people muttering that the EU is discriminating against Muslims. After all, Albania is mostly Muslim, Kosovo is almost all Muslim, and Bosnia — well, here it gets tricky. See Bosnia is only about 50% Muslim — but the Muslim Bosniaks are going to be hit particularly hard by the new visa system, because the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats can freely and easily get Serbian and Croatian passports. Both those countries allow, indeed encourage, double citizenship. But the Bosniaks? Are stuck.

    The “anti-Muslim” thing is IMO idiotic. (It ignores, for instance, that about a third of the population of Macedonia is Muslim, while about a third of the population of Albania isn’t.) But it’s true that the Bosniaks are getting screwed here somewhat. On the other hand, Bosnia is a badly misgoverned little country, and the Bosniaks are not innocent in this regard. So while this is unfair, it’s not exactly a crime that cries to heaven for justice.

    Meanwhile, another interesting wrinkle: what to do about Kosovo? As a self-proclaimed independent state, Kosovo issues its own passports. These are currently accepted by about 70 countries including most of the EU. “Accepted” meaning they won’t get you turned away at the airport. You still need a visa with them, though.

    So: these Kosovar passports will still be accepted by most EU countries, but they will not be valid for visa-free travel in Europe. So far, so good. But — Serbia still issues passports to Kosovar Serbs quite freely, and also to Kosovar Albanians if they’re willing to go through some hassle. (Because having K-Albanians claim a Serb passport supports Serbia’s claim that Kosovo is really a province of Serbia. And K-Albanians sometimes apply because the passports are accepted in places where the Kosovo passport isn’t, and also because it lets them drive through Serbia with much less hassle. It’s the Balkans, it’s complicated.)

    But the EU doesn’t want to grant visa-free travel to any residents of Kosovo, whether they’re ethnic Albanian, ethnic Serb, or whatever.

    The proposed solution is to have Serbian passports for Kosovo residents issued only by a special office located in Belgrade. These passports will indicate that they are for Kosovo residents, and they won’t be acceptable for visa-free travel in the EU. (It’s not clear how this indication will be made. A big red “K”, perhaps?)

    This leads to some interesting weirdness. If you’re an ethnic Serb living in Serbia? Come January 1, you’re good, no problem. Ethnic Serb living in Bosnia? You can’t travel to the EU on your Bosnian passport, but you can easily get a Serbian passport that will let you fly like a bird. Ethnic Serb living in Kosovo? Too bad — you can get a Serbian passport, but it will be the special “Red K” passport that will trigger alarms if you try to cross an EU border.

    Ethnic Albanian living in Kosovo? Same drill — you’re stuck in Kosovo. Ethnic Albanian living next door in Macedonia, Montenegro, or Serbia itself? Congratulations! You’re free to go.

    Obviously there is going to be some sudden border-crossing in the next few months. Albanians in Albania and Kosovo will suddenly discover roots in Macedonia; Serbs in Kosovo will suddenly develop addresses in Serbia proper. Nationalists on all sides will construe it as evidence that their side is right.

    Hopefully it will all sort out in another year or two, and everyone will be able to go everywhere.

    US, UK Prepared to Talk With the Taliban

    Britain: Next Step in Helmand Operation Is Talks with Local Taliban

    Military Touts Southern Helmand "Progress" Despite Rising Toll

    by Jason Ditz

    British officials say that stage one of the massive military offensive in the Helmand River Valley, the largest single ground operation in Afghanistan since the Soviet occupation, is completed and now they are moving on two the next step, courting what it described as “second-tier” Taliban leaders.

    The prospect of seeking a rapprochement with lower level Taliban in an attempt to drive a wedge between them and their top leadership is nothing new: indeed US and Afghan officials had been talking openly about it last year. Afghan President Hamid Karzai has also made talks with Taliban a key part of his strategy if reelected. So far, however, those attempts have all met with failure.

    But British officials say that the Helmand operation has created another opportunity to try to come to terms with them, and some are talking openly of power-sharing deals which would give them a measure of official local authority in regions where they are already in de facto control.

    The Obama Administration’s escalation has hit British forces particularly hard, with20 soldiers killed this month alone. There is growing concern among US officials that unrest will eventually force Britain to change tactics, which may be the source of this new attempt to calm the Helmand Province, where the British forces are based.

    The new August Prospect: Is Britain Bust?

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    The new August issue of Prospect

    James Crabtree

    Against a backdrop of grim economic news, rising government debt, dreadful public spending projections and general hand ringing over fiscal probity,Prospect’s August cover story asks a simple question: is Britain bust? James Buchan begins his journey to find the answer in the office of Robert Stheeman, the head of Britain’s debt management office, the previously unknown body which sells the UK’s IOUs.

    Stheeman is a busy man, having been asked to sell in this year more than three times as much debt than the year before, all to fund a huge gab in the Government’s finances. But, as Buchan explains, the cause of all this recent borrowing is not the banking crisis itself:

    The bonds required to fund the banks taken into state administration, a mere £37bn, were issued last autumn. No, Stheeman’s headache comes from spending by government departments (without accompanying tax rises) over the last nine years and is to be traced in the policies and misfortune of a single man, Prime Minister Gordon Brown.

    Buchan notes that “there have been anxious moments in recent months” especially as “Stheeman also suffered a bad quarter of an hour on 21st May when the rating agency Standard & Poor’s lowered its assessment on British sovereign debt from ’stable’ to ‘negative. But, as he goes on to argue, the culpability of the political class for over spending is actually nothing new. Leading figures of the Scottish enlightenment like Smith and Hume worried (without good reason) that their country was soon to sink below the budget line, as did many other leading intellectual lights during the 19th and 20th century. Are the concerns in this crunch any more likely to turn out badly? Read the piece here, and find out.

    27.7.09

    EU Speeds Iceland's Application

    BRUSSELS -- The European Union ordered its officials to begin examining Iceland's application to join the bloc just days after it was filed, in a clear sign the island nation will get swift treatment.

    The speed of the move was in marked contrast to how some other applications to join the bloc have been handled. The EU still hasn't got back to Albania, which applied four months ago. It took 10 years for Turkey to be declared "eligible" after it applied.

    But Iceland is a different matter. It is a country of 300,000 -- no great strain on anyone's labor market. It has bountiful geothermal energy. Its population is among the richest in Europe, though a hard crash in the financial crisis took it down a few pegs.

    "Iceland's application will be treated by the book. There will be no short cuts," EU-enlargement commissioner Olli Rehn pledged at a news conference in Brussels on Monday. But he acknowledged that as "one of Europe's oldest democracies" and a member of the European Economic Area already, it had a shorter distance to travel.

    For supporters of EU membership in Iceland, the major attraction is to join the euro, the bloc's common currency, and ditch the krona -- which fell so precipitously last fall that it stopped being traded internationally. "If there is anything we have learned" from the crisis, said Össur Skarphédinsson, Iceland's foreign minister, "it is the fact that it is extremely difficult for a small country like ours to maintain an independent micro-currency in a world that's globalized."

    Iceland's biggest hurdle to EU membership may be its own people, however. The bill to make the application passed Iceland's parliament narrowly, while a final decision to join the bloc would need approval in a referendum. A Capacent Gallup survey in May for broadcaster RÚV found 39% supporting EU membership and 39% opposed.

    That contrasts strongly with Albania and other aspirants in the western Balkans -- Croatia and Macedonia have also applied -- which are keen to get in but are held back by disputes with existing EU members or by EU concerns over poverty or corruption. The EU said it wouldn't accept Albania's application unless it held free and fair parliamentary elections in June.

    EU foreign ministers promised Monday in their statement on Iceland that they remain committed eventually to admitting the countries of the Balkans and that they will return to Albania's application once the country's election cycle is complete. On Monday, Albanian election officials said the party of incumbent Prime Minister Sali Berisha and a coalition partner had won just enough seats in June's election to form a government, following a recount.

    The EU often touts the lure of enlargement as its most powerful foreign-policy tool. But the EU -- now 27 members -- has begun to suffer from "enlargement fatigue." As unemployment mounts, few EU governments are eager to tout enlargement's virtues while their own populations fear competition from cheap labor to the east.

    Teaching the World to Steal, in Perfect Harmony


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    Much has been made of the arrest last week of 44 public and religious officials around New Jersey and New York, in a massive corruption bust that came after a two-year federal investigation. The feds charged three mayors, five rabbis and dozens of other local officials with crimes including bribery, money laundering, extortion, conspiracy, and trafficking in human organs and fake handbags.

    But while people are busy expressingshock at the discovery that New Jersey has a corruption problem, it seems the most striking aspect of this story has been largely ignored. There is a silver lining here. This enterprise required a great deal of cooperation between an extraordinarily diverse group of people. A merry band of walking stereotypes worked together, in perfect harmony, and remains together, united by their depravity.

    Indeed, the string of perp walks last week turned Newark’s federal courthouse into a veritable Noah's Ark of criminal archetypes. Behold…

    The Italian mayor of Hoboken, NJ, is accused of taking $25,000 in bribes, and was caught on tape boasting, “I could be indicted and still get 85 to 95 percent of the vote.” Best of all, he was caught on tape in a diner in New Jersey. Was “Don’t Stop Believin’” playing in the background?

    A bevy of rabbis and orthodox Jews in Jewish areas of Brooklyn and New York State were caught—what else?—laundering money. Two of the rabbis even come from a town called Deal. Of course they do.

    Ridgefield Mayor Anthony Suarez, who’s also an attorney, allegedly took dirty money for his legal defense fund. He spent so much money suing his political opponents that he needed more cash in a hurry. He’s a lawsuit-happy lawyer anda crooked mayor, all rolled in to one!

    Meanwhile, the informant in this whole mess was a corrupt real estate developer who was charged with defrauding a bank in 2006. A bank getting involved in a bad real estate deal? What are the odds?

    Of course most of the perps were local officials who likely rose to power withpromises to “clean up government” and/or “work for the people.” These arrests would suggest, however, that some elected officials may be prone to hypocrisy.

    The sweep netted Democrats and Republicans, New Yorkers and New Jerseyans, African Americans and Jews, Italians and Latinos, men and women, young and old. Even the crimes themselves were diverse, ranging from money laundering to black market organ sales.

    What a wonderful lesson for our children! In an era overrun with cynical race-baiting, this multi-colored clown car of conspiracy should be a lesson to us all.

    Seventeen years ago Rodney King famously asked, “Can we all get along?” Clearly, the answer today is, “Yes—assuming we can all have piles of cash and/or other peoples’ kidneys.”

    But this story is not just a glorious ode to cooperation among diverse groups. It’s also a cautionary tale about the dangers of selective stereotyping. If this criminal enterprise were narrower, it may have served to validate some prejudices and not others. Instead, it’s the best possible evidence that people from every ethnic group, political party, generation, region and religion are capable of debauchery.

    President Obama said Friday he hopes the Henry Louis Gates controversy turns into “a teachable moment.” Clearly he is unaware that just such a moment is already upon us.

    So parents, before you head home today, print out a copy of the New York Poststory about these arrests, thoughtfully entitled, “Kosher Nostra.” Read it to your kids at bedtime. Then sing “Kumbaya.” Unity is a beautiful thing.

    The way we live: when I think of that in the cusp of some small frustration—say, holding the phone waiting for a warm-bodied techie—random themes begin to buzz in my brain, like restless bees in a hive. Themes like politics, marketing, celebrity, trust, art, the void. How can I quiet these themes, these concerns, long enough to make sense of the noise?
    I do not mean to make an essay out of the tribulations of writing an essay—that’s tacky; I mean only to explain my title as a bewildered approach to the multitudinous present, the way we have become. It’s a large topic, relevant to what V. S. Naipaul called “our universal civilization,” relevant also to all those errant souls—immigrants, refugees, displaced persons, expatriates like myself—wandering the earth. It’s a large topic, but I have tried to hew to a particular line: the tyranny of appearances, a surfeit of seeming in America. Yes, now things must seem, not be.
    Bees buzz and also sting. The line I have taken may not always please. But I suspect that even Candide knew in his heart of hearts that whatever is, is not always, well, cool. The difficulty is tact: how to give dissatisfaction its due without slighting the fecundity of the present. In the end, Emerson said, temperament is the “iron wire on which the beads are strung.” In this text, temperament and autobiography do serve as wire, but also something else. Something impersonal. (No, not postmodern theory.) Call it an aspiration to reality beyond the delirium of appearances. That is also to say, an invocation of truth, not absolute but fiduciary—a truth we can trust—as mind, in its give and take, reckons with the world.
    But truth, trust, and mind can be weasel words. Some clarification of them, as they apply to this essay, is due before we start fingering the beads.

    Philosophers have long puzzled trust as they have puzzled truth. In Plato’s Republic, Socrates and Glaucon debate whether trust depends on fear of detection, as in the case of the shepherd Gyges, who found a gold, magic ring in the Lydian wilderness and considered keeping it. This perspective, rooted in rank self-interest, informs subsequent discussions, through Machiavelli and Hobbes and on down to John Nash’s solution—yes, think Russell Crowe in A Beautiful Mind—of the Prisoner’s Dilemma in game theory. Another perspective, developed by Locke, Hume, Kant, and Rousseau, takes a more benevolent view of human nature, locating trust in love, sympathy, moral responsibility. Then there’s the leap of faith, Kierkegaardian or otherwise, that finds truth and trust—now fused—in a spiritual impulse that overwhelms doubt, defies the weight of the world.
    And now? We perceive a crisis of trust, a dearth of veracity, everywhere. (This is not an American dilemma only, as Onora O’Neill’s Reith Lectures of 2002, in Britain, suggest.) Still, I am not wholly persuaded that America has become a culture of mistrust. Yes, hermeneutics of suspicion abound in academe. And yes, public scandals—in church and state, in sports and entertainment, in the very media that report all the scandals—seem unremitting, indeed cataclysmic, as we can now see. But have Americans really lost the will to trust, to believe in trust?
    More than a century ago, William James wrote in The Will to Believe:

    Our faith is faith in some one else’s faith, and in the greatest matters this is most the case. Our belief in truth itself, for instance, that there is a truth, and that our minds and it are made for each other, —what is it but a passionate affirmation of desire, in which our social system backs us up?

    Has that desire disappeared? Is “cognitive dissonance” now our common fate? I think there is an urge called truth, a longing called trust, which our natures seem unable to quell despite the chameleon in us all. Paradoxically, that urge and that longing find fulfillment in self-abnegation, self-bracketing at least, and at best self-dispossession. Thus we tend to credit what demands nothing from us and trust those who have emptied themselves of their needs. Perhaps that is the mysterious call of our destiny, the secret lure of all our religions and philosophies. Perhaps that was the primogenial impulse of mind, after all.

    As to mind, its road has been long and anfractuous. Some say the journey began with the big bang. Some say it started with a stray asteroid rich in iridium, smashing into present-day Mexico, exterminating the monsters of the earth, and tearing a hole into evolution so that our ancestors could squeeze through. To this accident or event—maverick scientists ascribe to it the so-called Anthropic Principle, enabling sentience on planet Earth—we owe not only our existence but also our awareness of existence, and even the capacity to name and explain the event itself. In short, the gift of language.
    That’s reaching far back, back to the origins of our flawed consciousness. But in a self-conscious age that considers representations supreme—signs, symbols, images, simulacra—the reminder is apt. These semiotic shards and shavings of mind, slowly displacing nature as our environment, now largely constitute our world. And so we live among superabundant signifiers—but where’s the signified? We have perceptions without substance. We lull ourselves with the mantra “appearances are everything.” This mantra echoes throughout American politics, economics, private lives, even the arts. How live with this surfeit of seeming? Let’s finger the beads, not wring our hands.

    II

    Statecraft is stagecraft, the dictum goes—it’s all show business, magic or show business. Nothing here is new. Cheops made the Great Pyramid his stage even before it housed his tomb, and the great Wizard of Oz used the props of comic fantasy to hide his impuissance. The fact is, politics owes more to dream, myth, ritual, and magic than to that Johnny-come-lately of evolution, the neocortex. Atavisms—irrational associations, projections, propitiations, scapegoatings, the illusory omnipotence of primal wishes—rule and overrule even worldly self-interests.
    In politics today, every photo op is an exercise in magical thinking—witness that wretched New Yorkercover caricaturing the Obamas as Islamic terrorists. Do the Kennedys still possess charisma? Shake a Kennedy hand. Do you need the approval of Joe Six-Pack? Lift a beer bottle to your lips. Have you survived the Hanoi Hilton? True grit belongs on Pennsylvania Avenue. I will spare you further examples. The point, as every spinmeister knows, is to charge the image intensely enough, repeat it often enough, spread it wide enough—bloviating all the while—to convince everyone. Perception is all and the method is magic, magic exercised at the cutting edge of technology. So, what is real?
    The comedian Steven Wright tells this joke deadpan: “I woke up one day and everything in the apartment had been stolen and replaced with an exact replica. I said to my roommate, ‘Can you believe this? Everything in the apartment has been stolen and replaced with an exact replica.’ He said, ‘Do I know you?’ ” The joke refracts our world, darkly. If appearances are all the eye can see, why speak of truth at all? Isn’t it there, and there, and there, manifest to all? Thus objectivity—however moot or complex, it remains indispensable to our understanding of reality—becomes truly superficial, simple as pie.

    The politics of perception is marketing by other means, and marketing, I submit, has become our obsession, our malady. America may always have been the land of entrepreneurs and hustlers glorying in greed, but what we experience today, as markets melt down before our eyes, is something else: the grip of an insidious hand outstretched. This is not high finance as we know it, not top-hatted capitalism. This is a radical reconception of human relations in terms of profit; it is an eversion of society itself, crunching credit (credo), subverting faith and trust.
    Church, college, hospital, and local charity have an honored right to seek our support. But try to call a bank, publisher, mortician, insurance agent, health provider, phone or gas or credit card company without dodging a sales pitch. I am not speaking of the princes of skullduggery, men like Bernard Madoff, Michael Milkin, and Jeffrey Skilling, or of the ghouls of the subprime debacle; I am speaking of the way we live, all existence as spam. We even sell by pretending not to sell—it’s called “murketing”—and we buy in a trance. The “numerati”—omniscient analysts of the consumer age—see to that.
    At this point, a voice usually snarls: “You gotta problem with spam? It circulates wealth, keeps the juices going, don’t it? It’s the American way, fella, get used to it.” I flinch but stand my ground, thinking: no, no, spam is a corruption of marketing, and marketing a corruption of giving and taking; they both undermine trust. We all fear not only the Mad Hacker but also the ubiquitous cadgers and subtlers prowling the Web. Once, knowledge promised power; now, trolling information—your data and mine—guarantees lucre. And that’s what happens to “marketing”—we used to say advertising—when it becomes evangelism, indistinguishable from civic or religious zeal. The gospel according to Nielsen.
    But here is the outcome: the individual—the one with a surname, the one with a unique personal history and perhaps a few secrets to keep—fades happily into virtual space.

    With that remark, we approach the inner world, whether in cyberspace or in the mind.
    Though I hardly visit MySpace or Facebook, I know that on these sites the most aching private diary can be read in Tokyo or Timbuktu. Read not once but forever. Read by sympathetic or predatory eyes. On these sites, a person—whatever age, gender, race, class, or sexual inclination—can have not ten but hundreds of “friends.” What, precisely, is the quality of these fungible “friendships”? Has privacy become so antiquated as to merit only a shrug and a rolling of the eyes? Or are we witnessing the emergence of a new self—a cyber or cellular self—a digital leap beyond David Riesman’s “other-directed” person?
    Facebook started at Harvard and then flung open its cyberdoors to the world. I doubt this hospitality came from the heart. In any case, the urge to socialize on the Web becomes the urge to be perceived socializing, to be perceived at all, and in the process to estrange oneself. (We become like those Scribble dolls of the fifties, with blank faces, their features drawn and erased with a special pen.) In this sense, the Web contributes to a virtual ontology: it surpasses politics and economics in validating our phantom being, worldwide.
    Think of celebrity—all glitz, frippery, and folderol. We know how much it depends on perception, reflected in the omniscient eye of the media, the “transparent eyeball” of our time. Celebrity is not only fifteen minutes in everyone’s life, as Andy Warhol—do we remember him?—quipped; it is also cyberfame, everyone’s secret life writ digitally across the universe. What chance has Lucy in the Sky with Diamonds against those hallucinations we call celebrities? And what Paris Hilton or Britney Spears, poor thing, does not pine sometimes to escape our swarming eyes, our roiling ids?

    I have no wish to asperse the young or to ridicule their alternate lives on Web 2.0. My concern is the thinning of the self when perception defines reality, when mirrors line every wall. Americans, of course, have been long charged with smiling vacuity; that is a stereotype demanded by European self-esteem. But is there no world within the world the media project? Should the medium always be the message? And must Narcissus, glazing all our images, define the limits of our trust? No man or woman is wholly transparent: we first assume, and then simply trust, who they are. (The trust from which inwardness derives thrives elsewhere, without self-concern.)
    Perhaps all this is only a matter of generational change, which always overtakes us while we are looking the other way. But Claude Lévi-Strauss thought a society can survive only if it is able to transmit its values from one generation to the next: “As soon as it feels unable to transmit anything, or when it does not know anymore what should be transmitted, it ceases to be able to maintain itself.” The statement cannot be dismissed as conservative. Meaningful change preserves even as it destroys, and all generations are lost only to find themselves again, both in succeeding and in anteceding generations.
    That, at least, is the gist of my experience. And so to experience I come, the experience of my own generation in and out of Egypt—these memories are also beads—before coming to literature and the arts.

    III

    I am writing this very sentence on the Fourth of July, 2008, listening over National Public Radio to several voices read the Declaration of Independence: “When in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people. . . .” It is a list of complaints, you might say cynically—complaints like mine?—and yet so much more than a list; it is a document that rises to a unique historical register. Whatever the myths of the American Revolution, whatever its gritty realities, the republic perdures, framed in a somber question: What happened? What happened to the Great Republic, as Winston Churchill once called it?

    Nothing, for me, makes the changes in America more vivid than my own sense of it as an Egyptian boy. To my feckless crowd, throughout the years of World War II, America meant Chiclets and Lucky Strikes and glorious Hollywood movies (the legs of Betty Grable, the gags of Bob Hope, the swashbuckling of Errol Flynn). For the few of us who had read Moby Dick, The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, or For Whom the Bell Tolls, America may have also meant . . . what? The fringe of darkness in high romance? Violence inhabiting the immensities of space and the human heart? That terrible loneliness, beyond self-reliance, of the American soul? All these are in my highfalutin, critical idiom now, but what Arabic, French, or English words would I have used then?
    In truth, I don’t know what genie planted America so firmly in my head. The act was so free of material duress as to appear gratuitous, even perverse. Yet I still see my errant motive—that long desire, that bright trespass—on faces crossing every meridian in our diasporic times. Let’s say I had a westering spirit, drawn to horizons, to visions of the verge. It’s in the American grain.

    It is facile now to think of America as the global imperium of the dwindling dollar, but that wasn’t always the case.
    When Rommel turned his foxtail on El Alamein, Egyptians did not know whether to weep or cheer. In my hot-headed cohort of engineering students at the University of Cairo, some were pro-German, some pan-Arab, none that I knew pro-British. Didn’t the Union Jack still flutter over the barracks at Kasr-el-Nil? Then the victorious Yanks arrived, with their Ray-Ban glasses and lazy drawls. Many young people, including myself, became instantly infatuated with—or rather, found validation of their fantasies in—these creatures in crisp uniforms, who seemed to have stepped down from a large, flickering screen. It was more than that, of course; it was America itself, its commitment to defeat fascism, its anti-imperialist stance, what we knew then of the American Way of Life. (Lynching was not on our screen; “It’s a free country, ain’t it?” was.) Never, never in history, was so much might expressed with such genial ease.
    I recall Colonel Siemen, a plump judge advocate with steel-rimmed glasses, who came to know my parents somehow. A Philadelphia Jew, he bore unobtrusive good will toward me, taking in hand my “pre-American education,” as he called it, and securing my admission to his alma mater, the University of Pennsylvania. I recall his quick, serious smile, crow’s feet around his eyes, whenever I showed off a bit of Americana. I never saw Colonel Siemen after I left Egypt on a rust-splashed Liberty ship called—yes, really—the Abraham Lincoln. Still, I felt carried away by his generosity, as on a gentle tide, rippling out across the Atlantic, rippling still.
    Others had it, too, that American “willingness of the heart” (F. Scott Fitzgerald). Like Dr. John Brainard of the Moore School of Electrical Engineering at Penn. Mild-mannered despite his crack mathematical mind—he was a co-designer of the original differential analyzer, ENIAC—he recognized my inchoate wish to abandon engineering for literature. Coughing diffidently behind his palm, blue mischief in his eyes, he asked, “Are you sure? Have you read the Elizabethans? Beaumont and Fletcher?” I hadn’t. Still, despite his cheerful puzzlement at my lapse, he eased my crossing over to the wrong side of the professional tracks.
    And Dr. C. Harold Gray, seemingly stolid like a fireplug but with a faraway gaze. He hired me as instructor of English at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute when no one else would entrust me—an intense young man with a foreign accent—with teaching young Americans their own literature. Some thought he favored me because he had once taught at Roberts College in Istanbul. I believe he was himself a maverick and liked to take risks. He saw life as an adventure in the old American way; he liked to lend a hand here, there tweak fate. So why not hire a lapsed engineer to teach English to would-be engineers?
    Then Dr. Victor Butterfield, president of Wesleyan University, visionary with gnarled hands and thin, craggy face. He interviewed me one summer while driving his bulldozer, clearing out boulders on his New England farm. My seat next to his was bumpy, the interview smooth. We spoke of Plato and Akhenaton, Billy Buddand Science in the Modern World. (Whitehead was his intellectual hero.) Butterfield hired me, I believe—hired me in his head—before we dismounted from the monster machine. Sixteen years later, I left Wesleyan a changed man after arguing ideas with gifted colleagues and, terrified into a semblance of pedagogic competence, learning to teach from smart students confident of their future.
    Where but in America? Common as these events seem—and that’s also the point, that they are common—they reveal a large aspect of this “fresh, green breast of the new world” (Fitzgerald again), still flowering for wanderers and sojourners of every kind. Oh, I admit it: I believe in the pursuit of happiness. Like other immigrants and expatriates, I believe in that ideal, peerless among nations, richer than the dream of riches within the American Dream. But that is only a partial admission.

    Earlier in this essay, I asked: what happened in America? I ask again, and this time two images, two actual photos, float into my mind. One, taken in 1961, shows Louis Armstrong, cheeks puffed, eyes closed—I imagine the eyes laughing behind their lids—and trumpet tilted toward the sun, playing for a jubilant throng of Egyptian children in front of a hospital in Cairo. The other, snapped secretly some four decades later in Abu Ghraib, shows a prisoner . . . do I need to describe that grisly parody of the Statue of Liberty? The latter we rightly remember, the former we sadly forget. Two sides of America or the same side? Say, rather, part of an endless montage that includes literature, all the arts.
    Oh, those supermarket peaches, glorious in their skin, tasting of Styrofoam within: they are not all that America grows. A great literature has sprung from this soil.

    IV

    I come to the jewel among the beads: art. But does high art still enjoy wide esteem? Will it survive television, the computer, the delirium of our super malls? Can it still purvey the truth we need lest we perish? (I know: we perish anyway.)
    American popular arts—film, television, music, song—are the gold and tinsel of entertainment in our time, sometimes both in the same glance, the same beat or breath. Their underside, like the hidden face of Dorian Gray, is a grotesquely contorted image of America: drugs, violence, crime, promiscuity, an anarchic licentiousness that doubles as the world’s id. “They” loathe us because, among other things, we offer what they crave but cannot admit they want. In this sense, the Great Satan acquires the shadow of sense.
    But what of high art, “serious” art? The question still matters though high and low have mixed in the wondrous achievements of the last half century—say, the works of Norman Mailer, the dramatic productions of Julie Taymor, the art of Robert Rauschenberg, the music and lyrics of Bob Dylan, Joni Mitchell, or Bruce Springsteen, and innumerable films. The question still matters because art may be the last refuge of our inwardness, our spiritual life: it can never be all surface, it enfolds reality, it confronts even “the end: ice, chastity, null” (Thomas Mann).
    Art, however, is notoriously long. Here, I will concern myself only with literature, particularly the scrambling of fact and fiction—symptomatic of our moment, so corrosive of trust.

    For several decades now, writers—prize-winning journalists, novelists, memoirists, even scientists—have played fast and loose with the root assumptions of fiction and nonfiction, plagiarism and originality. The scams merit little attention in themselves; their authors are forgettable. But the issue remains central, gathering in itself other issues of authorial integrity, audience trust, ultimately the nature of appearance and reality. Lurking behind all the chicaneries, the fraying of fantasies and hyping of facts, is that old, intuitive sense of veracity. (Without that sense, Oprah will continue to scold her literary mountebanks in vain.)
    The issue is no less ethical than epistemological, though ethical in multiple and surprising ways. It reaches beyond the lust for celebrity in a culture of surfaces. It spurns the pseudo-philosophical point that fiction and fact are both mental constructs, and so finally indistinguishable. (Oh, yeah? Cry wolf once too often and see who runs to your aid.) It transcends the neurological and psychological debates about the unreliability of memory, the fictive element in recall. Indeed, the issue, like so many human issues, returns to us, audiences and readers everywhere, how we live, who we are, how we speak, and the stories we tell as fabulating and confabulating creatures.
    Confabulating? Is literature, then, but another sweet lie?

    Here we need to widen our view, for the quarrel of fiction and fact, poetry and history—the quarrel about versions of truth—reverts, after all, to Plato and Aristotle, and has echoed through the ages in different cultures and climes. It still sounds, for instance, in the kerfuffles between historians like Inga Clendinnen and novelists like Kate Grenville, enlivening the current Australian scene. Who can deal better—more thoroughly, more insightfully—with the genocide of Aborigines? Who skews the truth more? And what about that smarmy statement, fronting so many novels, that “any resemblance to real people, living or dead, is unintended”? Is this a legal fiction or an empirical fact?
    Nicholas Jose, an Australian writer of fiction and nonfiction, concludes: “We seem to be very complex creatures when it comes to questions of representation, willing to be deceived, yet not completely.” Just how much deceived? Author, author! we cry, and find unbearable the thought that a work, whatever its genre, gives us no emotional access to a fellow human being, preferably its author. This naiveté—if that’s what it is—animates literature, and has done so from the start. This simplicity—if that’s what it is—will never be wrested, nor should it be, from every reader’s heart. We want literary works to answer; we want someone to reach out to us through all the verbal ceremonies and forms. But that someone is not the author, a creature with a hand that sweats and bleeds: it is a verbal being.
    Hence, I would submit, the importance of the label, the integrity of the genre, especially if it applies to the “nonfiction novel” or “creative nonfiction.” The label tells readers how they may approach the author, adjust their expectations, receive the work. It also reminds writers—however devious their memories, however lively their imaginations—of their particular relation to audiences, the grounds on which they seek trust. Trust the novel, not the novelist, D. H. Lawrence cried. Precisely: dead or undead, the author tends to fib. Trust also the memoir, not the memoirist, Lawrence might as well have cried, because something in the act of good writing, of writing and endless rewriting—perhaps the fierce genius of language itself—burns off the human dross and lets the truth of writing shine through, sometimes as glimmer and sometimes as blaze, despite the author who sweats and bleeds. (In the end, the “verbal being” is all we really trust.)
    Still, the trust we put in fiction and the trust we put in nonfiction are not of the same kind, as I want to show in a signal example: J. M. Coetzee’s Diary of a Bad Year.

    V

    The critical consensus about Coetzee is firm, and it includes members of the Nobel Prize and Booker Prize committees. Nevertheless, I want to demur at some aspects of his most recent work, a quilt—I almost said pastiche—of brilliant aperçus, bearish opinions, and narrative games.
    Diary of a Bad Year comprises a trinity of parallel texts on the page, “spoken” by interacting figures. The first—let’s call him JC—is the author of concise essays, packed with ideas and prejudices on topics ranging from the origins of the state to Dostoyevsky. The second figure, C, is a celebrated, wintry writer who tersely confides his life to a diary. The third, Anya, is a warm and lovely young woman, with dark hair and a “derrière so near to perfect as to be angelic.” She types C’s essays, comments irreverently on everyone, including her caddish lover Alan, and calls the great writer Señor.
    Reading through the various layers on the page, I wondered: why this, why now? Nearly half a century has slipped away since the postmodern experiments of John Barth, Julio Cortázar, and Michel Butor, since the fractional lectures of John Cage and antic essays of sundry paracritics. Why would Coetzee resort to the conceit of yoking fiction and nonfiction on the same page, indulging himself with wacky self-criticism and writerly in-jokes? A phrase, appearing below an essay called “On Terrorism,” kept tugging at my mind. The writer there, presumably C, says: “An opportunity to grumble in public, an opportunity to take magic revenge on the world for declining to conform to my fantasies: how could I refuse?” Somewhat irritably, I thought: he means “ignoring,” not “declining to conform to,” and his self-irony does not cancel the point about “magic revenge.” This reflexive critique, whether in Anya’s, or C’s, or JC’s mouth, won’t wash.
    In serious reading, however, irritation should serve only to clarify its own cause. Why my impatience with this text? Because of its dislocations, which necessitated reading and rereading, remembering and flipping the pages back and forth, lifting up my eyes then dropping them down again? Perhaps. But the game, though mechanical at first, compels readers to query premature closures of their reading, and therein lies a certain pleasure of the text. Then there is the childish, riddling delight of figuring out things for oneself, playing with time and space like a small-time demiurge, which is what every reader wants.
    Whence the irritation then? Can it be the ethos of the superimposed essays? They display concinnity, yield startling insights, express some views I honor and values I share. Still, the essays—“laments, fulminations, curses,” as C himself remarks—will never be mistaken for the urbane meditations of Michel de Montaigne (woken to music every morning of his childhood). But why carp? Coetzee seems hard enough on himself—no hostile critics need apply.
    What about half-friendly critics, though? Perhaps all of Coetzee’s tricks of anticipation, preemption, and self-subversion serve only to excuse, in fact to validate, their author. Then, again, I wonder: where is empathy, where compassion, for the strong as well as for the weak, for the bad and the ugly as well as the good? Great writers—Shakespeare, Tolstoy, Melville, but not Dante—strike through the mask of villainy, through evil itself, to seize the mangled human being within. Are historical figures—George W. Bush, John Howard, Tony Blair—wholly exempt from our deeper understanding?
    Perhaps that’s what politics, bloody-minded politics, demands. Perhaps, also, that’s what Coetzee’s armchair “anarchism” entails—he calls it “pessimistic anarchistic quietism,” in self-parody. Then, again, perhaps the tone is due to the need of a “selfish child . . . who has turned into a cold man” to expiate his imaginary sins. And, of course, there’s always Africa itself, all those failed states, blood and bile flowing in the heart of darkness, guilt blanketing the continent like jungle heat. But these are all extraneous speculations.
    When all is said and undone, though, Diary of a Bad Year remains a warped text, neither fiction nor nonfiction; more, the “verbal being” who inhabits it eludes my trust. The driving force, the real conatus, of the work, despite its small drama of love, loneliness, and death, is less imaginative than political, is at best cerebral. Can we still make such distinctions after the works of Mann, Musil, Borges, Broch? I believe we can, becauseDiary of a Bad Year does not wholly surmount—sublimate? sublate?—its own animus as good novels do. I close the book feeling that Coetzee still wants something from me. What? All I know is: I’m not ready to assent.

    VI

    Here I reveal my own prejudices about art, about the novel particularly, and about the current clamor of nonfiction (including this very essay).
    For me, the Kantian criterion of “disinterestedness”—pleasure “without a concept”—still holds despite the turbid tides of ideologies sweeping over the world since the Critique of Judgment appeared in 1790. The criterion holds, not only because it “suspends” existence for a time, and not only because it permits the “free play of imagination,” but also because, in its self-relinquishment, it invites trust. In that sense, all disinterestedness is spiritual: it turns us into “transparent eyeballs,” for as long as it lasts. “All mean egotism vanishes. I am nothing, I see all,” said the man from Concord. (Of course, the bounties of fiction are not all spiritual; they are also adaptive, evolutionary, as Denis Dutton convincingly shows in The Art Instinct.)
    But an ironic serendipity here intrudes: Coetzee himself knows that stories—unlike dogmas, documents, opinions—“tell themselves.” More, in an essay titled “On Authority in Fiction” in Diary of a Bad Year, he notes: “What the great authors are masters of is authority. . . . But what if authority can be attained only by opening the poet-self to some higher force, by ceasing to be oneself and beginning to speak vatically?” For us, who listen rather than speak, a story draws us out of ourselves while the teller’s breath still hangs within the sanctum of our hearing. Isn’t that auricular kenosis?
    “Once upon a time”: yes, yes. This “yes” knows a certain truth, the truth of imaginative trust. This “yes” is also what a deep reading of literature demands, the kind of reading implied in Emil Filla’s haunting portrait of Kafka, titled “A Reader of Dostoyevsky”: the very image not just of absorption, but of self-recognition in self-loss.

    Nothing here would surprise readers of earlier generations. In An Experiment in Criticism, C. S. Lewis remarks: “In reading good literature, I become a thousand men. . . . I transcend myself; and I am never more myself than when I do.” Nor is anything here alien to later generations—generations are not cast in iron—that might include, say, a Junot Diaz, Pulitzer Prize–winner for fiction in 2008. A small-town librarian in New Jersey saved him from being “young and knuckleheaded,” from being poor, brown, immigrant, rejected, by opening the wide world of reading for him. Thus, at a recent Sydney Writers’ Festival, Diaz praised readers (not writers, mind you, and not even literature): “We readers will be remembered more than any individual writer for safeguarding that delicate web of human interconnectivity that so many forces wish to buy, capture, enslave, and mine.”
    Hear, hear! That “delicate web of human interconnectivity” depends on imaginative trust. (No, literature does not lie.) Still, the Internet is here, not just to stay but to evolve, and the fate of book reading remains in doubt. Studies say this, studies say that, as pols and experts haggle. Meanwhile, young and old alike lead their lives, lost as always in the continual translations of existence, in the play of appearances and whatever reality may be intuited or grasped.

    VII

    We have reached the last few beads on the wire, and a moment of reflection about my own sense, my own translations, of the topic is due.
    Statisticians may come to more cheery conclusions about emergent America, but statistics are not destiny, and in any case I prophesy nothing. I let my bafflement about the present stand; I refuse nostalgia. Thus, my critique of surfaces does not call for a return to mystifying depths or repressive hierarchies. If anything, it pleads the interdebtedness of all things. Buddhists know this, ecologists, cultural holists. Creation is not segregated but immanent. Betty Jean Craige reminds us in Laying the Ladder Down that a flutter of butterfly wings, in chaos theory, may explode into a Caribbean hurricane. So lay that ladder down: there’s no place to climb or descend.
    But that does not mean reality is skin deep. Holistic views assume myriad relations invisible to the eye—the self-involved eye. Surfaces do reveal, but they also deceive. (Plastic surgery will not cure us of the human condition.) The Hollywood metaphysician Groucho Marx once remarked: “The secret of life is honesty and fair dealing. If you can fake that, you’ve got it made.” Sometimes I think we’ve all got it made in that way. Given the tyranny of appearances, how else would the ego act? Is there no way out? Must there be a way out?

    Once, at a small, lakeside resort in Wisconsin, sunset calming the water, my wife Sally and I watched children run and splash on the beach with a last, shrill burst of play while Mozart’s “Gran Partita” wafted down from speakers in the trees. Moodily, I said to Sally: “Do they hear it? Do they know what’s going on?” She looked at the children, the darkening oaks, maples, and firs, a patch of pale light hovering over the canopy, and without turning to me replied: “They are what is going on.” Perhaps that is the way out. But perhaps, in her mind as well as in mine, some larger idea waited to break out and take flight in the evening air. An idea lighter than air, an idea of nothing.

    Nothing. Lao Tzu says: “Thirty spokes share the wheel’s hub, but it is the hole in the center that provides its usefulness.” Likewise, beads and wire trace an empty space on the table, freed from needy fingers at last. Hole and hub, the prayer beads in a circle, zero, the Greek omicron and Hindu sunya and Arabic sifr—these reveal the foundations of the universe. As Robert Kaplan puts it in his wonderful book, The Nothing That Is: “If you look at zero you see nothing; but look through it and you will see the world.” How many of us can see the world through nothing? We understand foolish Lear better when he cries: “Nothing comes out of nothing.” (A slogan for marketers.) Yet it was the old king himself, grief-maddened and heath-wild, who discovered that naked we see reality at last.

    Alice's addiction in Cyberland

    'Second Life', by Chris Johnston


    BY ADAM MCKENNA
    Second LifeAs we continue to become tools of our tools, we risk mistaking online social networking for social capital. Social networking is widespread because humans are social animals, and technology has changed the way we live, interact and seek to interact.

    In the BBC documentary Wonderland: Virtual Adultery and Cyberspace Love, a 37-year-old American housewife almost forgets her husband and four children exist as she pursues an online relationship in the virtual world ofSecond Life. Her online persona is a scantily-clad, raven-haired beauty; her in-game beau impossibly muscle-bound and brandishing twin Uzi sub-machineguns.

    It seems inconceivable, but while for many users, virtual worlds — or 'metaverses' — are merely something to dip their toes into, others fall in head first, to the extent that it pervades their waking thoughts even when they are not logged in.

    Often touted as a glimpse at the possible 3D future of the web, Second Life, which celebrated its sixth anniversary in June, is a 'sandbox' experience in which gameplay is open-ended and driven by user-created content.

    It is often described as an MMORPG (Massively Multiplayer Online Role Playing Game), but I prefer the moniker MUSH (Multi-user Shared Hallucination) — a journey down the rabbit hole in which deep vein thrombosis is not the only travail that may await the unwary.

    The avatar itself, a 3D wire frame swathed in textures and invariably younger than the person behind it, is a kind of projection into the ether with which the virtual realm is experienced.

    The word 'avatar' has its origins in Sanskrit and can be taken to mean the 'descent of the god' to earth. This is fitting, due to the manner in which individuals seek to edit and control what happens in their game experience — a potted life that can be micro-managed like a bonsai, right down to the ability to edit the day/night cycle.

    Second Life allows that the interior world of the individual to be rendered in a public space in an anonymous and relatively risk-free manner — indeed I have heard enthusiasts refer to it as the 'inside world of people'. (I can't help but think of Marianne Moore's line about 'imaginary gardens with real toads in them'.)

    Devotees distinguish between the virtual world and 'meatspace' — ordinary life — a distinction that presupposes that something is wrong with reality. As with many hidden worlds of the internet, it's a parable of belonging and adulation, with interest group titles displayed above avatar heads, and profiles — which can be accessed by clicking on the avatar's name — detailing their in-world 'friends', 'fathers', 'mothers' and even 'children'.

    With no specific site to deal with addiction to this phenomenon, the afflicted googled themselves to The Elliptic Blog's Second Life Addiction thread. The result is a frightening catalogue of neglect and self-neglect, of disintegrating families, foreclosures, relationships ruined, and businesses going belly up as a result of individuals diving too deeply into this online realm.

    A teen bemoans the fact that both parents are too busy 'managing' their virtual club to give her any attention. Spouses speak of strangers that were once intimates, lost to an illusion of life. A distraught wife relates how her husband hoards happy snaps of his online romances, prizing them over real ones.

    Greek thinkers like Leucippus and Democritus, who first posited the notion of a world composed of atoms, would marvel at people willing to exchange it for one of pixels. Yet the fact that so many adults find themselves lost in here is perhaps more testimony to the power of the human mind, than the medium itself — after all, although in some ways is is an extraordinary creative platform, Second Life is only a kind of advanced 3D chat.

    Second Life merely reflects forces at work in the wider developed world — the corporeal one, of flesh and bone, where time ravages our envelope of flesh, and society worships the unravaged. The tweaking of the avatar is cosmetic surgery. The lack of standard game elements such as level progression or any guiding principle becomes a void in which endless consumption becomes the goal — virtual items paid for with real money — mirroring the endless dissatisfaction coded into us by a culture predicated on instant gratification.

    Second LifeIn the course of my own investigations — and like a cop infiltrating a bikie gang, at times I wasn't sure if I was investigating or participating — I encountered a circle of avatars dancing in synch beside a blazing pixel fire at a simulated beach on an actual weekend, expressing their dismay that their teenage children were addicted to World of Warcraft (another, and even more popular MMO game).

    'My son suffers from an affliction called WOW,' said one, apparently a mother. 'Oh my ... so does mine!' exclaimed another. 'Is he OK?'

    The irony was perhaps lost on them.

    As we continue to become 'tools of our tools', as Henry David Thoreau warned long ago, we risk mistaking online social networking for social capital (real 'meatspace' connections between people and groups of people). If this phenomenon is widespread it's because humans are essentially social animals, and technology has changed the way we live, interact and seek to interact. It manipulates us, as much as we manipulate it.

    Richard Dawkins has pointed out that Moore's Law, which dictates that computer processing power effectively doubles every 18 months, means it is almost inevitable that coming virtual worlds will contain avatars that look like real people. This does not bode well for the future.

    And in the present, sharp increases in user hours and economic activity in the first quarter of 2009 (up 42 per cent and 65 per cent respectively over the corresponding quarter last year) perhaps indicate an influx of cyber refugees, sheltering in imaginary worlds from economic storms.

    The concept of a digital life is indeed troubling, but there may be a positive side to all of this in that people seem prepared to bare their souls, safely hidden behind a pixel doll. Even if they do wear a mask, to some extent this creates an atmosphere ripe for reasoning about how to live. 'You level-up when you quit the game', a European legal professional and resident told me in-game, 'by realising what you have to fix in your real life.'

    Intriguingly, virtual worlds may be a means of reasoning about what is worth doing, by doing something that is perhaps not. Even so, in other cases Alice may need some help in finding her way back from Cyberland.

    The Facade of Arms Control

    bombLast week the press variously celebrated and bemoaned the UK refusal of a few export licenses for components for Saar gunships to Israel. The Jerusalem Post claimed that Britain had blocked a 'third of all arms exports to Israel this year' while the Daily Mail 'accused' Miliband of imposing a partial embargo on Israel and claimed, falsely, that Miliband 'decided to revoke all arms export licenses to Tel Aviv following the (Gaza) offensive'. In fact the government had revoked five, out of 182, existing licenses to Israel.

    When it comes to the issue of arms sales to Israel the British government likes to try to position itself on both sides of the fence. Or, put another way, likes to try to convince thepublic that arms to Israel are restricted while allowing the arms industry freedom to export exactly what they want.

    Since the invasion of Gaza during January 2009, where Israel presented the world with a catalogue of war crimes enabled by a plentiful supply of foreign weapons, the UK's exports to Israel have come under increased scrutiny. In January hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets, trashed businesses linked to the occupation and pelted the Israeli embassy with shoes. In actions throughout January solidarity activists caused hundreds of thousands of pounds worth of damage to EDO MBM/ITT in Brighton, blockaded BAE systems in Newcastle, demonstrated outside UAV engines in Lichfield and occupied the roof of Raytheon in Bristol for over five weeks. In February Amnesty International reported that components from UAV engines in Lichfield had probably been utilised in Israeli drones during the bombing of Gaza and that an arms embargo should be imposed against Israel.

    The result of this public resistance and general outcry over arms to Israel is that the government, at first, responded by saying it could not be sure that British weapons were not used during the Gaza bombardment. Then, in April, David Miliband admitted that British weapons had, in fact, without doubt been used in Gaza, predominantly, he said, in Israeli F-16s, Apache helicopters and Saar gunships . All but the latter were exported to the US and re-exported to Israel. The government promised to review all extant export licences to Israel in the light of the 'new situation' after Operation Cast Lead. Miliband said, in April, that "I can confirm that we are looking at all licenses to see whether there is any need for reconsideration in the light of recent events in Gaza," In July the Foreign Office announced that, as a result of this increased scrutiny, it had reviewed its export licenses to Israel and had disallowed five licenses on the ground that they could be used for 'repression'. These were the licenses relating to the Saar Courvette gunship, the only weapon directly exported to Israel that Miliband had admitted that Israel used in Gaza.

    The corporate media, whatever side of the fence they may be on, have sought to make much of these license refusals as a step toward further control of, or an embargo on, arms to Israel. It is worth noting that this facade is what the government wanted to achieve. The state's policy on arming Israel in the last ten years has been simple; to allow as much as possible, the unfettered export of weapons components bound for Israel from British companies and, in the face of growing public opposition and resistance, to create the false impression that arms exports are subject to strict controls. After the public bouts of resistance in 2002, following the Israeli invasion of the West Bank and Gaza and crushing of the Palestinian authority, Jack Straw tightened controls on direct exports but not on parts being exported via the US. After the far more effective resistance to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon of 2006, where a citizens decommissioning took place at Raytheon in Derry and break ins occurred at bases where US planes were refueling en route to take arms to Israel, the government imposed stricter restrictions on export of components for the F-16. However, actual UK arms exports to Israel are increasing steadily. So what is exactly is being exported?

    The government claims that heavy weapons, such as tanks, warships and artillery have not been granted export licenses to Israel since 1997 and according to Bill Rammell, no license for a 'whole item' (that is, presumably, a whole weapon) has been approved since 2002. Perhaps this is why British companies have become so prominent in the manufacture of electrical weapons components. One such company EDO MBM/ITT who manufacture circuit boards, arming units and bomb racks designed specifically for use with the Israeli F-16 bomb carriage, the VER-2 have been subject to a relentless direct action campaign in Brighton (see www.smashedo.org.uk). As a result of the campaign the company has become symbolic of an industry that, as one campaigner put it, makes 'the nuts and bolts and bits and bobs that make weapons work'. Amnesty International, in their report, Fueling Conflict, state that 'the introduction in 2002 of revised UK guidelines for the control of exports of components for incorporation in military systems were specifically intended to allow the export of UK components to the USA for incorporation in military equipment such as F-16 combat aircraft and Apache combat helicopters which were known be exported to Israel' but that, conveniently, 'details contained within UK government reports do not allow for a meaningful assessment of the end-user of this equipment' .

    One smokescreen to public understanding of the issue is the lack of available information on exports. The government does not publish details of the individual products being exported or the corporations exporting them. The Department of Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (DBERR) publishes details of export licenses which have been approved, refused and their value but no details on what, specifically, has been exported or by who. Another stumbling block, in terms of the possibility of public knowledge, is the unavailability of information relating to arms exports through Freedom of Information (FOI) requests. For example, FOI requests asking for information on EDO MBM/ITT's exports to Israel have been uniformly refused and are now subject to an appeal to the information commissioner.

    The government, during and since the Gaza invasion, made use of the lack of public understanding about the nature of export licenses to make disingenuous statements about its exports to Israel. In January both Bill Rammell and David Miliband claimed that Britain had not granted licenses for goods associated with armoured personnel carriers, F 16s or Apache helicopters since the Israeli bombing of Lebanon in 2006. To the average observer this might suggest that no exports had occurred since 2006. The reality is that many export licenses granted to UK companies are 'Open Individual Export Licenses' (OIELs) which allow the export of a category of equipment from the UK military list until the license is revoked, in theory the licenses can remain in place forever (although apparently they are usually reviewed every five years). So, to imply that the fact that no licenses had been granted since 2006 meant that arms exports to Israel were tightly controlled is a travesty, what about all the license granted before 2006 that still remain in place. Bearing in mind that OIELs still remain in place since pre-2006 and that this statement may not encompass component parts of weapons, it is necessary to look at actual export figures. In fact, according to figures quoted in Amnesty International's recent report, Fueling Conflict, actual direct exports from the UK to Israel have increased more than tenfold since 2006. From the Export Control Organisation's reports we can see that, licenses granted included, for example, 'components for combat aircraft', 'components for military electronic equipment', 'components for airborne electronic warfare equipment' and 'components for unmanned aerial vehicles' .

    The UK's tightening of arms control after bouts of Israeli repression is matched by a liberal flow of arms in the run up to them. In 2002, as Israel was gearing up Operation Defensive Shield, UK arms exports to Israel doubled. In 2005, the year before Israel's attack on Lebanon which killed over a thousand people in less than a month, the UK exported £22.5 million worth of arms to Israel, twice the amount exported in 2004. In the first three quarters of 2008, prior to Israel's attack on Gaza, Britain exported £27 million worth of arms to Israel - an unprecedented amount.

    It is worth saying, however, that the UK's steps to revoke export licenses show that the government perceives a need to provide a sop to public dissent against exports to Israel. The strength of resistance in the UK, unprecedented in any other country outside the Middle-East, to the Gaza bombing and the growing movement in solidarity with Palestine has clearly disturbed the government. This can be seen, elsewhere, in DEFRA's consideration of legality of the sale of Israeli settlement goods in the UK and in the British embassy's cancellation of a move of its offices into a property owned by an Israeli settlement developer.

    The state is responding to widespread resistance to arms exports to Israel steadily imposing controls on the arms industry which they hope that companies will be able to circumvent. In turn, the arms industry has responded by moving into the market for components incorporated into US weapons bound for Israel. In that context the companies profiting the most from Israel's war crimes may be those manufacturing 'the bits and bobs' that make the weapons work.

    Corporate Watch
    oCcrporate Watch

    Climate change 'threatens' Pacific isles


    pacific-islands-seek-low-cost-storm-prot-1393388099-large.jpg

    Oxfam says residents of the Pacific islands will be the ones to suffer if Australia and New Zealand fail to act on climate change

    New Zealand and Australia need to take urgent action against climate change to stop neighbouring Pacific Islands becoming uninhabitable, charity Oxfam says.



    Millions of people from developing Pacific nations faced increased risk from cyclones, storm surges, king tides and ecosystem destruction due to climate change, the development agency said in a report released on Monday.

    "Without a significant effort by developed countries now, some island nations in the Pacific face the very real threat of becoming uninhabitable in the decades ahead," the report's writers said.

    People living in poorer Pacific nations already faced higher rates of malarial infection, more frequent flooding and were losing land and being forced from their homes, Oxfam said.

    "It makes financial sense to act now, given that for every dollar spent on disaster preparedness and risk reduction, two to ten dollars is saved in disaster response."

    The report called for New Zealand and Australia to reduce carbon emissions by 40 per cent by 2020 and by 95 per cent by 2050.

    'Urgent action' needed

    On Sunday, New Zealand's Climate Change Minister Nick Smith said a 40 per cent cut by 2020, compared to 1990, was neither achievable nor affordable and would have too great an economic impact.

    However, the Oxfam report recommended urgent action to avoid being forced into making more drastic choices in coming decades.

    "It is in Australia and New Zealand's best interests to take this action now.

    "The more frequent disasters caused by climate change will require Australia and New Zealand to respond, and the displacement of people in the Pacific due to rising sea levels will force them to look for new homelands," the report's writers said.

    By 2050, eight million people in the Pacific Islands may need to find new places to live, along with 75 million people in the Asia Pacific region, it said.

    Oxfam advised the governments of developed nations to begin considering how to deal with the looming issue.

    The development agency supported a "polluter pays" scheme where New Zealand should pay $NZ792 million ($A637.3 million) and Australia $A43 billion to help repair the environmental costs of developing their economies.

    Malaria, dengue fever risk

    Oxfam called for more resources to be directed toward tapping into local knowledge, as well as a renewed focus on sustainable livelihoods, food sources and water supplies.

    Oxfam also warned of increasing coral bleaching, where climatic change kills the organisms making up the coral, causing the surrounding ecosystem to collapse.

    Pacific reefs faced a "significantly reduced ability" to provide food - for both local people and fishermen coming for tuna and other high-value fish, it said.

    The report's writers also called attention to research probing the link between climate change and health, specifically mentioning the spread of malaria and dengue fever.

    In Papua New Guinea's Western Highlands, researchers had recorded a large jump in the number of reported cases of malaria, from 638 in 2000 to 4,986 in 2005.

    "For countries like Kiribati, Tuvalu, Tokelau, the Marshall Islands, Fiji, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea and the Federated States of Micronesia, climate change is not something that could happen in the future but something they are experiencing now," Oxfam said.

    Iceland Proves That in a Financial Crisis, Breaking Glass and Trashing Currency is a Good Remedy

    The headline exaggerates, but not by much. Back in April, a Vanity Fair story about Iceland's remarkable financial blow up was grist for a Vanity Fair story by Michael Lewis, "Wall Street on the Tundra". The quick version is that Icelandic men were not merely reckless, that is such a common male pathology as to barely warrant mention, but were possessed of a particular fondness for physical aggression and bullheadedness that helped made Iceland ground zero for the most spectacular banking industry boom and bust in the history of man. Iceland managed to go on a debt party that saw its obligations soar to 850% of GDP, leaving America at a mere 350% firmly in the dust.

    So how is Iceland faring now? One would assume still broke and chastened. One would be dead wrong.

    The krona is down 50% from its peak, and it seems to have sparked a speedy revival. I remarked when Iceland fell apart that someone should swoop in and buy a business that sold strictly in international markets (I had thought fish oil would be a good candidate). But that takes time, legwork, and walking around money.

    This is the same remedy that the Nordic countries used in their banking crises, save they nationalized the banks, put in new management, cleaned them up, and reprivatized them, But they also devalued their currencies versus the ECU.

    But Iceland and the Nordic countries can make move like that without precipitating competitive devaluations. What works individually does not work collectively.

    The EU bashing is a bit heavy handed, but the general comments are nevertheless useful

    BTW, reader Richard Kiine is in Iceland now, perhaps he can give a report when he returns.

    From Ambrose Evans-Pritchard at the Telegraph:
    The krona has fallen by half against the euro since the `New Viking' trio of Landsbanki, Glitnir, and Kaupthing strayed out of their depth and brought down Iceland's financial system.

    Nothing is cheap, but prices have come within reach. Reykjavik's cafés are packed with euro-youth, at last able to afford a taste of all-night dancing at this Arctic Ibiza...

    Out in Iceland's Eastern fjords, Alcoa has raised aluminium production to record levels – and metal matters as much as fish for exports.

    "The smelters are running full speed," said the new-broom finance minister, Steingrimur Sigfusson. So is Mr Sigfusson himself. Last week he launched three new banks on the ruins of the old. Normality is returning. "We are going to get through this better than feared. We're feeling real activity in the economy, and much of this comes from a favourable exchange rate," said Mr Sigfusson.

    Iceland's great lurch towards casino capitalism over the last decade has a cultural logic. "We are a fishing culture: when the herring is there, we take it," said Andri Snaer Magnason, author of `Dreamland: A Self-Help Manual for a Frightened Nation'.
    There was no easier catch on offer than the Greenspan bubble and the global "carry trade". How could fishermen resist?
    In one sense it was a terrifying shock for the 310,000 inhabitants of this Norse-Celtic outpost of lava rock to see their currency, banks, and global image crash in a single week last autumn. Yet nothing has really changed.

    "Everything still feels normal. The services of the state are intact. The swimming pool is open. You can still have a decent heart attack in Iceland," said Mr Magnason.

    "Friends who lost jobs in banking have already found new work, and you could say the krona has worked as a buffer for us. We all went down together, and that has led to healthier recession without mass unemployment."

    The jobless rate has risen to 9.1pc. This is below the eurozone average of 9.5pc, and is stabilising much earlier.

    Those who point to Iceland as a scarecrow exhibit of what happens to a small country caught in a financial storm without the shield of euro membership have the matter backwards, as will become ever clearer over the next two years.

    The OECD expects Iceland's economy to shrink 7pc this year. This is much better than Ireland at minus 9.8pc, and recovery will come sooner. So next time you hear the Sacra Congregatio of the euro faith incant yet again that EMU saved Ireland from a terrible fate, know that they deceive only themselves.

    You take your punishment early with devaluation, as Britain did on leaving Gold in 1931, or ending the D-mark torture in 1992, or now. You look a sorry sight at first, but sweet vindication comes later.

    It is those caught in a deflation trap with fixed exchange rates that face slow asphyxiation, and deeper social damage. Youth unemployment is already 34pc in Spain, 28pc in Latvia, 25pc in Italy, 24pc in Greece, and rising.

    At Iceland's central bank – mercifully, no longer listed beside al Qaeda as a terrorist body by UK authorities – Governor Svein Harald Oygard says currency therapy is working as it should. "If you lean back and look you can see that fall of the krona accentuated the shock at first, but it is also now working as a turbocharger for recovery.

    "We've seen a strong hit on wealth and asset values, but the story for real economy is very different."

    Devaluation is always double-edged. Some 13pc of households in Iceland hold mortgages in euros, Swiss francs, or God forbid, yen. Their debt levels doubled overnight.

    Some 70pc of corporate loans are in foreign currencies. Exporters are hedged. Those that earn in krona are not, and a "large number" are now in dire straits.

    The Governor is a Norwegian who cut his teeth in the Oslo banking crisis of the early 1990s. He was brought in as a troubleshooter after the last crew was literally banged out of the Sedlabanki by the Saucepan Revolution in February.
    With justifiable pride, he showed me the latest trade figures. Iceland has defied the global shipping crash to eke out an 11pc rise in exports over the last year. Even China has seen a fall of 21pc.

    Iceland will be back in surplus by next year, from a peak deficit of 25pc of GDP. You could say the same about Latvia, which has stuck to its euro peg under orders from Brussels. But there is a big difference.

    Latvia is balancing its books by crushing demand. Exports are down 28pc, but imports are down even more. The result of this Stone Age policy is economic contraction of 18pc this year, and 4pc in 2010 (state data).

    Icelanders have taken a hit, of course. Unions have accepted 'real' wage cuts of 10pc. Health care and welfare is being cut 5pc, education 7pc, and the rest 10pc. This is comparable to what is happening in Ireland, but again there is a difference. Dublin faces a Sysphean task as collapsing tax revenues force ever deeper austerity: Reykjavik is over the worst.

    It baffles me why rating agencies still talk of downgrading Iceland's debt to junk. The country should emerge with public debt of 80pc to 100pc of GDP – much like Britain. Yet Iceland also has the world's best-funded pension system at 120pc of GDP. It is the two together that counts.

    In their angst, Icelanders look wistfully at the apparent safe port of EU membership. The Althingi has voted to start entry talks. But the storm will have blown over well before an EU referendum is held in two or three years. By then the delayed cluster bomb of Europe's unemployment will have detonated. Try selling EU protection then.

    naked capitalism

    26.7.09

    Revealed: The Secret Evidence of Global Warming Bush Tried to Hide

    Photos from US spy satellites declassified by the Obama White House provide the first graphic images of how the polar ice sheets are retreating in the summer. The effects on the world's weather, environments and wildlife could be devastating

    by Suzanne Goldenberg and Damian Carrington

    Graphic images that reveal the devastating impact of global warming in the Arctic have been released by the US military. The photographs, taken by spy satellites over the past decade, confirm that in recent years vast areas in high latitudes have lost their ice cover in summer months.

    [Satellite images of polar ice sheets taken in July 2006 and July 2007 showing the retreating ice during the summer. (Photograph: Public Domain) To see larger image: http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/jul/26/climate-change-obama-administration#zoomed-picture]Satellite images of polar ice sheets taken in July 2006 and July 2007 showing the retreating ice during the summer. (Photograph: Public Domain) To see larger image: http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/jul/26/climate-change-obama-administration#zoomed-picture
    The pictures, kept secret by Washington during the presidency of George W Bush, were declassified by the White House last week. President Barack Obama is currently trying to galvanize Congress and the American public to take action to halt catastrophic climate changecaused by rising levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.

    One particularly striking set of images - selected from the 1,000 photographs released - includes views of the Alaskan port of Barrow. One, taken in July 2006, shows sea ice still nestling close to the shore. A second image shows that by the following July the coastal waters were entirely ice-free.

    The photographs demonstrate starkly how global warming is changing the Arctic. More than a million square kilometers of sea ice - a record loss - were missing in the summer of 2007 compared with the previous year.

    Nor has this loss shown any sign of recovery. Ice cover for 2008 was almost as bad as for 2007, and this year levels look equally sparse.

    "These are one-meter resolution images, which give you a big picture of the summertime Arctic," said Thorsten Markus of NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center. "This is the main reason why we are so thrilled about it. One-metre resolution is the dimension that's been missing."

    Disappearing summer sea ice poses considerable dangers, scientists have warned. Ice shelves are used by animals such as polar bears as platforms for hunting seals and other sea creatures. Without them, they could starve. In addition, ice reflects solar radiation. Without that process, the Arctic sea could warm up even more. The phenomenon threatens to set off runaway heating of the planet, say climatologists.

    The latest revelations have triggered warnings from scientists that they no longer have the funds to keep a comprehensive track of climate change. Last week the head of the US's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Professor Jane Lubchenco, warned that the gathering of satellite data - crucial to predicting future climate changes - was now at "great risk" because America's aging satellite fleet was not being replaced.

    "Our primary focus is maintaining the continuity of climate observations, and those are at great risk right now because we don't have the resources to have satellites at the ready and taking the kinds of information that we need," said Lubchenco, who was appointed by Obama. "We are playing catch-up."

    Even before her warning, scientists were saying that America, the world's scientific superpower, was virtually blinding itself to climate change by cutting funds to the environmental satellite programs run by the Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and NASA. A report by the National Academy of Sciences this year warned that the environmental satellite network was at risk of collapse.

    In February, a NASA satellite carrying instruments to produce the first map of the Earth's carbon emissions crashed near Antarctica only three minutes after lift-off.

    The satellite would have measured carbon emissions at 100,000 points around the planet every day, providing a wealth of data compared to the 100 or so fixed towers currently in operation in a land-based network.

    The NOAA is under additional pressure to provide environmental data because of the re-emergence of the El Niño climate phenomenon, where warming of the tropical Pacific causes heatwaves, droughts and flooding around the world. June's land and sea surface temperatures were the second hottest on record, and scientists are predicting this will be the warmest decade in recorded history. The last major El Niño was in 1998, the hottest year in recorded history.

    The Obama administration has already taken steps to tackle America's flagging scientific lead. The president's economic recovery plan allotted $170m (£100m) to help close the gaps in climate modelling. The NOAA is seeking an additional $390m in its 2010 budget to upgrade environmental satellites, and help make data more available to researchers and government officials.

    Mercosur desconoce al gobierno golpista

    Los países del Mercosur desconocen al gobierno de facto de Honduras
    No reconocerán "ningún gobierno que surja de esta ruptura inconstitucional".

    Clarín
    (Argentina)

    Los presidentes del Mercosur reafirmaron hoy su condena al golpe de Estado en Honduras al desconocer al gobierno de facto y considerar inválidos sus actos, incluido un eventual llamado a elecciones. La declaración final de la Cumbre (a la que no asistieron los presidentes de Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, ni de Ecuador, Rafael Correa), anuncia además que se solicitará a la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos que continúe adoptando todas las medidas para la tutela y defensa de los derechos humanos y las libertades fundamentales en ese país.

    En de los temas dominantes de la Cumbre presidencial que ese bloque celebra en Asunción, Paraguay, los presidentes del Mercosur recalcaron que la restitución del depuesto Manuel Zelaya es condición indispensable para el restablecimiento de la democracia y, en ese sentido, agradecen las gestiones mediadoras del presidente de Costa Rica, Oscar Arias, y las de la Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA).

    Este grupo de países sudamericanos "no reconocerá a ningún gobierno que surja de la ruptura inconstitucional" porque considera "ilegal" a las autoridades que asumieron el poder el 28 de junio, desplazando a Zelaya. Del mismo modo, se solicita en ese documento encontrar una solución pacífica y democrática a la crisis política y se "exige la restauración inmediata, segura e institucional a sus funciones" del presidente Zelaya, "electo por la soberanía popular a través de las urnas".

    Horas antes de la difusión del documento, la presidenta argentina, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, había propuesto un "pronunciamiento contundente" del Mercosur contra el golpe de estado en Honduras. "Deberíamos emitir un pronunciamiento contundente en este ámbito acerca de estas cuestiones, sin estridencias ni discursos panfletarios, pero con la certeza y precisión de que no podemos tampoco tolerar lo que sería una ficción", dijo Fernández.

    La condena al golpe hondureño fue una posición unánime en la reunión de Paraguay, cuyo presidente, Fernando Lugo, dijo al abrir las deliberaciones: "¡Que nunca más, nunca más en territorio de América surja una dictadura que provoque el silencio de la muerte, de la voz o del hambre!".

    Britain: Tackling the fascist cancer of the BNP



    The election of two European parliamentarians from the far-right, racist British National Party in June has removed the cover on a political sewer that should have been sealed for all time.

    BNP leader Nick Griffin, a man with a history of anti-Semitism and holocaust denial, now calls for “chemotherapy” against the Islamic “cancer” in Europe.

    The echoes of the past are deliberate. The choice of words is chilling.

    Griffin’s election to European Parliament has given the BNP unprecedented access to the media, and he is using it to promote the most vicious racism.

    His genocidal rantings towards Muslims followed his call for the sinking of ships carrying migrants from Africa to Europe — in other words the premeditated murder of men, women and children on a desperate voyage to escape poverty and oppression.

    Almost 1 million people voted for the BNP in the European elections. If there is a cancer in Europe, then it is the cancer of racism.

    Yet the response from the political establishment to Griffin’s remarks has, so far, been less than overwhelming.

    Defensiveness and political compromise have marked the response of mainstream parties to the rise of the BNP.

    This is not a temporary blip before we return to business as usual. Ignoring the BNP or playing down their successes will not make them go away. It is time for the anti-fascist movement to go on the offensive.

    Griffin’s Nazi-style outbursts cannot be dismissed as an irrelevant excess by a marginal figure. He knows what he is doing. He wants to make legitimate what was once illegitimate.

    He aims to shift the centre of gravity of political debate sharply to the right. He knows that his more extreme rhetoric is in tune with his party’s membership and large swathes of his voters.

    But he also knows that every time mainstream politicians bend to his agenda in an attempt to occupy ground he is staking out, the racist argument is strengthened.

    It is a pattern we have seen all too frequently. Faced with a rise in racism, politicians seek to ride both horses at once: deploring racism while conceding ever more political ground to the far right.

    Isn’t this exactly what Prime Minister Gordon Brown was doing when he called for “local homes for local people”?

    There are too few affordable homes. But that is because successive governments have relied on the market to provide what it patently cannot do.

    What should be done is to tackle this policy failure, which would provide affordable homes for all those in need.

    Furthermore, the Equality and Human Rights Commission has revealed that nine out of 10 social housing residents were born in Britain, giving a lie to the BNP myths bout “local people” losing out to immigrants and asylum seekers.

    Instead of focusing on these realities, voters are told that their prejudices are justified and that the government will do what the BNP cannot.

    It is a tactic both cynical and ineffective.

    The response to Griffin’s call to “sink the boats” cannot be one of pledging to do everything possible to keep out immigrants short of launching missiles at defenceless people.

    His call for “chemotherapy” against Muslims must be challenged, rather than conceding fears of Islam in Europe are justified. The alternative is to accept that ever more extreme and dangerous fascist rhetoric will define political debate in our society.

    Those who promote fear and hatred of African immigrants or Muslims have to be openly and directly confronted.

    It is not legitimate to blame migrants or refugees for the recession. They were not the ones who became rich beyond anyone’s dreams while gambling away our economy.

    It is not legitimate to blame immigrants for rising unemployment. They did not close our factories and devastate our manufacturing base.

    It is not legitimate to blame “outsiders” for the housing crisis. They are not the ones who passed legislation that strangled the ability of local councils to build new housing on the scale needed.

    And it is not legitimate to scapegoat Muslims, who represent just 3% of the population, for any supposed threat to “British identity”.

    A recent Gallup poll on Muslim integration revealed that while only half the British population very strongly identifies with being British, 77% of Muslims do. And only 17% of British Muslims wanted to live in an area consisting mostly of people of the same religious and ethnic background as themselves, compared to 33% of the population as a whole.

    Being “different” is not a sign of alienation from society as a whole. Yet more and more people conclude that Muslims are a breed apart.

    There is a gulf between the reality of our lives and the perception that is created by a constant stream of horror stories.

    Today, it is anti-Muslim racism that is at the cutting edge of the fascist strategy. It is effective because it feeds on the suspicion and prejudice that is the theme of so much mainstream discussion.

    Its consequences are real. Already, there are signs that attacks on mosques and individual Muslims may be rising. The police are warning of the danger of far-right terrorism.

    Earlier this month we saw an openly racist provocation in Birmingham city centre, under the guise of a protest against “Islamic extremism” — a label that the organiser made clear applied to all Muslims.

    We, as British Muslims, have a direct and immediate interest in defeating this fascist threat. The anti-fascist movement must reach out to Muslim communities who are at the sharp end of BNP attacks.

    But the rise in racism is not only a threat to Muslims.

    The BNP may be playing down their anti-Semitism and anti-Black racism in order to drive a wedge between Muslims and the rest of society. But to the BNP, we are all “racial foreigners”. Our very existence as British people denied.

    We have to not only unite all those targeted by the BNP, with every possible ally who rejects racism and fascism. We have to also positively assert our multicultural and pluralist society.

    It is a message of hope that is in tune in an increasingly interconnected world. It is a source of strength and vibrancy. We are one society and many cultures.

    And we will only remain so if we are prepared to stand up and be counted.

    Salma Yaqoob, Birmingham

    China's concubine culture is back


    China's ancient concubine culture, illegal during the Mao Zedong era, is again in vogue with the rich and powerful, and most certainly with government officials. An estimated 95% of officials caught for corruption were keeping at least one mistress - and in one case it was 140. It seems concubines' appetites for gifts and cash can push a man to abuse his power. - Stephen Wong


    SHANGHAI - The saying "Behind every successful man, there is a woman" has a twist in China, where it seems that behind every corrupt male official, there is at least one concubine. A top anti-graft official recently acknowledged in public that 95% of the corrupt officials netted in Beijing's crackdowns kept mistresses.

    China's millennia-old culture of men keeping concubines is back, with many communist party and government officials now keeping at least one "second wife" as a status symbol or to satisfy his sexual needs.

    Addressing government and party officials in the prosperous city of Dongguan in Guangdong province earlier this month, Qi Peiwen, a senior official with the party's Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection, warned officials against "beautiful women," saying that having a mistress proves an easy way for an official to become to corrupt.

    Qi's comments prompted a flurry of responses in domestic media and Internet chat-rooms about the resurgence of China's ancient concubine culture in officialdom.

    He claimed that a shocking 95% of corrupt officials kept one or more concubines. Some people have joked that the trend has made it even more difficult for non-officials to find a wife, given China's imbalanced sex ratio. (According to the semi-governmental All-China Women's Federation, the sex ratio among newborn babies in 2005 was 119 boys to 100 girls.)

    The ancient Chinese tradition of men keeping concubines was attacked by the Communist Party when it came to power in the 1949 revolution. With its "iron fist", the party under Chairman Mao Zedong also successfully weeded out other "social evils" such as prostitution and drugs. Bigamy is still outlawed today, at least on paper.

    With the advent of economic modernization and capitalistic values in China, an undercurrent of sexual liberation and material decadence has also emerged, resulting in the return of concubines and an increase in extra-marital infidelity.

    For the rich and the powerful, keeping extra-marital relations has become fashionable, particularly in officialdom. It seems that from senior party and government officials to grass roots organizers - anyone who has access to power has access to mistresses.

    The highest-ranking official to fall from grace in recent years was Chen Liangyu, the former Shanghai party chief and a Politburo member. He was sentenced to 18 years in prison for corruption and was said to have kept at least two mistresses.

    The current record holder in terms of number of mistresses is Xu Qiyao, the former director of Jiangsu province's construction bureau whose death penalty over corruption was reprieved. Xu, who was in charge of infrastructure projects in the eastern Chinese province, had kept more than 140 mistresses. Anti-graft officials were astonished when they found Xu's sex diary which recorded the names of all his mistresses and his sexual experiences with them.

    Corrupt officials and their mistresses has now become a target of humor among Chinese media and bloggers.

    Chinese netizens have compiled a list of records made by corrupt officials in terms of the number and beauty of their mistresses, as well as the amount of money spent on them. The list was widely posted on popular websites.

    Power, money, and sex
    China's new concubine culture is not limited to government officials. The phenomenon has become widespread, with the so-called "concubine villages" springing up in coastal cities.

    With China's reform and opening-up, the orthodox Marxist-Maoist ideology was discarded and the vacuum has been filled with materialism. Material desires are "liberated". People need more power, more money, and it seems, more sex. Keeping a "second wife" is now in vogue among the rich and powerful.

    Jin Weizhi, the general manager of a State-owned milk company who was convicted of bribery and embezzlement in 2000, once said: "Keeping mistresses is not only for physical needs. It's more about a symbol of status. If you don't have several women, people will look down upon you."

    Second wives are often accused of convincing officials to to take bribes or commit other abuses of power. In trun, officials often shower mistresses with lavish gifts, money - or contracts for profitable projects.

    In an extreme case, Deng Baoju, a banker in the booming town of Shenzhen, spent 18.4 million yuan (US$2.7 million) of his bank's money on his fifth mistress within 800 days, averaging 23,000 yuan each day. He was sentenced to 15 years in prison for the fraud.

    Corruption and concubines go hand in hand, according to a 2008 report by Guangzhou-based newspaper Southern Weekly, which surveyed 41 provincial-level officials under a graft probe between 1998 and 2008. It found that 36 of them kept mistresses.

    The Southern Weekly quoted the wife of a high-ranking official in central China as saying that the residential compound for officials where she lived "like a widows' village" because men seldom returned home. Many wives were aware of their husbands' infidelity, but chose to keep silent over family interests.

    Committing bigamy is punishable with up to two years in jail according to the Chinese law, but in practice keeping mistresses seldom brings a bigamy charge, as long as the men don't formally register marriage.

    Curbing the concubine culture
    The resurgence in concubine culture led the Communist Party in 2007 to start a massive crackdown on officials keeping mistresses. The party conducted its first-ever survey on the marital status of government officials and its Beijing committee even ordered officials to report marriage changes to the authority. So far the measures have had little effect.

    Still, almost every senior male official under graft investigation has been found to have keep one or more mistresses. This has led the media to suggest anti-graft organizations start graft probes with finding out whether the officials have concubines.

    To stop mistresses from making use of their official connections, China's judicial authorities have expanded the legal interpretation of bribery to include the act of giving gifts to an official's mistress.

    Earlier this month, the government of Meishan City in Sichuan Province banned "abnormal relationships" between officials and women. However, the ban was widely criticized for being impractical - the government did not specify what an "abnormal relationship" is or what penalties officials would face.

    Like most media in the world, the Chinese press laps up juicy stories about corrupt officials and their mistresses. Still, if the perpetrator remains in power, few dare to question his fidelity to his wife or his cleanliness from corruption. In the United States, South Carolina governor Mark Sanford - who almost lost his job for meeting his mistress - must be envious of his Chinese peers.

    UK MPs urge talks with Hamas


    Brown's government says it is open to talks with Hezbollah, but not with Hamas [Reuters]

    British legislators have urged the government to talk to moderates within Hamas, saying the West's policy of shunning the Palestinian group was showing little sign of success.

    Russia is the only member of the Quartet of Middle East peace brokers, which also comprises the United States, the United Nations and the European Union, talking to Hamas.

    The British parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee said in a report on Sunday it stood by a recommendation it first made two years ago that the government should engage politically with moderate elements within Hamas, which rules the Gaza Strip.

    "We conclude that there continue to be few signs that the current policy of non-engagement is achieving the Quartet's stated objectives," the committee said.

    "We further conclude that the credible peace process for which the Quartet hopes, as part of its strategy for undercutting Hamas, is likely to be difficult to achieve without greater co-operation from Hamas itself."

    Incentives

    The committee, made up of MPs from all the main political parties, said it was dismayed that, six months after the end of fighting in Gaza, there was still no ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas.

    There had been little change to several issues that contributed to the conflict, it said.

    "We conclude that this situation makes for an ongoing risk of insecurity and a renewed escalation of violence," it said.

    The committee said it was concerned the Quartet was failing to provide Hamas with greater incentives to change its position.

    It said Britain should talk to Hamas moderates as a way of encouraging the group to meet the Quartet principles.

    Prime Minister Gordon Brown's government changed policy in March by saying it was open to talks with the political wing of Lebanon's Iranian-backed Hezbollah, but it remains opposed to talking to Hamas.

    Israel invaded Gaza on December 27, 2008 and fighting continued until January 18, 2009, killing more than 1,000 people.


    Russia acts against 'false' history

    Russian soldier flies the Red Flag on top of the ruins of the Reichstag in Berlin (1945)
    It may become a criminal offence to infringe on "historical memory" about WWII

    By James Rodgers
    BBC News

    What is worrying Russia? Why is the country convinced that it is the victim of a campaign to make it look bad?

    President Dmitry Medvedev recently announced the setting up of a commission to counter the falsification of history. He said this was becoming increasingly "severe, evil, and aggressive".

    Dmitry Medvedev (file)
    Dmitry Medvedev believes there is an anti-Russian bias in the Western media

    "This is absolute poppycock," says Robert Service, professor of Russian History at Oxford University. "History is all about argument. There is no absolute historical truth about anything big in history."

    Mr Service dismisses the Russian leader's suggestion that his country is facing some kind of academic aggression.

    Instead, he sees a desire to dominate, worthy of the most repressive totalitarian regimes of fiction.

    "President Medvedev, following in the path of his predecessor President [Vladimir] Putin, wants to control history," he says.

    "And he wants to control history as a means of controlling the present. This is the classic George Orwell scenario."

    'Hysterical reaction'

    Many Russians, though, agree with their president.

    Natalia Narochnitskaya, a former deputy in the Russian parliament and now a member of the new Historical Truth Commission, says that she is surprised by what she terms the "almost hysterical reaction" in the West.

    "In the Western media especially, there is a certain prejudice against Russia and Russian history," she says.

    "They always feel that Russia since, you know, Ivan the Terrible, is a certain country which is off the European civilisation."

    German Foreign Minister Joachim Ribbentrop (2nd left), Joseph Stalin (centre) and his Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov (right) pose in the Kremlin after signing the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact (23 August 1939).
    In August there will be such a yelling about the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, saying that that was the step that led to the Second World War
    Natalia Narochnitskaya, member of the Historical Truth Commission

    Ask a few more questions, though, and these two apparently separate views begin to converge.

    At least, they agree on what the key issue is - World War II. And here lies the clue as to the real reason for the establishment of the new commission.

    This is what appears to anger today's Russian historical establishment: accounts of Red Army crimes on the march to Berlin; assertions by the Baltic countries and others in Eastern Europe that Soviet forces came as occupiers as much as liberators; any suggestion that Stalin's Soviet Union and Nazi Germany were anything but complete opposites and bitter enemies.

    Here, perhaps, there is a clue as to the timing of the commission's founding.

    Next month sees the 70th anniversary of the non-aggression pact between the USSR and Hitler's Germany, something Ms Narochnitskaya expects the West to make a lot of noise about.

    "In August there will be such a yelling about the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, saying that that was the step that led to the Second World War, and that Germany and the Soviet Union were two equal, disgusting, totalitarian monsters."

    Nationalist sentiment

    Why does this matter today? Do these arguments have any great importance beyond the walls of universities? In Russia, the answer is yes.

    So many people are speaking about strong, Orthodox Russia, military power... The commission is partly a response to this atmosphere
    Tamara Eidelman
    Moscow history teacher

    The country sees its victory over Hitler's forces as the greatest moment of the 20th Century.

    The war is sometimes discussed in the news media as if it were a recent event, not increasingly distant history.

    Any attempt to tarnish the glory of that triumph is seen as a deliberate attempt to make Russia look bad.

    Russia's past haunts its present. Recognising that, the authorities want to rule the version of the past which dominates today.

    Tamara Eidelman, who teaches history at a Moscow High School, feels surrounded by nationalist sentiment.

    "So many people are speaking about strong, Orthodox Russia, military power," she says.

    Military parade in Red Square (1969)
    The authorities want to rule the version of the past which dominates today

    "It is something that is very strong in historical tradition and in popular opinion. This commission is partly a response to this atmosphere."

    The creation of this commission seems to go to the heart of what troubles modern Russia.

    The chaos which followed the collapse of communism left many Russians deeply distrustful of politics and officialdom.

    President Medvedev has complained of the corruption and "legal nihilism" which plague his country.

    Russia's leaders today know that they need this shining, sacred, memory of victory to give their people something to believe in.

    In the near future, it may even be backed up in law.

    The Russian parliament is on its summer break at the moment, but legislation is being considered - legislation that would make it a criminal offence to "infringe on historical memory in relation to events which took place in the Second World War".

    25.7.09

    Seven Deadly Sins – Revisited

    The human animal may be, individually, capable of some subtlety, but collective action tends to be pushed along by broad-stroke principles functioning in the weeds of daily detail. Faced with a specific decision, the direction of action can be most often surmised from the general principles upon which the society sees itself as being based. Thus the attachment to lists of such principles: The Ten Commandments, The Bill of Rights, The Seven Deadly Sins, the 12 steps and a number of other shorthand prescriptions for both action and remediation.

    If we examine these lists closely, we find internal contradiction, limits of application and other exceptions to strict adherence, but we don’t really understand these devices as absolute anyway, but rather as guides. Even those that have the force of law, like the Bill of Rights, must be adjudicated in specific situations since a few words can do no more than offer direction for a journey, not prescribe its every turn.

    It is in this spirit that I offer this list of the Real Seven Deadly Sins. The limits and contradictions may seem especially glaring, but this is only because we are not use to them – and I will deal with some of the exceptions.

    The “original” Seven Deadly Sins have a long history, quite a variety of inclusions and have been 5, 7, 10 and more sins at different turns. A society picks its sins; they are adaptive.

    We have come to a time when we desperately need a new list. This is not to say that the list that evolved from Dante (lust, gluttony, greed, sloth, wrath, envy and pride) has become acceptable, although fashion has certainly changed for several; in fact, if we had been more serious about these, we might not be in such a present pickle. But we need to refocus on those activities and, especially, the principles that have morphed from sin to saw.1

    These are the New Sins:

    1) Progress
    2) Economic growth
    3) Property
    4) Excess
    5) Censorship
    6) Repression
    7) Religion

    One of the first things that you might note from the new list is that it is easily adaptable to collective action, where as the Dante list is more easily seen as the unfortunate qualities of individuals. For this and other reasons, we might best keep those seven available for personal use. The new list is, in some cases, the “originals” writ large.

    It is, today, our institutions that are dominating human action, and human institutions are not just the summing up of individual human behavior, but are, under the Consciousness System of Order, developing into new entities with new properties for which new guidance is needed.

    1) Progress

    This is the most insidious sin and one from which some others receive their motive force. We have come to see this greatest source of devastation as the essential positive value – and we rarely question it; taking the assertion, “It is progress,” as a substantive and often final argument.

    Progress is change that arises from some previous condition, change that is judged by some humans as an improvement. But it has come to pass that the only guiding principle for the design of change is a previous condition that formed from some even earlier progress. That this seems perfectly normal to you is a measure of just how insidious this sin is.

    Living things “progress” by adapting to the biophysical realities of the living space. Of course, they begin with what they have, but the changes occur in a universal context of long scale forces and processes. In humans, progress has come to mean changes that modify some existing condition arising in the human context, a condition that came to exist with the last round of progress. The speed of adaptation and the power to discover and use specific bits of information about how the biophysical world functions has allowed humans to ‘defeat’ certain biophysical rules. By bringing enough energy to bear and using mechanical physics, heavier than air machines can fly. By concentrating specific chemical species a concentrated consequence can be made to happen: poison, acid, lighter than air balloons, metals, etc. There are millions of examples. These things we call progress.

    An evolutionary system would have to integrate every consequence that occurs within evolution’s time frame. Consciousness Order system time frames are so much more rapid than biophysical time frames that we have avoided the consequences of our behaviors. This we call progress.

    Progress is building dikes to keep the waters out – both literally and figuratively; and then building buildings behind and on the dikes, and then building more and better pumps to remove the water that seeps through, and then, and then… The reality is that the water level is higher that the land level. Think for a moment on this from a position of sanity.

    The sin of progress is to act outside of the context of the biophysical time frame, to make changes in response to existing conditions in such a way that the biophysical costs are deferred to other humans, other species and the future. Our societies today are dependent on billions of jobs that are the products of progress and all but a handful are made from the overcoming of the overcoming. We now have to keep trying to overcome the very fabric of universal reality to continue to ‘make progress.’ Such is the depth of our depravity.

    And so Progress is a sin. Rather than seek it, we must make appeal to attempt it; must be able to demonstrate that the proposed changes enhance integration into biophysical reality, not attempt to defeat reality with some slight of hand. We would continue to change, to learn and to use the living and physical worlds, but at a pace to which all living and physical process on earth could adapt; a pace that will not create the dramatic synergies of a convulsive rejection of living things as the consequence of our progress.

    2) Economic Growth

    The sinfulness of growth is more obvious than the sin of progress. One need only think for a moment of the concept of the exponent. And it needs to be clear that human capacity has created a new model for growth; it is not the same process as growth of biological systems – just the same word. Biological growth is replenishment with the capacity to exceed its bounds, but fully inhibited by homeostatic feedback so that ecosystems are no-growth, sustaining systems.

    Economic growth means an increase in the volume and speed of transactions of exchange. Transactions of exchange are the trading of one thing for another. Since there are basically three kinds of things (material/energy, behaviors and abstract tokens of exchange) there are a variety of forms that exchange can take, but ultimately increasing amounts of real stuff must be extracted, moved, modified and consumed as an economy grows. To some extent the need to actually raise crops, dig in mines and cut forests brings perspective to our economic growth, but…

    economic growth can occur, so long as participants believe that tokens of exchange represent real things, as a result of trading those tokens – really betting on how many of a particular token will be required to trade for a particular real thing at a particular moment. This allows ‘not real things’ to increase in amount without limit. If the tokens are in a demand relationship with real things, then it is possible for there to be more ‘real stuff’ represented by tokens than there is or ever can be. The result is that demands are made of the earth’s capacities that cannot be met; the reality of the effort and limits of extraction is overcome in the perception. This is a sin.

    A component of economic growth is investment: I loan you a hatchet to cut firewood and you return the hatchet plus a bit of cut wood, or I could loan you tokens to trade for a hatchet and you give me back the tokens plus a few extra. Either way you have to cut more wood than you require. The amount of material or behavior traded becomes more and more dependent on the obligation and less and less on the actual state of need. Economic growth mutates into increasing states of obligation.

    If there is not a constantly increasing need or obligation, then there can be no more than momentary or situational occasions for investment. And so – placing the cart squarely in front of the horse – our economic system sustains the investment model without regard to the relationship of human economics to the natural biophysical economy. This is a sin.

    3) Property

    Property once seemed so simple; I learned it at my father’s knee: It is mine, you may not use it or touch it without my permission. I hold it by a force as close to a divine right as such things get. And yet, my ball (hat, toy or _____ ) could be taken and tossed around and eventually tossed onto a roof in the age old game of ‘humble the property owner’, AKA ‘keep away.’

    I have discovered that humans come with a great variety of respect for property. Some have arm’s length rules and others will take even useless things. Different groups of people define property in different ways – what can be property, degrees of holding property, what must be done to identify property.

    “Keep away” offered this instruction: property and force are intimately related. Property is mine so long as I am willing and capable to use sufficient force to keep it. A powerful man in my town lived at the end of a long road; the sign at his gate, “If you trespass, you will be shot.” This was not at his front door – his house could not be seen – but was at the most easily approached edge of the 30 or 40 acre mountain valley to which he lay claim. Records show that his family drove out the previous inhabitants with legal trickery and one punctuating dynamite explosion.

    There are 3 ways that we can view property: 1) that which is, 2) that which is ours (or theirs) and 3) that which is mine (or his or hers).

    “That which is” belongs to all and to no one. You may use it only as long as you don’t change it or deny its use to any other organism or process. “That which is ours” belongs to the commons, the community decides potential uses and what compensations and ablutions are required. “That which is mine” belongs to me; again, however, the community decides what can be personal property and often the limits of control and use – this should tell us something. The attempt to turn ‘that which is mine’ into absolute domination without regard to the rest of existence is a sin.

    It is circumstance and excess that moves the sustaining to the sinful. Human progress and economic growth have driven property from balanced patterns of use, compensation and replenishment to the assumption of more and more private ownership; so that today we claim we can not only own the contents of our pockets and immediate living space, but we can own the land, the water, the air, living things, DNA, chemical processes and ideas. And we have even added a specialized instrument of private ownership called the corporate collective to own in even greater amounts and with greater force. This is sin.

    4) Excess and Wealth

    Excess has almost always been a sin in almost every culture. Yet, in our present condition the application of Sins 5 and 6 (censorship and repression) have led the way in justifying excess, usually claiming envy as the reason of objecting to wealth. This is quite simply sin supporting sin.

    Excess is a sin because it perpetuates the sins of property, is the product of growth and can only be justified by dishonest and coercive means. But, primarily it is a sin because it damages the human relationship to the planet and to each other.

    Ultimately the excess of wealth (both private and societal) can only be extracted from the universal commons and it can only be extracted by the coercion of one human entity by another. It is difficult to say who is harmed more in the existential sense, the miner who must dig or starve, yet retains some vestige of specieshood or the owner who believes in the madness of his right of power to steal the life and labor of the miner and the product of the land. It is, of course, not difficult to see who lives in the greatest distress of the moment.

    5) Censorship

    It is obvious to many that we must not speak of dangerous, harmful and distressing things. To do so would bring upset and disruption to our settled lives: speak the Devil’s words and call the Devil.

    There is, as there always is, a major difficulty: How are we, or who is, to decide? We are ultimately faced with this simple choice: freedom of speech with only the most limited restrictions or speech controlled by whoever can wrest power over its methods and topics.

    Control of speech is control of idea, is control of possibility. And yet we cannot live in a world without design, a world that limits and organizes possibility. The probability of glucose moving through a cell membrane in controlled by insulin, which is controlled by a dozen other conditions of the organism. We can expect nothing less for a super-organism collective like human societies. But there the analogy fails; the process by which biological evolution designs physiological function leaves out nothing. Every force and movement of the natural world gets its say without inhibition because it is exists in the total reality. Again, we can have nothing less for our collective social order.

    Lying is a special form of censorship that denies access to a factual basis for action, but lying should be no more reviled than demanding that the truth of another’s understanding not be spoken.

    This is an especially dangerous sin as new and powerful forms of human super-organism are demanding and receiving the power to censor speech that challenges their domination by controlling the means of speech and using that means to control the topics of speech.

    6) Repression

    The rejection of one identifiable racial, ethnic, language, cultural or behavioral group by another is one of the oldest human actions. When there was space and available niches, this was less sin and more signal to spread the species around. It even served certain other useful functions by reducing the spread of disease and supplying gene pools from which vigorous crosses could test the genetic waters.2

    But today and for some many hundreds of years the repression of one group by another as been in the service of quite other forces: economic and political power. Billions of human lives have been lived out in the greatest of distress – truly painful, brutal and short because of the sin of repression.

    Life has never had a guarantee – or so is my belief – but to assign beforehand that billions of lives will be lived in horror and pain is a sin. And this is a sin that is likely to continue to increase dramatically as it has over the last few thousand years. Never have so many lived such deprived and devastated lives as in today’s moment.

    Two hundred years ago there were one billion people on the earth, nearly half of whom lived in deep poverty at the advancing edge of European expansion and industrialization and in islands of industrial servitude. One hundred years ago there where two billion people on the earth, nearly half of whom lived in the deepest poverty as the first world nations were converting the rest of the world into their larder. Today there are almost 7 billion, nearly half of whom live at the edge of survival. Local sustaining practices have been so damaged and demonized that even those who are not in immediate peril today are but one global economic decision away from dust.

    7) Religious Piety

    Religion is one of the least understood of human behaviors. Its supporting structures and designs are deep in our origins, but it has become a chimera, a crossing with politics, economics and the institutional super-organism. Religion is a developmentally dysfunctional entity demanding the privilege of an infant while having the strength of a powerful adult.

    In its origin religion was the combined effect of the Stories that integrated human action within the environment and the instinctual emotional connections to environment and community. It gave strength to the adaptations that formed the basis of human success. It did not create the behaviors, but responded to them as the collected Stories that organized the behavior of a group, carrying them through space and time.

    Devotion to religious story has become the central madness of our time and one of the greatest inhibitions to our survival. There were in the past many thousands of religions because there were thousands of situations in which people lived. Since religion’s function is to define a way of life, then it must be completely connected to immediate and sustaining reality – it used to be! Now religions are devoted to the remains of Stories that once had some relational meaning, but are no longer connected to reality. This makes the Stories of religion easy prey for any entity to use as devices of censorship and repression.

    Summary

    These are the sins that we need to “hold in our hearts” as unacceptable. These are the sins that are devastating our world. 30 years ago drunk driving was a laughing matter (even as people were killed), but became a matter of scorn and rejection as people incorporated into their habits of thought, into their lists of sins, driving drunk. We need to see these seven sins in the same way. Just as with the original seven deadly sins a small number of people are empowered by them if allowed, but if enough people reject those behaviors, actively reject them, they will be weakened and more of us may begin to see them for what they are.

    1. It is an irony of our time that those who claim to champion individual freedom are really speaking for the institutional collective and the individual’s subservience to it, while those who are accused of socialist “collectivism” see the collective in service of the individual. []
    2. Cultural habits combining with instinctual behaviors associated with incest created complex rules that often involved either males or females moving from one group to another. []

    24.7.09

    Report Card on Obama From a New Frontiersman

    Probably like most of you, I am engaged in a daily attempt to make up my mind about President Obama. I was an early supporter.

    And as a former Washington "player," I am aware how difficult is his position. I began to worry when he failed to grasp what I have seen to be the early window of opportunity for a new administration -- the first three months -- when the government is relatively fluid. As the months have flown by, I have seen that there are many positive things, mainly in his eloquent addresses on world problems, notably his speech at the University of Cairo on world pluralism, but also quite a few negative things. With sadness and alarm I find that my list of the negatives keeps on growing.

    Among them are the following:

    (1) The commitment to the war in "Af-Pak" which (I believe) will cost America upwards of $6 trillion but perhaps only a few hundred casualties since we are relying increasingly on drone bombing. Just the money costs could derail almost everything Obama's supporters hoped and thought his administration would do. That amount of money is roughly half the total yearly income (the GNP) of America. Of course, it will cost Afghanistan far more.

    Less dramatic perhaps but more crucial will be the further breakdown of Afghan society, leaving behind when we ultimately get out, an even more demoralized, fractured society and will probably lead to a coup d'etat in Pakistan, further enhancing the danger of war between the South Asian countries. The nominal leaders of Afghanistan (Hamid Karzai) and Pakistan (Asif Ali Zardari), whom we practically appointed and with whom we have chosen to work, are hated by their people and are human monuments to the potential of government corruption. (Drugs, traffic in American arms even to insurgents, shakedowns of citizens, sale of public offices, outright stealing, kidnap for ransom...the list is long and as an old hand, it certainly reminds me of South Vietnam.) We now have a window of opportunity to get out of this looming disaster, but it seems that the President is determined to "stay the course." Fundamental to my worry is that I do not hear anyone around the President or he himself saying things that indicate that they know anything about Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir or India, much less "Pashtunistan", aka The Northwest Frontier. Ignorance is rarely a very rewarding guide.

    (Parenthetically, I have recently read the British "how to do it" manual on "Tribal fighting on the Northwest Frontier" by General Sir Andrew Skeen. Skeen spent his life fighting the Pathans. He warned British soldiers back in the 1920s that the Pathans were "the finest individual fighters in the east, really formidable enemies, to despise whom means sure trouble." My copy is the only one I could find on the internet. It survived in a British officers' mess library. I doubt that Messrs Petraeus, McChrystal et al have ever heard of it. It makes more sense than Petraeus's Counterinsurgency Field Manual.)

    (2) the choice of personnel is (to me) baffling:

    In the military he has chosen to keep on Bush's Secretary of Defense (who signed if not wrote the latest version of the neoconservative-inspired US National Defense Doctrine calling for, among other things, the "right" of first striking almost anyone we choose if we don't like them), General David Petraeus, whom I regard as a con man for breathing life into the Vietnam counterinsurgency program (which has never worked anywhere in the world in the last two centuries when tried by the British, the Russians, the French, the Germans or us), and General Stanley McChrystal, who makes statements that sound terrifyingly like the SS. His main claim to fame appears to have come out of running the prison system in Afghanistan where, apparently, some of the worst cases of torture happened. These men, allegedly, have told Obama that he could win the war in Afghanistan "on the cheap." So when his then principal military adviser gave a more sober assessment -- nearly half a million men -- Obama fired him and listened to Petraeus' siren song. Again, as an old hand, I cannot help remembering Vietnam, where we went from 1,700 to half a million soldiers and still lost.

    The Pentagon budget is not only enormous but contains a number of potential scandals. Our overseas bases now cost us over $100 billion yearly. Since the DOD sops up over half of the disposable resources of the government, Obama must get control of it. His task will be difficult because the DOD and what President Eisenhower called the "military industrial complex" have cleverly portioned out the work and procurement on the program to virtually every congressional district. Congress will opt for the program even if it bankrupts America. Congress will be Obama's enemy if he tries any reforms. Even to try, he will need able advisers and staff. He should certainly know better than to appoint the foxes to guard the henhouse.

    In the State Department’s activities, the most attractive person is Senator George Mitchell, but he does not seem to have any significant power. I hope I am wrong, but he reminds me of my dear friend Governor Chester Bowles after JFK fired him and used him only for window dressing. The others have their own agendas. To be generous, one has to say that Hillary has not yet shown enough to judge, but some of her statements would be hard to worsen. I assume that she has begun to run for the presidency in 2012. She reminds me of the wise saying that when a president assembles his cabinet, he has all his enemies in one room. Dick Holbrooke has a bully's approach to diplomacy in one of the touchiest spots in the world. His browbeating, hectoring, shouting "Balkan" tactics are ill-suited to Central Asia. In the White House, I think it would be hard to find a worse choice than the new Special Assistant to the President, Dennis Ross. Three examples of his skill: a) in the early negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians, when he was supposedly the honest broker, he took a more disruptive position than even the Israelis, apparently shocking even them; b) in the build-up to the Iranian elections he sponsored and organized a program to "electronically invade" Iran with destabilizing messages trying, more subtly to be sure than the 1953 CIA-MI6 coup, to "regime change" it.

    Whatever else could be said about the "Iran-Syria OperationsGroup", it played right into the hands of Ahmadinejad and the rightwing of the ulama and the military, giving them a proof text for American interferencein the elections and thus may have backfired, since no issue in Iranian politics is as sensitive as the fear of foreign espionage; (c) just before his appointment to be the chief honcho on all the Middle East, Ross published a book whose message was essentially 'let's try a bit of di-plomacy for a short time. Of course it won't work, but it will justify our attacking.' That is, his approach to peace-seeking is consistent and negative. Since he is now Obama's point man, we are in for deeper trouble.

    The Vice President, as you know, just reversed the final position of the Bush administration, where Bush told the Israelis that America would not approve an attack on Iran: Joe Biden essentially authorized it, saying what they decided to do was their business, not ours. But those of you who have read my occasional essays could tick off the list of potential disasters for America and the Western world such an attack would bring on. It is patently absurd to suggest that an Israeli attack (made with our weapons and implicit approval) is not our business; indeed, regardless of our weapons and our approval, the long-term consequences for our economy, our position in the world, and our exposure to terrorism would be almost impossible to exaggerate.

    On the CIA I confess I am not a big admirer. It has taken on 3 tasks: gathering information, evaluating it and performing dirty tricks. It is usually agreed that over 80 per cent, perhaps more like 95 per cent, of the information it accumulates comes from sources that you and I can access if we have the time, energy and interest. Most of the rest comes from technology (intercepts and code breaking which appear to be valuable for counter-terrorism but, at least in my experience, are of near zero value in 'strategy'; on satellite and overflight imagery much the same can be said.) The second task, evaluation or "appreciation" is very difficult at best, but the record, at least during the Bush administration, is pretty poor. It was far better done then and during the Vietnam war in the tiny Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the State Department. The third task often leads to disasters and violates all that America should stand for. There are scores of examples to back up this statement, but one that has now come back to haunt us is the 1953 coup d'etat that destroyed an elected and popular Iranian government that, had it survived, might have avoided the 1979 Iranian revolution and relieved us of our current worries there. We should get out of the business of espionage, kidnap, torture and murder. Period. The current leadership of the CIA does not seem to have addressed these issues, and President Obama has gone out of his way to grant a sort of blanket pardon in advance lest anyone fear that what he did was illegal or, more accurately, knowing that it was illegal, might be called to court.

    Back to the President: From my experience with life at the "brink," during the Cuban Missile Crisis, I think that the President's initiative on cutting back nuclear weapons is perhaps the best thing he has done so far. True, it is a very modest step, leaving thousands of "devices" in place on both the Russian and American sides, only urging Israel, which has hundreds of bombs, to join the NPT, actually encouraging India to forge ahead with its nuclear program and so probably moving inexorably toward at least doubling the number of nuclear-weapon-armed countries rather than (as I have strenuously advocated) moving from Russo-American cutbacks to nuclear free areas and ultimately toward worldwide abolition of nuclear weapons. But, at least it is a step in the right direction.

    That's for foreign affairs.

    There are, of course, for President Obama as for all previous presidents, myriads of issues, but one that I believe will haunt him for his own term and beyond is moral and constitutional: What are we doing -- and what will we be seen to be doing -- to the vast but unknown number of prisoners --terrorists, freedom fighters, accidents -- we are holding indefinitely, without charges, without recourse to the courts or that fundamental right in our heritage from the struggle against tyranny, habeas corpus. What we are doing at Guantanamo, Bagram and an unknown number of other "secret" prisons is, as the courts have rightly, if belatedly and guardedly, held, a violation of our legal system. We don't need the courts to tell us that it certainly a violation of our moral code. Obama began by urging transparency on this sordid issue, but he backed off. His Justice Department is now appealing a US District Court order that the Supreme Court decision on habeas corpus rights for Guantanamo also applied to a set of prisoners at Bagram who apparently arrived there by rendition or who, at least, are non Afghans. Of course, the most sordid issue is the evidence of sodomy, rape and torture captured in the photograph collection that Obama first wanted to release and then changed his mind. Those who profess to know say that what these pictures show is truly horrible. Some have compared them to the vivid record the Nazis kept of their sadism. Even pragmatically, since they are known -- indeed known worldwide -- it is questionable to say the least that hiding them will protect our reputation. For what little it is worth, my opinion is that making a clean breast of the evil and making an apology -- as we have repeatedly urged other countries to do in comparable cases -- would be or could be the beginning of the resurrection of America.

    I am waiting for the Obama we elected to show up. I hope this drama does not follow Samuel Beckett's script.

    WILLIAM POLK

    Surreal Honduras

    Gabriel Garcia Màrquez could easily have written "A Hundred Years of Solitude" in any country of Central America. It's a region replete with characters and magical landscapes and myths with power to make the hair stand up on the back of your neck when you merely hear them. There's the one about the gringo who visited the mining region of Cabañas and soon thereafter the water turned bad and the fish in the river died and the people all began to die simply because a mysterious gringo passed through.

    That's the story as Miguel Rivera tells it. His brother, Marcelo Rivera was the latest victim of the newly organized death squads, formed from what appears to be a triad of power: Pacific Rim (a Canadian multinational), the ARENA party (the political party organized by the death squad killer of Monsignor Romero, Roberto D'Aubuisson) and the "maras" or gang members.

    Of course Miguel, who has a deep and even scientific knowledge of his locale, is aware that the myth is just that: a small story that reveals a larger, hidden truth, in this case that a "Gringo" multinational indeed entered the area, but the reason for the deaths was the heavy metal waste from the mining that was poured into the community's water.

    In cultures and states where telling the exact truth can lead to one's death, it's always more convenient to wrap the story in myth. Those who unpackage the myths, like Marcelo Rivera, often disappear into thin air -- that is, until they're found, as he was, naked, castrated and murdered after being horribly tortured: his fingernails had all been pulled out; his face had been disfigured so much that his brother could only identify him by his nose; the beatings had broken his skull. Finally, after he had been strangled to death, his body was thrown in a sixty-foot well, covered with chicken manure, dirt, and pieces of meat.

    The right wing press did, of course, repeat the official story that Marcelo had fallen in with "mara" gangsters and drank with them, but editors had the integrity to also print a counterpoint that everyone who knew Marcelo had quite clear: that the victim of the unholy triad of moneyed power in El Salvador never drank nor hung out with the maras. His hero was Monsignor Romero and Miguel says the last time he saw his brother he was wearing a t-shirt with the image of that martyr on it.

    There's a significant difference between El Salvador under the FMLN where power in the media is actively being contested, and Honduras where there is a blackout of the opposition perspective. Another difference is that the ARENA party has lost control of the military and has to rely on "maras" to do its dirty work while in Honduras the government hasn't yet had to consider recruiting "civilian contractors" from the 100,000 or so "maras" operating in Central America. Thus far the military has been quite happy to do the job of eliminating or terrorizing opponents under the "golpista" Honduran government (coup government) of Micheletti. On July 5, for example, the military fired with machine guns on a crowd numbering in the thousands. This is the unofficial story, of course. The papers, including El Heraldo, claimed that the military had fired on the crowd with rubber bullets. Officially, also, only one person died. Protestors say that there were eight or nine victims who died on the way to the hospital, and whose bodies were disappeared. Given the machine gun fire, it's only surprising that more didn't die.

    The Honduran government of the 1980s found it had no need to replicate the widespread massacres being carried out in El Salvador and Guatemala. It was able to selectively eliminate a couple hundred leaders of the opposition and take care of its problem with the "subversives." But in order to maintain control over the rest of the population and assure its docility and compliance, like anywhere else, it required a press willing and able to cloak a damning reality in a less threatening myth.

    Once again Honduran reporters are being called in to do overtime in psyops. Granted, the press in Honduras under the "golpista" government isn't any worse than Fox News. That being said, everything having to do with the news around the recent "golpe" (coup) has a quality that ranges from surreal interpretation to black propaganda. It would seem that the journalists of the major papers of Honduras really were frustrated writers of dystopian science fiction.

    One Honduran tells me she saw a murder in her neighborhood that was multiplied in the journalistic alchemy of the Honduran press by six the following day. I keep that in mind as I sit here in my hotel room in Tegucigalpa, leafing through what my wife back home would call "the daily pack of lies."

    As I try to discern the Honduran narrative of the "golpe" I recall the copy of the article I left behind in El Salvador, printed in a right wing paper -- and, unfortunately, the newspapers are all right wing in El Salvador, with the exception of the Diario Co-Latino, the latter a blessing not bestowed upon Honduras. The Salvadoran article was based on a piece that appeared in Honduras' El Heraldo. The author claimed to have in possession secret documents that indicated that President Hugo Chavez was working with a large number of "maras" who he was arming and paying, and also infiltrating his own military to do a lightning attack and kill high-ranking officials of the Micheletti government. Supposedly residents have seen armed men in inaccessible regions of the country. Does that sound like the narrative of "Al Qaeda sleeper cells" doped up on the Koran ready to attack Bush's America? Only the names, places and drugs of choice have changed.

    I'm looking here at a full page ad in La Tribuna from Tuesday, the 21st, paid for by "Hondurans for Democracy." There is a photo, in the top half, of Chavez aiming a gun. Beside the photo is the caption "Chavez calls for violence and wants bloodshed in Honduras" Beneath that picture is a crowd shot of Hondurans dressed in white (the color of the Conservative Nationalist Party) and holding the blue flags of Honduras. The caption reads, "But Hondurans want peace, unity, democracy and freedom." Ah, behold the foreign devil who has brought death to our peaceful little country. It's a variation on the diabolic gringo myth, but in reverse, since Chavez has been a counterforce to the "deadly gringo."

    The following day, (Wednesday, July 22) El Heraldo has an interview with Alejando Peña Esclusa, a right wing Colombian who is president of UnoAmerica, described as "a democracy organization (sic: organización democracia) of Colombia." The headline reads, "The FARC [Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia), Narcotrafficking and ALBA (Bolivarian Alternative of the Americas) are all the same thing." The surrealism doesn't end with the title, which makes laughable connections between a program of solidarity created by Venezuela to share its wealth with loans and grants to Latin America to facilitate growth and development, and narcotics trafficking and a guerrilla that, while it taxes the cocaine trade, seems to have fewer connections to the actual trade than does the Uribe government.

    Esclusa develops his surreal story in this large-spread article on page 6: He says that the coup "has kept Honduras from falling into the project of Hugo Chavez and saved democracy from the Constitutional coup which Zelaya hoped to undertake." What was the "Constitutional coup" Zelaya was plotting? To bring people more deeply into the political process of the country by asking them if they'd like to write a new constitution. So according to Esclusa, the military coup was a way of saving "democracy" by taking it away. And the project of Chavez, well, ask 60-70% of Venezuelans who support Chavez and they'll tell you that his project is to move the country from "representative to participatory democracy." But the interview with Esclusa gets even wilder: "the principle element of the disturbances in Honduras is not "Mel" Zelaya nor the discussion of whether or not he returns" (this would come as a surprise to the hundreds of thousands of people marching daily in Honduras for the single purpose of having their president return) "but it is Hugo Chavez who finances the dirty campaign, buying minds ("conciencias") so as to disinform about Honduran reality."

    Again, the utterly implausible charge that Chavez, and not the golpistas, is behind all the country's problems. For Esclusa, the solution is simple: Isolate Chavez from Honduras and all the problems will be solved.

    What's fascinating about this analysis is that there's not even a hint of truth in it. First of all, the marches aren't financed by anyone but the marchers. And secondly, the only Venezuelan I've seen has been an old friend who is a documentary filmmaker--and probably the last Venezuelan journalist in the country since Telesur was chased out. Noticeably absent from the marches is even the slightest mention of Chavez or Venezuela, neither of which appear in any of the chants, placards, discussions, programs, or anything else. There's only one message: "Golpistas Leave! Bring Mel Home."

    In this surreal world where Chavez is working with narco gangsters and infiltrating along the coast, paying people to demonstrate, the poor golpistas are also unfairly being persecuted by "the OAS, UN and the international community."

    This line was repeated to me the other day in the hotel by the woman behind the desk, who identified herself as a National Party supporter. She almost whined as she told me that "everyone is against us." Does that sound a little paranoid? When a sane person is told that everyone is opposed to what he or she is doing, that person begins to reflect again on his or her actions. Not so Micheletti; not so Mr. Esclusa; not so the National Party and Liberal Party members who went out on the 23rd on the march for "peace, unity, democracy and freedom."

    Then the bombshell: According to Mr. Esclusa, the FARC, a guerrilla force of 30,000 with shrinking power, is the force behind all the presidents who are part of ALBA which is, in turn, a project of the FARC and financed by cocaine money.

    If this were the ravings of a madman in the street, we could afford to ignore him. But this interview is published in one of Honduras' two major newspapers, with big headlines, a photo of Esclusa, on page 6. And obviously the government is taking this same paranoid siege narrative seriously because on page eight is the story and headline, "Honduras Breaks Diplomatic Relations with Venezuela" and the subhead reads, "Venezuelan officials, in a confrontational attitude, warn they won't leave the country. The [Honduras] Chancellor cancels the consular visa of Iranians for fear of terrorism."

    Now that's interesting. Honduras breaks relations with Venezuela and it's Venezuela that is being confrontational. Takes you back to the bad old days of Bush and the Saddam Hussein "menace" doesn't it? Then there are the Iranians, whose government has never so much as threatened anyone in Latin America, yet who now "feared as terrorist." Wild rumor, speculation on a fantastic level: Vice Chancellor Marta Lorena Alvarado says that "we've confirmed the existence of terrorist Iranian cells in Latin America and considering that there are direct trips from Teheran... to Venezuela and from Venezuela to Nicaragua... there's concern that there's been a terrorist incursion into [Honduras]."

    Here we've definitively returned to the bad old days of Rumsfeld, Cheney and Bush with the Amber, Yellow and Orange alerts when supposed "sleeper" cells that were never uncovered or identified were sleepwalking the US.

    These are but a few of the jewels from the Honduran press. You could do with it as I did when I first confronted it in the hotel with the woman behind the desk: you could try reasoning with it. You could, as I did, say, isn't the very definition of a coup when an elected representative is removed from office and, rather than being held and tried and convicted or returned to office, is sent out of the country into exile at gunpoint. But the response is just as wild: "They were trying to prevent bloodshed. If they kept him here, his followers would cause bloodshed." But we're to believe that the people who sent the military to the airport on July 5th to machine gun protesters are really concerned about bloodshed? By the look on the woman's face, a gringo has come to town and poisoned the water.

    Clifton Ross is the writer and director of Venezuela: Revolution from the Inside Out and Translations from Silence, a book of poetry introduced by Jack Hirschman available at: www.freedomvoices.org. He can be reached at:clifross@gmail.com

    Colapso laboral en EEUU: Se multiplican los riesgos de explosión social

    IAR Noticias

    Lo que suena como un panorama fantástico para el Imperio norteamericano (las huelgas y los conflictos sociales) es un escenario de corto plazo que ya están manejando entre líneas analistas y medios norteamericanos a la luz de la crisis industrial y de las quiebras empresariales que están desatando una creciente ola de despidos y un récord de la desocupación en EEUU.


    Desde el estallido de la crisis financiera, en septiembre pasado, la ONU, el Banco Mundial, la mayoría de los expertos y últimamente el G-8, vienen advirtiendo sobre el peligro de estallidos sociales a escala global que podrían generarse por el impacto de la crisis recesiva con despidos masivos y por la escalada de los precios de la energía y de los alimentos en los países más pobres de Asia, África y América Latina.

    Esta semana, el Grupo de los Ocho (G-8), considerado el "Directorio del Mundo", afirmó en una declaración que la situación "sigue incierta" en la economía global, con "riesgos significativos para la estabilidad". De acuerdo con las potencias centrales nucleadas en la entidad, el aumento de la desocupación este año y el próximo puede producir estallidos y revueltas sociales.

    Sorpresivamente, la evolución de la crisis (que devino de financiera a crisis estructural con la recesión) hoy golpea con más fuerza a las potencias centrales que a los países emergentes o subdesarrollados.

    El malestar social que generan la desocupación creciente y el deterioro de las condiciones salariales, así como el achicamiento de la capacidad de consumo, alimenta y exacerba el estado de frustración colectiva, provoca pérdida de confianza en los políticos y alienta las huelgas y protestas sociales que ya comienzan a extenderse por toda la geografía europea y amenazan con extenderse a EEUU.

    La crisis social (consecuencia de la caída del consumo y los despidos laborales) se perfila como un potencial emergente de la crisis recesiva- laboral que detonó escalonadamente como consecuencia de la crisis financiera en EEUU.

    Las señales son claras: La crisis financiera ya devino en recesión y amenaza (por efecto de la desocupación masiva) en convertirse en una crisis social de difícil pronóstico en EEUU.

    "El mercado laboral de Estados Unidos tiene un desempeño aún peor que el de la economía en general, lo que causa temores dentro y fuera del gobierno de que el resultado podría ser el de una recuperación sin empleos incluso cuando termine la recesión", señala este jueves The Wall Street Journal.

    "En un desafío a las normas históricas, la tasa de desempleo --que asciende a 9,5%-- es de 1 a 1,5 puntos porcentuales más alta que lo que se hubiera previsto bajo el sentido común económico, dice al Journal Lawrence Summers, uno de los asesores económicos del presidente de EEUU, Barack Obama.

    Desde que comenzó la crisis en diciembre de 2007, la economía estadounidense perdió 6,5 millones de trabajos, 4,7% del total de empleos en el país. La tasa de desempleo subió cinco puntos porcentuales mientras que la economía se ha contraído alrededor del 2,5%.

    En los últimos días, Summers, el director de presupuesto de la Casa Blanca Peter Orszag y el presidente de la Fed Ben Bernanke han hecho declaraciones públicas sobre la "desconexión inusual" entre el crecimiento y el desempleo.

    El propio presidente estadounidense, Barack Obama, pronosticó el miércoles pasado que el desempleo en el país, que alcanzó un récord de 9,5%, probablemente seguirá en aumento en los próximos meses, pues los puestos de trabajo tardan más en recuperarse que otros sectores de la actividad económica.

    Según The Wall Street Journal, las recuperaciones económicas sin empleos no son nada nuevo: las empresas suelen ser reacias a contratar cuando recién sube la demanda.

    Sin embargo, hay posibilidades más sombrías --agrega--, ya que los trabajadores con problemas podrían arrastrar una economía frágil a una recesión más profunda.

    En un cuadro recesivo, la pérdida de empleos en EEUU se aceleró el mes pasado y la tasa de desempleo aumentó a 9,5%, arrojando dudas sobre la capacidad de recuperación de la primera economía imperial.

    "La demanda final y la producción han mostrado señales tentativas de estabilidad", dijo el presidente de la Reserva Federal, Ben Bernanke, a reguladores el miércoles, como parte de su presentación ante el Congreso de EEUU. No obstante, aclaró: "El mercado laboral, sin embargo, sigue debilitándose".

    Según los últimos datos, en un récord histórico, el rojo fiscal en EEUU se disparó a más de US$ un billón (doce ceros, un millón de millones) en los primeros nueve meses del ejercicio anual e implica ya el 8% del PBI. Pero cerraría en más de US$ 1,8 billón, contra "sólo" US$ 455.000 millones del año pasado.

    El Departamento del Tesoro de EEUU informó que entre octubre de 2008, cuando empieza el año presupuestario, y junio último, el "rojo" fue de 1,086 billón de dólares, una marca sin antecedentes.

    La crisis económica recesiva en la mayor economía del mundo, ya se expresa en recesión, desempleo, menos recaudación impositiva y más gastos para paliarla, entre otras variables, complica las cuentas públicas.

    En este marco, lo que suena como un panorama fantástico para el Imperio norteamericano (las huelgas y los conflictos sociales) es un escenario de corto plazo que ya están manejando entre líneas analistas y medios norteamericanos a la luz de la crisis irresuelta del sector automotriz y de las quiebras empresariales que están desatando una creciente ola de despidos en EEUU.

    Cada jornada de la economía norteamericana (desde finales de 2008) se convirtió en un vértigo marcado por una dinámica inevitable: Recesión industrial y comercial con baja del consumo y desempleo masivo que se proyecta desde EEUU y los países centrales al mundo periférico "subdesarrollado" y/o emergente.

    De esta manera, la desocupación (emergente de la desaceleración económica) se ha convertido en una cuestión clave para el equipo de Obama y el establishment de poder estadounidense que temen que su propagación convierta a EEUU, la primera potencia mundial, en un polvorín de huelgas y conflictos sociales que terminen paralizando aún más a la economía.

    En un orden secuencial, para que se produzca un desenlace del proceso recesivo, tiene que haber una convergencia interactiva de la "crisis financiera" (los mercados del dinero), la "crisis estructural" (la economía real) y la "crisis social" (el impacto de la crisis económica-financiera en la sociedad).

    Por estas horas, medios y analistas norteamericanos coinciden en que la desocupación (como emergente de la recesión industrial) se ha convertido en la prioridad absoluta de la agenda de Obama y su equipo.

    Desde hace varios meses, el protagonismo de la crisis financiera-bursátil fue rebalsado y cedió paso a un nuevos actores: Las quiebras empresariales y los despidos masivos.

    Los billonarios paquetes de "rescate bancario" estatal con dinero de los impuestos (pagado por toda la población estadounidense) no han servido de antídoto y han fracasado estrepitosamente como medida para enfrentar la crisis que ha devenido de financiera a recesiva a escala global.

    El mapa de la crisis social

    El desempleo en la región occidental de Estados Unidos superó el 10% en mayo pasado, la primera vez en 25 años que una región del país tiene ese porcentaje de desocupación.

    Ocho estados alcanzaron cifras de desempleo sin precedente y sólo dos - Nebraska y Vermont - no reportaron aumento alguno.

    El Departamento del Trabajo informó en junio pasado que 48 estados y el Distrito de Columbia sufrieron aumento en el desempleo en mayo. La peor situación es en Michigan, donde las empresas automotrices se han visto obligadas a eliminar miles de empleos. La tasa de desocupación allí ascendió a 14,1%.

    La región occidental del país fue la que tuvo mayor desempleo, con 10,1%. La última vez que una región tuvo esa cifra fue en septiembre del 1983, cuando el país apenas se recuperaba de una recesión.

    En esa región se encuentra California, donde el desempleo ascendió a un récord de 11,5% el mes pasado, Nevada, donde ascendió a otro récord con 11,3% y otros estados golpeados por la crisis de vivienda y donde han descendido el empleo y los ingresos.

    California es el mayor Estado del país por población (36,75 millones de habitantes) y por PIB (con 1,84 billones de dólares supone el 13,3% de todo EEUU, según datos de 2008). Si fuera un país independiente estaría entre las diez primeras potencias del mundo.

    La debacle de la construcción (tanto residencial como terciaria) ha sumido a California en la mayor recesión desde la Gran Depresión. Así, el Estado ha perdido 904.300 puestos de trabajo desde diciembre de 2007.

    La Casa Blanca indica que California es el tercer estado con más créditos fallidos. Además, en lo que va del año 391.611 propiedades inmobiliarias han comenzado el proceso de ejecución hipotecaria, la cifra más alta de EEUU, que supone un alza del 15% respecto al mismo periodo de 2008. Esta coyuntura está afectando a la banca de EEUU, sobre todo a Bank of America, el primer banco del país, que tiene una gran exposición a la costa oeste.

    Los otros seis estados que tienen una tasa de desempleo inédita desde 1976 son Carolina del Norte, Oregón, Rhode Island, Carolina del Sur, Florida y Georgia.

    En cuanto a despidos, Arizona y Florida fueron los que más sufrieron, seguidos por Oklahoma, Arkansas, Kentucky y Michigan.

    El riesgo del estallido

    Los despidos masivos de obreros y empleados en EEUU son el barómetro y marcan el momento en que la crisis comienza a salir de la "superestructura" económico financiera y a meterse dentro de la sociedad estadounidense.

    Todo el planeta (globalizado y nivelado por el sistema capitalista "único") está aquejado de los mismos síntomas: Nuevo repunte y vuelta a la especulación financiera del petróleo y de las materias primas, devaluación de las monedas y revaluación el dólar, crisis crediticia con achicamiento del consumo, suba de precios internos de los alimentos y la energía y oleadas de despidos laborales constantes en EEUU y las potencias centrales.

    En su última reunión el G-8 sostuvo que para atacar la crisis, "hay que sostener la demanda y recuperar el crecimiento", lo que implica afrontar la situación con nuevos recursos si hacen falta.

    Pero mientras Alemania quiere frenar la hemorragia de fondos públicos en la economía, EEUU, Gran Bretaña y otras naciones como Francia creen que es necesario impedir que la crisis -ya devastadora- se convierta en una bomba social por el alza del desempleo.

    En marzo de este año, el diario francés Le Monde publicó un informe con un pronóstico de especialistas del LEAP/Europa 2020, un grupo de reflexión europeo, en el que anticipó que la crisis financiera y económica generará explosiones sociales violentas en Europa y EEUU donde podrían crearse las condiciones de una guerra civil.

    De esta manera, la crisis podría incluso fomentar violentas rebeliones populares cuya intensidad se vería agravada por la libre circulación de armas de fuego, pronostica el LEAP.

    América Latina, pero también los EEUU, son las zonas que corren mayores riesgos. "Hay 200 millones de armas de fuego en circulación en los EEUU y la violencia social ya se manifiesta a través de pandillas", advierte Franck Biancheri, quien preside la asociación.

    Esta visión apocalíptica parecería "fantástica" si este grupo de reflexión no hubiese vaticinado, en febrero de 2006, con una precisión asombrosa la actual crisis recesiva mundial.

    Hace tres años, la asociación describía la llegada de una "crisis sistémica mundial", iniciada por una infección financiera global vinculada al endeudamiento norteamericano, seguido por la caída bursátil, particularmente en Asia y en los EE.UU. (de -50% a -20% en un año) y el estallido de las burbujas inmobiliarias mundiales. Un paquete que provocaría recesión en Europa y una "muy Grande Depresión" en los EEUU.

    De cualquier manera, y a la luz de los datos económicos, un escenario de huelgas y conflictos sociales en el Imperio USA no está sacado de una novela de Julio Verne sino (además de la crisis global) de una proyección lógica y emergente de la desocupación desatada por la recesión industrial y empresarial estadounidense, para la cual ni la administración saliente de Bush ni la administración de Obama han conseguido soluciones concretas.




    Majority Oppose Both Wars


    Growing Pessimism About Iraq Pullout Timetable

    Jason Ditz

    A new AP-GfK poll released today shows a majority of Americans opposed to the wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The numbers also reveal growing concern that the president will be able to meet his goals, particularly in Iraq.

    The Iraq War was opposed 63-34, while the slightly more popular Afghan War was opposed 53-44. Both numbers split strongly along party lines, with roughly two thirds of Republican supporting each war. Only 10 percent of Democrats support the Iraq War while only 26 support the Afghan War, which has been the foreign policy centerpiece for the Obama Administration.

    Other polls have showed growing opposition among allies for their own nations’ contribution to the Afghan War, and it seems that as the war has become a more prominent part of American foreign policy with the Obama Administration’s escalations that opposition is rubbing off on Americans as well.

    The governments of some of those nations, Britain and Germany in particular, have been rock solid in their commitment to continue the war despite popular opposition, and likewise Vice President Joe Biden has insisted that the rising death toll in Afghanistan is “worth” it. The Netherlands however is planning to end itscommitment by the end of next year, and other nations are considering non-combat roles as a way to quiet domestic opposition to the war. Germany’s Defense Ministry has sought to stem anti-war sentiment by arguing that its not a war at all.

    Though the Obama Administration only yesterday insisted that the Iraq pullout remains “on schedule,” which the current plan having the majority of troops out by August 2010 and all troops out by the end of 2011, the snail’s pace of the pullout so faralso appears to be sewing pessimism about the plan’s chances, with the number who believe the President will have even “most” troops out of Iraq in the next four years dropping to only 68 percent, down from 83 percent before his inauguration.

    23.7.09



    ILLUSTRATION: BRUCE ERIC KAPLAN
    DEPT. OF FINANCE: Cocksure, by Malcolm Gladwell
    The roots of the financial crisis were not structural or cognitive so much as they were psychological…

    PIONEERS

    Twelve Women Who Changed the Way We Look at Sex
    From Margaret Sanger and Dr. Ruth to Monica Lewinsky andMadonna, these women—some courageous, some just clumsy—have helped America overcome its reputation as the Land of the Repressed.

    The Masters of Perfidy

    AIG and the System

    The first clue that something was terribly amiss with the insurance giant AIG should have been made manifest when the conglomerate began offering products--and financial products at that. What exactly does an insurance company produce? The short and nasty answer is that AIG manufactured precisely what it was meant to guard against. Namely, risk. Extreme risk.

    Ultimately, AIG was cashiered on several trillion dollars of risky financial products, sewn together by Ivy League math whizzes and aces in the arcane art of arbitrage. These were fanciful consolidations of debt that no sane insurer would ever have indemnified. When the company crashed in the dismal autumn of 2008, it turned sheepishly to the insurer of last resort for rescue: the U.S. government. The disgraced executives made the case that the rot in AIG was spreading and was threatening to go systemic. Too big to fail became the mantra of the bailout. AIG, perhaps the most recklessly managed company in the world, was so thoroughly enmeshed in nearly every sector of the American—and even global—economy that to let it sunder would be to risk the crash of the nation. Or so they said.

    Both the Bush and the Obama teams—themselves thoroughly marinated in the AIG mindset—quickly capitulated to financial extortion and infused the company with more than $182 billion in taxpayer cash—a sum that continues to rise each month with the inexorability of a lava dome inside an active volcano. Thus did the Obama administration in one of its first official acts endorse the remorseless logic of throwing good billions after bad.

    The Treasury Department and AIG’s management were so harmonious that Timothy Geithner allowed AIG’s executives to continue to run the company even after the bailout. The top brass at AIG had successfully duped Geithner and his political puppet master Larry Summers into buying the far-fetched idea that the collapse of AIG had been perpetrated by a handful of rogue traders operating out of satellite offices in distant London and suburban Wilton, Connecticut.

    Indeed, Geithner and Summers were so sympathetic to the plight of these corporate titans that they sanctioned more than $450 million in executive bonuses to managers at AIG, including the disgraced Financial Products Division.

    Of course, AIG had, among other giants of Wall Street, insured Goldman Sachs, which had made its own dementedly bad investments in subprime loans to the tune of tens of billions of dollars. And there was no way in hell that Geithner, Summers or Hank Paulson was going to let Goldman Sachs eat those loans. And that bit of political sleight-of-hand seems to have paid off handsomely for Goldman Sachs, which just posted record quarterly profits of $700 million only a brief nine months after it seemed like the investment house was on the verge of an ignominious collapse. In other words, the $54 billion in direct payments the feds had lavished on Goldman, Merrill-Lynch and the other Wall Street firms was just the icing on a very rich cake.

    In a sense, it’s only fitting that the government ended up as the ultimate guarantor for those furious seasons of Wall Street greed. After all, by consciously dismantling the regulatory framework that tended to constrain the felonious instincts that come naturally to the Wall Street player (such as the Glass-Steagall Act), the government played a decisive role in fostering the rampant financial criminality and looting that reached its apogee in 2008, crashing the global economy, draining retirement funds and pension accounts and casting millions from their homes and millions more into the perdition of long-term unemployment. All of this coming down in an era of extreme government austerity, typified by over-burdened and underfunded social welfare programs. As with the defunct regulations to restrain corporate crimes, so too had the economic safety net been sheared away--its tethers sliced by Reagan, the Bushes and Clinton—long before the economy cratered. Now there is nothing to cushion the blow on the long fall to the bottom.

    The architects of this economic deregulation achieved a truly fearful bi-partisan symmetry that persists to this day. Even now, amid the rubble of Wall Street’s collapse, the neo-liberals and neo-conservatives remain as uniform as conjoined twins in their devotion to a broadly deregulated market. Any talk of bringing back forceful correctives such as a new and improved Glass-Steagall Act was immediately squelched by Obama, flanked by John McCain and Mitch McConnell, as well. If the crash of AIG—the largest in history—was in the sclerotic parlance of the times a “teachable moment” it is apparent that while much was ventured, nothing was learned.

    The problem is that the government bailout, which some accounts now estimate will eventually top $24-cap T-for Trillion—flowed almost entirely in the wrong direction. Instead of helping to mend the lives of Wall Street’s victims—the unemployed, the uninsured, the destitute and homeless—Bush and Obama rewarded the perpetrators. They even gave them bonuses.

    * * *

    As the financial writer Michael Lewis explains in a fascinating article on the AIG FP division in Vanity Fair, the financial products offered by AIG were little more than complex iterations of the bizarre financial instruments designed in the 1980s by Drexel, Burnam, Lambert—the company that brought us the junk bond and other improvised explosive devices of high finance.

    The young turks at AIG FP, led by Joseph Cassano, improved on the Drexel, Burnham model—or at least mutated it for their own purposes. The game was all about swallowing risk—hiding it, hedging it and repackaging it as, yes, a financial product and not a liability. In other words, something to swap, buy, sell and make money on. Lots and lots of money.

    And it worked—for a while. Soon Cassano’s division was piling up $300 million a year in profits and making the platoon of financial tricksters themselves hugely wealthy. Bonuses of more than $25 million a year were commonplace. The executives were making a killing in looting their own hedge funds by skimming 35 per cent of the profits, a self-asserted gratuity that would shame even the most rapacious personal injury lawyer.

    All through the high-flying 90s, the AIG risk-swallowing business continued to defy gravity, posting amazing profits on ever more opaque financial confabulations. Then in 2002 came the first whiff of rot. AIG insiders told Michael Lewis that the decomposition began to gnaw away at the FP Division the very moment Cassano replaced his mentor Tom Savage as CEO of the subsidiary. Of course, this retrospective was almost certainly motivated in large measure by post-fall ass-covering. But there’s no question that Cassano was an abrasive personality and not, like many of the traders, an Ivy Leaguer with a DNA profile shaped by generations of old money.

    Like AIG’s former CEO, Hank Greenberg, who had been chased out of the company by Eliot Spitzer, Cassano was viewed by his rivals and subordinates as a reckless bully, who ruled the company through the humiliation of nearly everyone he encountered from secretaries to junior executives. Cassano’s father was a police office and the son brought the brute mentality and creepy paranoia of the street cop into the executive suites and the trading room floor. He ruled the London office by fear and did not countenance any contrarian opinions, even as the trading instruments passing before the insurers became more fantastical and the economic perils ever more extreme.

    Lewis’ AIG confidents blame the terminal descent of their company on Cassano’s over-weening arrogance and his rather crude understanding of the very products his FP Division was manufacturing.

    In other words, Cassano simply didn’t have the head for the complex math at play in those deep derivatives. He didn’t see the pitfalls, trapdoors and inevitable apocalypse at the end of the road. And his team of math geniuses—many with minds minted by MIT and Harvard—went along for the ride, swallowing his torrents of abuse, glossing over the hollow core of the hedge funds. Why? Because, naturally, they were making too much money to object and Cassano, despite his tyrannical fits, was dishing out eight-figure bonuses for Christmas. Indeed, many of the top AIG traders did worse than merely endure Cassano’s abuse—bother personal and organizational. They coddled his worst financial impulses and sucked up to him. In other words, they did their damnedest to suppress their consciousness of guilt.

    In the aftermath of the wreckage, Cassano’s supervisors back at AIG HQ in Manhattan have worked sedulously to create the impression that they scarcely knew the man running their hottest division. From Hank Greenberg to Edward Libby, the top brass has sought to portray Cassano and his team as an out-of-control unit that had somehow fled the reservation.

    This won’t wash. Not for those in the know, any way. The man who was running AIG’s darkest appendage had been installed as boss of the division by Greenberg himself, who saw in Cassano a man who shared his own despotic management style in playing billion-dollar shell games with other people’s money. When Eliot Spitzer brought down Greenberg in 2005 for the executive’s accounting high-jinks, some inside AIG thought that Cassano might eventually end up taking his place. Others in the company believed that he should’ve been slapped in leg irons. Opinions on Cassano four years ago were divided, but there was no shortage of them. Now Cassano is suddenly the man no one knew about.

    According to his colleagues in London, Cassano was ascetic in his total commitment to the company he was steadily destroying. So devoted, in fact, that Cassano recycled most of his $38.5 million salary right back into AIG and its toxic products. The remainder of his AIG trove—estimated at some $238 million—he cached in that most timid of financial parking lots, the U.S. Treasury Bill. Say this for Cassano, he was no preening financial playboy. He dressed casually, drove a modest car and lived to work—and terrorize his staff. “Without AIG FP, he had nothing,” one trader told Lewis.

    * * *

    With Greenberg and Savage by his side, Joseph Cassano turned AIG FP into a kind of recycling station for toxic financial properties held by corporations, equity firms, banks and institutional hybrids, those freaks and sports of the post-Glass-Steagall era. Cassano opened the gates of AIG FP to them, one and all, eventually absorbing $450 billion in corporate credit-default swaps and another $75 billion in the fatal subprime mortgages. He became Wall Street’s one-stop waste manager, insuring and amalgamating bad debts of every stripe, from credit cards to student loans, corporate buyouts to commercial mortgages, transmuting this junk into big new packages with a glossy veneer that masked the entropic nature of the whole enterprise.

    After the attacks of 9/11 and subsequent nosedive of the global economy, AIG’s business began to pick up, as troubled executives desperately scrambled for someplace to dump their risky debts. Cassano and Co. were happy to provide the landfill services, charging a very healthy tipping fee.

    But gradually, almost imperceptibly, the weight of the debt-load began to shift, tilting away from traditional corporate investments and decisively toward the necrotic subprime mortgages. By 2005, AIG FP’s consumer loan insurance portfolio consisted of 95 per cent subprime mortgages. The seeds of destruction had been sown. When housing prices began to plummet, AIG was doomed.

    But is Cassano the arch villain of this particular chapter in the annals of American capitalism or was he, in the end, Wall Street’s willing dupe?

    To reach a plausible assessment it’s vital to remember that AIG was digesting what the big Wall Street houses fed it. Often these packages were artful mixes of consumer and corporate debt. So artful, in fact, that AIG’s brain trust wasn’t entirely clear what they were bonding. The risks were blended, sliced and pressurized into indecipherable collages of debt, like mutual funds from Mars. One top analyst thought that AIG’s credit-default packages consisted of no more than 10 per cent subprime loans. Another put the figure at 20 per cent tops. Cassano, it appears, had no clue about the real number and didn’t care. In his mind, there was simply no way the housing market would go bust—not across the board, any way. And his Wall Street clients at Goldman, Sachs and Merrill-Lynch backed him up in this delusion. After all, what did they have to lose?

    In 2007, Cassano, as blissfully ignorant of the peril immediately before him as Wile E. Coyote ten feet off the cliff, boasted in a talk to a seraglio of investors that it was hard for him to even imagine a scenario “that would see us losing one dollar on any of these transactions.”

    Less than six months later, it was all over. Cassano had been evicted from AIG (though he continued to get paid $1 million a month as a consultant without portfolio) and Goldman, Sachs was knocking at the door of the company demanding that AIG compensate the investment firm for its own landslide of bad debts. AIG was in no position to pay up, naturally, but Goldman, Sach’s man at Treasury, its former CEO Hank Paulson, did—dollar for dollar.

    In for a dollar, in for a trillion.

    It has been said by Wall Street apologists that the crash of AIG was an aberration, a singularity of greed run amok. No one could have predicted the fall, they say. Wall Street analysts were beguiled by the blizzard of prospectuses and portfolios on AIG operations that were, they claimed, as immune from explication as the most arcane passages in Finnegans Wake. So too with the business press, which was apparently so mesmerized by these chimerical reports that they completely missed the financial fun-and-games transpiring inside AIG FP.

    The regulators at the SEC have also connived to claim ignorance about the true condition of AIG and it’s more malign operations as it veered toward the cliff of no return, fooled, they claimed, by the company’s diction of deceit. Somehow missing the daily bulletins of impending ruin, the regulators have tried to offload all the blame on Cassano and his traders for perverting the system.

    This is all nonsense. AIG operated at the very heart of the system, a system enabled by the SEC and its political overlords. Indeed, AIG served as the system’s great backstop, its failsafe. What happens when the failsafe fails?

    So now the bills from this tableau of financial debauchery have come due. That $182 billion pay-out wasn’t a final call, but merely an opening bid. Tens of trillions may yet follow.

    No, AIG didn’t pervert the system. It was a creature of a perverse system. One that it is literally consuming itself from the inside out. A mighty leveling looms.

    JEFFREY ST. CLAIR

    Climate change threatens more hunger

    Simon Butler


    Zero point eight of a degree of warming may not seem like that much. This is how much average temperatures have risen over the past two centuries as a result of carbon pollution.

    Yet this seemingly small change is already upsetting the delicate balance of the Earth’s ecosystems and throwing once predictable seasons out of whack.

    Closer to the poles, the warming is happening much faster than the world average. Thanks to global warming, locally grown broccoli, carrots, cauliflower, cabbage and even a few strawberries now stock supermarket shelves in ice-covered Greenland.

    It might seem like a good thing for the 57,000 people who live in Greenland. But it’s an example of the changing weather patterns that threaten to wreack havoc on human civilisation.

    Without emergency action to cut emissions and develop sustainable farming, climate change will make some of the world’s richest agricultural areas unproductive.

    Climate change equals more hunger. A failure of the world’s richest polluting nations to act will add millions more to the shockingly high numbers — a billion people — who are malnourished today.

    The currently existing dysfunctional, profits-based food system will be unable to cope with the changes. A new report released by Oxfam on July 6 warned that climate change threatens to make famine, disease and disasters “the new normal”.

    “Hunger will be one of the major impacts of climate change”, the report said. “It may be the defining human tragedy of this century.

    “Millions of people in countries that already have food security problems will have to give up traditional crops and agricultural methods as they experience changes in the seasons that they and their ancestors have depended upon.”

    In February, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) predicted changing weather patterns, water scarcity, the spread of damaging insects and pests to new areas and land degradation would increase in many parts of the world due to climate change.

    It said up to 25% of world food production might be lost by 2050 if no action are taken.

    In parts of the wealthy, industrialised world (excluding Australia) crop yields may actually rise. In the US, for example, agricultural profits may rise in the short-term by as much as 4% a year due to warmer weather.

    Wheat production in other major polluting nations in northern Europe and Canada may also rise — at least in the short-term.

    Meanwhile, the outlook for billions of people in the global South — the people who have contributed least to the climate disaster — is dire. Climate change will change seasons, lower yields and spread hunger among the world’s poorest.

    Maize is a staple crop in sub-Saharan Africa. Oxfam predicts US$2 billion worth of the crop will be lost every year.

    Dr Balgis Osman-Elasha, from the Higher Council for Environment and Natural Resources in Sudan, told the Copenhagen Science Conference in March that “53% of African disasters are climate-related and one-third of African people live in drought-prone areas. By 2020 yields from water-fed agriculture in Africa could be down by 50%.”

    Wheat production in south Asia’s fertile Indo-Gangetic plain could fall by 50% by mid-century. Rice yields in the Philippines could fall by 50%-70% in a decade.

    South African government officials warn of a 50% drop in the region’s cereal production by 2080.

    The UNEP said the disappearance of glaciers in the Himalayas due to climate change would mean no water for irrigation for about half of Asia’s total cereal production by 2050. The region accounts for a quarter of world food production today and provides for almost 2 billion people.

    It was more a publicity stunt than a serious commitment, but the world’s richest governments, including Australia, settled for a target of 2ºC warming at the recent G8 summit. This amounts to more than a doubling of warming from now.

    However, scientists say current pollution levels and government inaction will mean the planet will overshoot the 2°C target by a dangerously wide margin.

    The Oxfam report pointed out that even 2°C is still far too high to prevent “death, suffering, and devastation for millions”.

    The rich countries have an immense ecological debt to repay the global South after centuries of pollution. Ending unfair agricultural subsidies for First World producers and massive aid and investment to develop sustainable farming must be part of this repayment.

    Otherwise, up to 200 million people will become refugees every year due to hunger and land loss by 2050, Oxfam warned.

    The widespread development of sustainable organic agriculture offers a way out of the looming crisis. The UNEP said a recent African study of 114 farms across 24 countries showed a marked increase in yields, while improving soil quality. Most farms doubled food production.

    In some East African farms, the yield shot up by 128%.

    Greenhouse emissions from unsustainable agricultural practices — mostly from big agri-business concerns — are also a big part of the climate change problem. If emissions from livestock, the use and production of synthetic fertilisers and the transport of food for long distances are included, capitalist agriculture is responsible for up to 30% of the total carbon pollution worldwide.

    The dominance of corporate interests in agriculture is the biggest barrier to much needed sustainable changes in food production. Ten corporations control 67% of the world seed market. Ten large firms also control 63% of animal pharmaceuticals and 89% of the agro-chemical supply.

    A shift to organic farming might save many lives, but it would hurt their profits.

    Real food security for the world is possible. But it will require a decisive break from today’s market-based food system — a system that drives hunger and climate change at the same time.

    Sub-Saharan Africa’s Vanishing Peasantries and the Specter of a Global Food Crisis

    Likened to a sudden tsunami, reports of declining staple food availability and the possibility of a world food crisis first appeared in the international press in late 2007.1 Sub-Saharan Africa, with its deepening need for disaster food relief in arid and war-torn areas, was most vulnerable. The economic viability of western donors’ food aid to the continent was increasingly being stretched. As food riots flared in various Asian and Latin American cities, urban food riots also began surfacing in Africa, alongside the perennial threat of rural famine.2

    Paradoxically, the global food price surge occurred at a time when the United States was experiencing a bumper maize harvest and international grain prices had declined over the preceding decade.3 A flurry of debate about the causes of the food crisis followed, including an article in Monthly Review.4

    Largely missing from the press reports and general debate, however, was any acknowledgement of three decades of agrarian change in the South, which had profoundly altered the nature of global agricultural food production. Much of what was headlined as breaking news was, in fact, the logical outcome of already well-established vulnerabilities that analysts and media observers had failed to note.

    The incidence of agrarian upheaval and inadequacy of staple food supplies was most acute in Sub-Saharan Africa. The following discussion probes why the fault lines of a world food crisis have publicly been recognized only recently, and how African smallholder peasant agriculture and the changing character of African staple food demand fits into the wider global picture. Why were signs of escalating global food supply constraints ignored despite international donor agencies’ professed concern with alleviating African rural poverty? To answer these questions, it is useful to revisit the development perspective that prevailed prior to the first global oil crisis in the 1970s.

    Development Discourse Championed African Peasant Farmers

    Rural peasantries were a central axis of international donor policy in the post-independence era. In the new African nation-states, peasant farmers constituted the majority of the population. Their political, economic, and cultural influence was pervasive throughout the continent, with the exception of South Africa.5

    The term “peasantry” is defined here as rural dwellers who occupationally live off the land as farmers and/or pastoralists combining subsistence and commodity production. Socially they group in family units that form the nucleus for organizing production, in addition to consumption, human reproduction, socialization, welfare, and risk-spreading. They form a class externally subordinated to state authorities as well as regional and international markets. They tend to be associated with localized village community life and traditional conformist attitudes.6

    In Sub-Saharan Africa, European colonial annexation in the late nineteenth century molded the multitude of different agrarian, pastoralist, and occasionally even hunter-gatherer groups into peasant producers largely through the imposition of residential hut and poll taxes. This forced rural producers to earn cash for tax payment, generating the foundations for the continent’s agricultural export economy based on the beverage crops of coffee, cocoa, and tea and several food and fiber crops including peanuts, cashew nuts, tobacco, sugar, and cotton.

    Peasant cash crop producers provided the political force behind the national independence movements that swept the African continent in the 1950s and formed the foundation for the economies of the newly independent countries that came into being in the 1960s. During that decade African countries’ economic performance was promising. African and Asian countries were parts of the “third world” destined for eventual achievement of the first world’s higher standards of living.

    Western donor agencies actively supported health, education, and infrastructure programs deliberately targeted at rural rather than urban areas. A severe famine in the Sahel in the early 1970s underscored the importance of food security as a prerequisite for development. Hence UN agencies and bilateral donors prioritized the modernization of peasant agriculture. The success of Green Revolution investments in raising rice and wheat yields in South Asia during the 1960s led African governments and donors to put a great deal of effort into developing staple food improvement packages, especially for maize. Beginning in the 1970s, peasant farmers in many African countries participated in subsidized fertilizer and seed programs and began to experience increasing yields.7

    The Aftermath of the Oil Crisis

    The improving staple food yields, however, were short-lived. In the mid-1970s, the economic shock of the oil crises undermined African peasants’ prospects and their national economies. Most African governments had established state enterprises to market the widely fluctuating stocks of commercial staple food crops produced by peasants. Peasant farmers in many countries had received fixed returns regardless of their distance from urban centers of staple food demand. This, in addition to peasant farmers’ subsidized crop input packages, had created incentives for peasant grain production. But at the time of the oil crisis, as the cost of surface transport escalated, state finances became severely stretched. This marked a turning point in the tripartite relationship between peasant producers, state infrastructure providers, and the global market.

    Peasant households were scattered throughout the length and breadth of an immense continent. Rising oil prices quickly undermined the competitiveness of their agricultural exports, which had to be transported exceptionally long distances to ports. Many African governments found it cheaper to rely on foreign imports of maize, rice, and wheat to feed the cities.8

    Meanwhile, African governments became heavily indebted. By the end of the 1970s most were forced to seek debt financing from the IMF. In doing so, the World Bank and IMF gained leverage and eventually the lead in African policy formulation, a lead that African governments, in the main, have failed to regain. In the context of emerging neoliberal ideology, connected with the rise of Reagan and Thatcher on the world stage, the World Bank diagnosed that the continent’s decline was due to the over-involvement of African states in their economies. Structural adjustment programs (SAPs) had the two-pronged agenda of reducing the role of the state in the economy and cutting back on state-provisioned infrastructure and services.

    SAPs spelled the end of attempts to raise peasants’ staple food yields. Fertilizer and seed subsidy packages were retracted. FAO statistics in chart 1 show an upward trend in grain output on a par with South Asia, which then leveled off in the 1980s — while South Asian yields continued to increase — as subsidized crop input programs collapsed and yields on unfertilized soils declined.9 Peasant farmers, having seen the difference that fertilizer application could make, deeply resented this setback, blaming the state for the removal of subsidies. Subsidies and support for export crops were similarly affected. Economic liberalization policies enforced by international financial institutions led to the dismantling of the market and productive service infrastructure that had ensured timely marketing and crop quality control for Africa’s major cash crop exports since the colonial period.10 African peasant farmers’ output of export crops eroded significantly.

    Chart 1. African cereal yields in comparison with other regions

    Chart 1: African cereal yields compared to other regions

    Source: FAO statistics cited in WDI indicators, 2009,http://publications.worldbank.org/WDI.

    Double Standards in World Agriculture

    The 1980s are considered to be Africa’s lost decade. Cutbacks in rural health, education, and especially agricultural support programs produced a widespread malaise. Western donors seemed oblivious to SAP policies’ impact on peasant producers. In effect, structural adjustment short-circuited the African agricultural efforts that the donors had previously initiated in collaboration with African governments. Aid disbursement to agriculture declined precipitously in the 1990s.11

    A long-term decline in the terms of trade for agricultural exports accompanied the decline in agricultural investment. In OECD countries, the falling prices were offset by extremely high levels of agricultural subsidy to farmers advantaging them relative to developing country farmers.12 Most recently, the growth and concentration of private agro-industrial enterprises has impacted commodities, rural labor, and, increasingly, land markets. The use of biotechnology, global value chains, supermarket trade channels, and just-in-time production have spread.13 In the face of these tendencies, African peasants’ more remote locations and smaller scale of production made it more difficult for them to meet market specifications for increased regularity of sales and product standardization.14

    These trends have widened the productivity gap between smallholder and large-scale production.15 Large-scale farmers not only have more land, but far more capital investment, which serves to raise land and labor productivity. There are extreme differences between Sub-Saharan Africa where agricultural value added per worker16 averages $335 in income as opposed to $39,000 for farmers in the United States.17

    The highly capitalized, fossil-fuel reliant nature of North American and European farmers enables them to out-compete Asian and African farmers in the global market for most commercial export crops.18 Displacement of African and Asian farmers in commodity markets is inevitable in the absence of increased capital investment in their agriculture. As the history of North America, Europe, and Japan demonstrates, there may be nothing inherently problematic about such displacement if the producers are both willing and able to find viable alternative livelihoods. But given the massive numbers of potential “economically displaced people” and the unknown consequences of such a historically unprecedented global tidal wave, the belief that world commodity markets will eventually optimize production and welfare for the world’s poor has to be treated with skepticism.

    The gap in value added between African and Asian farmers and those in the United States and Europe is not simply a difference in economic capability and output. Rural ways of life, which have evolved over the millennia in Africa, have been finely tuned to the local environment, social consensus, and political balance. The undermining of the local economies of rural communities due to sudden market shocks or gradually worsening terms of trade, market disincentives, and obstacles has already and will continue to undermine personal welfare, leading to social upheavals and political destabilization.

    Peasant Households Respond

    Over the last thirty years, Sub-Saharan Africa has experienced a process of deagrarianization entailing a reduction of labor directed toward agricultural production within peasant households.19 Male household heads’ decision-making power has waned, giving women and youth within rural households more scope for economic autonomy. Local social norms are breaking down and inter-household economic differentiation is generating winners and losers, corroding the egalitarian legacy of tribal and other closely related communities.20 Deagrarianization in rural Africa has triggered “depeasantization” as peasant households and communities have lost their coherence as social and economic units.21

    There has been a surge in a variety of non-agricultural activities, notably trade and mining, in place of export crop production. Activities formerly done on a local exchange basis or as a contribution to village life are increasingly performed for cash. Payment for various categories of family labor has become more common. Wives, as well as youth and even in some cases children, may join male heads of household in working for cash. Households have gained multiple income streams, which are not always pooled within the household.

    Work experimentation is widely prevalent. Engagement in non-agricultural activities is no longer reserved for the agricultural off-season. Individuals may pursue two or more livelihoods simultaneously or serially switch from one activity to another in a process of experimentation, trying to offset losses in one area with gains in another. In many rural areas local purchasing power has imposed severe constraints such that people, especially youth, are motivated to be more mobile or migrate in order to facilitate their trading or other occupational activities.

    The upsurge of trading activities and the role of youth and women in trade has overturned age-old patterns of the agrarian economy and the traditional transfer of farming skills from one generation to the next. In many parts of Africa, non-African ethnic minorities — Asians in East Africa and Lebanese in West Africa — have historically played a significant role in rural produce marketing. After independence, non-African traders tended to be displaced by the establishment of state marketing agencies. As these agencies were dismantled under SAPs, African traders gained a greater scope for their operations although they were severely hampered by lack of capital for investment. As a result, most African rural traders have been restricted to easy-entry, overly competitive petty trade with extremely slim margins.

    Sometimes, the most lucrative alternative to farming is mining. Employment in large-scale gold mining in Southern Africa has declined in importance, but the distress of continent-wide economic recession during the 1980s prompted many farmers in mineral-rich areas to start prospecting for gold, diamonds, and other precious and semi-precious stones in and around their villages despite government bans on mineral excavation. Small-scale miners proliferated in already well-established mining countries like Ghana and Zimbabwe, in countries without a strong historical legacy of mining such as Tanzania, and in countries where war-torn circumstances propelled growing numbers into lucrative mining as exemplified by Angola, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

    Rural dwellers’ efforts to find alternatives to low-yielding commercial agriculture generally do not represent an abandonment of agricultural production. Rural households retain their foothold in agricultural production to provision their subsistence food needs.22 The reality is that alternative non-agricultural livelihoods are usually experimental, with the risk of low or even no returns. Reliance on subsistence agricultural output is the vital insurance that rural households need to undertake their risky economic ventures into the unknown.

    Feeding Africa’s Expanding Cities

    While rural households try to achieve a balanced portfolio of productive activities, with subsistence food production as insurance against failure, no such balancing efforts are taking place at the national level. African countries’ domestic staple food markets are getting increasingly less able to meet the rising food demand emanating from their rapidly expanding cities. Over the last three decades, Sub-Saharan Africa experienced an exceptionally strong urbanizing trend, which, contrary to economic models, was not associated with economic growth or industrialization.23 Urban migration is propelled by the push from a declining rural peasant sector rather than from the pull of rising urban productivity. Most of Africa’s urban economic activity is taking place in the informal sector, where livelihood experimentation with low and uncertain earnings, as described above for rural areas, is the norm.

    Not surprisingly, in view of the declining staple food yields of the continent, African urbanization has gone hand-in-hand with increasing food imports.24 Wheat, which is not a traditional African grain crop, is overwhelmingly consumed in urban settings. Its rising import trend mirrors the growth of African urban populations. Maize was not a traditional African staple food, but is now grown widely and has become a very important component of both rural and urban populations’ food consumption, particularly in East and Southern Africa. While its overall import trend is upward, it is subject to variation depending on domestic harvests.

    Chart 2. Grain imports to Africa, 1970–2006

    Chart 2: Grain imports to Africa 1970-2006

    Source: FAO trade statistics, 2009, http://faostat.fao.org.

    Chart 3. Wheat imports, 1970–2006